SAFE_ROUTES has 19 entries (backends.js), not 18. reference.md and
reference.zh-CN.md both said '18 entries'; both now say 19.
reference §4 said the /api/enabled and /api/admin/session calls are
'admin-session Bearer-auth'd'. The code says otherwise: config_authorized
(notify.rs:423) accepts the shared worker token OR a valid admin session,
and create_admin_session (notify.rs:1187) is gated by worker_authorized
against the admin credential CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY — it is what mints the
session, so it cannot be session-auth'd. Both languages now state the two
distinct credentials and why adding /api/enabled opens no new credential
path.
deployment §10.8 said every request-bearing entry point, listing /healthz
and /api/*, calls refresh_business_config. The actual 10 call sites cover
8 distinct paths (/ready, /worker, /reconcile, /push/jmap, /webhook/tg,
/api/config, /api/business-config, /api/telegram/register-webhook). GET
/healthz is a static 200 "ok" and never refreshes; /api/status,
/api/enabled, /api/push/register, /api/push/disable and the
/api/admin/session pair do not either. Both languages now list the real
set and name the exclusions.
design.md §5.7 listed the search trigger prefixes as English
'search'/'find'/'retrieval'; worker.rs:689 accepts the Chinese prefixes
搜索/查找/检索 and the help text states English aliases are not supported.
The two user-facing strings were also mistranslated: the empty-query
guidance prompt is 请提供搜索关键词，例如：/search 发票 (worker.rs:623)
and the no-match reply is 没有找到匹配「<query>」的邮件。
(worker.rs:792). The degraded-rendering marker is likewise a Chinese
string. SEARCH_SUBJECT_MAX=120 / SEARCH_PREVIEW_MAX=160 /
SEARCH_LIMIT=10 verified unchanged.
design.md §5.6/§5.7 were machine-translated from Chinese back into
English and were broken: 'the first 300 if it fails. characters', a
stray closing ** mid-sentence, '(none) deny_unknown_fields)' with a
mismatched paren, and 5 zero-width-space artefacts. charter.md:168 had a
broken '**Tables, lists, or values may not be copied across documents. **'
and opengaps.md had 4. All ZWSPs removed from docs/.
deployment.zh-CN.md §10.5/§10.6 were thin mistranslations: 'Worker 域'
for 'Worker URL', the debug-token requirement dropped entirely, and a
mangled '两者都使用用于验证部署的可用和版本'. Rewritten against the EN.
Also replaced a worker.rs:227 line anchor with the MetadataWorker doc
comment; that drops the repo's line-refs from 72 to 71, so new text no
longer adds to the drift surface.
No code changes; GATE-DOCS 6/6 (71 anchors, 455 section refs, 727 path
refs).
> Deployment form = **General HTTPS-only Docker, no long connection** (deployment.md `C-NO-LONG-CONN`/`C-HTTPS-INBOUND`):
> Deployment form = **General HTTPS-only Docker, no long connection** (deployment.md `C-NO-LONG-CONN`/`C-HTTPS-INBOUND`):
> Telegram is Webhook only; JMAP real-time is Push callback only; slow tasks are asynchronously stepped into Redis Streams; reconciliation is triggered by **External HTTPS Cron**.
> Telegram is Webhook only; JMAP real-time is Push callback only; slow tasks are asynchronously stepped into Redis Streams; reconciliation is triggered by **External HTTPS Cron**.
@ -216,47 +216,47 @@ Candidate comparison (`teloxide` / `grammers` / old `telegram-bot`), 6 reasons w
- **Status quo**: The first (and currently only) channel is Telegram. The goal is to retain the ability to expand DingTalk/Feishu in parallel, but not to achieve it ahead of time.
- **Status quo**: The first (and currently only) channel is Telegram. The goal is to retain the ability to expand DingTalk/Feishu in parallel, but not to achieve it ahead of time.
- **Principle**: Decoupling the domain layer and channel layer - Mail/JMAP/AI/intention state machine ** must not rely on Telegram type**.
- **Principle**: Decoupling the domain layer and channel layer - Mail/JMAP/AI/intention state machine ** must not rely on Telegram type**.
- **Abstract (not over-engineered)**: No empty traits are reserved. `src/channel.rs` had three zero implementations
- **Abstract (not over-engineered)**: No empty traits are reserved. `src/channel.rs` had three zero implementations
"Stable ID + Phase 0 placeholder"), **Deleted** (see `docs/retired.md` for registration) - Actual Telegram outbound
"Stable ID + Phase 0 placeholder"), **Deleted** (see `docs/retired.md` for registration) - Actual Telegram outbound
`channel::telegram::TelegramClient::send_text` (self-developed by `reqwest`), by `worker.rs`
`channel::telegram::TelegramClient::send_text` (self-developed by `reqwest`), by `worker.rs`
`MetadataWorker` and `notify.rs` are held directly and are never passed through these three traits. The command is parsed in
`MetadataWorker` and `notify.rs` are held directly and are never passed through these three traits. The command is parsed in
`parse_intent` (`src/worker.rs`), rendering logic is scattered in `src/worker.rs` / `src/notify.rs`.
`parse_intent` (`src/worker.rs`), rendering logic is scattered in `src/worker.rs` / `src/notify.rs`.
What is passed between the domain and the channel is the domain `Notification` (`src/domain.rs`), and the channel only adapts at the edge.
What is passed between the domain and the channel is the domain `Notification` (`src/domain.rs`), and the channel only adapts at the edge.
- **Constraints**:
- **Constraints**:
- The public interface of `jmap` / `llm` / intent state machine / `notify::core` only accepts/returns domain types;
- The public interface of `jmap` / `llm` / intent state machine / `notify::core` only accepts/returns domain types;
- Specific channel SDK types must not appear in the domain layer (the channel layer does not currently introduce third-party Bot frameworks, see §4);
- Specific channel SDK types must not appear in the domain layer (the channel layer does not currently introduce third-party Bot frameworks, see §4);
- Add new channel = new adapter + assembly, do not change the domain layer. When abstraction is really needed, add it with the implementation and leave no empty traits.
- Add new channel = new adapter + assembly, do not change the domain layer. When abstraction is really needed, add it with the implementation and leave no empty traits.
- **What not to do**: Do not define a polymorphic configuration registry, do not abstract the "channel capability matrix" in advance, do not build a plugins mechanism; evolve on demand (YAGNI).
- **What not to do**: Do not define a polymorphic configuration registry, do not abstract the "channel capability matrix" in advance, do not build a plugins mechanism; evolve on demand (YAGNI).
### 5.3 Running model (short request, no long connection)
### 5.3 Running model (short request, no long connection)
- Single binary `message-weave`, `#[tokio::main]`.
- Single binary `message-weave`, `#[tokio::main]`.
- On startup:
- On startup:
1. Load configuration (`config::Config`).
1. Load configuration (`config::Config`).
2. Construct `JmapService` (`Client::connect` completes session parsing, account_id caching, mailbox role→id mapping warm-up); sinceState is restored from external Redis (`MOD-SINCESTATE`).
2. Construct `JmapService` (`Client::connect` completes session parsing, account_id caching, mailbox role→id mapping warm-up); sinceState is restored from external Redis (`MOD-SINCESTATE`).
3. Start the **HTTP portal** (axum, single port `PORT`): `/webhook/tg`, `/push/jmap`, `/reconcile`, `/healthz`, `/ready`; three of the write paths first pass the `SAF-AUTH-*` portal authentication (fail-closed, §7.3), `/healthz`, `/ready` For the public probe (`SAF-PROBE-PUBLIC`); `/ready` has done end-to-end detection (configuration + Redis + outbound read-only detection JMAP session `GET` and TG `getMe`, each 3s, parallel, about 3s at worst).
3. Start the **HTTP portal** (axum, single port `PORT`): `/webhook/tg`, `/push/jmap`, `/reconcile`, `/healthz`, `/ready`; three of the write paths first pass the `SAF-AUTH-*` portal authentication (fail-closed, §7.3), `/healthz`, `/ready` For the public probe (`SAF-PROBE-PUBLIC`); `/ready` has done end-to-end detection (configuration + Redis + outbound read-only detection JMAP session `GET` and TG `getMe`, each 3s, parallel, about 3s at worst).
5. **Does not hold any long connections and does not build self-timers** (`C-NO-LONG-CONN`); reconciliation is triggered by **external HTTPS Cron**`/reconcile` (`FLOW-RECONCILE`).
5. **Does not hold any long connections and does not build self-timers** (`C-NO-LONG-CONN`); reconciliation is triggered by **external HTTPS Cron**`/reconcile` (`FLOW-RECONCILE`).
- Notification sending and command processing share `Arc<JmapService>`, and internal `tokio::sync::RwLock` protects the variable cache; cross-request status always falls to external Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`).
- Notification sending and command processing share `Arc<JmapService>`, and internal `tokio::sync::RwLock` protects the variable cache; cross-request status always falls to external Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`).
- **Multiple instances and load balancing (deployment form, `ARCH-LB-WORKER`)**: Since the state is all external Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`) and the delivery is idempotent (`MOD-DEDUP`), **the same image can be instantiated across multiple serverless platforms**, free Cloudflare Worker is used as the only entrance and failover (`C-LB-SINGLE-REG-URL`); `/reconcile` Use Redis to lock a single instance (`SAF-RECONCILE-LOCK`), and Streams to automatically amortize using the same consumer group (`MOD-STREAMS-GROUP`). See deployment.md §10 for details. **Field/channel logic does not need to be changed. **
- **Multiple instances and load balancing (deployment form, `ARCH-LB-WORKER`)**: Since the state is all external Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`) and the delivery is idempotent (`MOD-DEDUP`), **the same image can be instantiated across multiple serverless platforms**, free Cloudflare Worker is used as the only entrance and failover (`C-LB-SINGLE-REG-URL`); `/reconcile` Use Redis to lock a single instance (`SAF-RECONCILE-LOCK`), and Streams to automatically amortize using the same consumer group (`MOD-STREAMS-GROUP`). See deployment.md §10 for details. **Field/channel logic does not need to be changed. **
- **Production uses no database** (`C-NO-DB`): No SQLite/Postgres/MySQL/embedded database; Redis is the only production state store.
- **Production uses no database** (`C-NO-DB`): No SQLite/Postgres/MySQL/embedded database; Redis is the only production state store.
- **Disable local file/directory writing** (`C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE`): no log files, no data files, no temporary cache, no local volumes mounted.
- **Disable local file/directory writing** (`C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE`): no log files, no data files, no temporary cache, no local volumes mounted.
- **Log only writes to stdout/stderr** (`C-LOG-STDOUT-ONLY`): The container/platform is responsible for collecting and placing disk; disable the file log backend.
- **Log only writes to stdout/stderr** (`C-LOG-STDOUT-ONLY`): The container/platform is responsible for collecting and placing disk; disable the file log backend.
- **Log and Redis write content constraints** (`SAF-LOG-PURITY`): Only structured events, counts, timestamps, desensitized summaries; **Prohibited** key original text, JMAP email body, AI request/response, attachment content.
- **Log and Redis write content constraints** (`SAF-LOG-PURITY`): Only structured events, counts, timestamps, desensitized summaries; **Prohibited** key original text, JMAP email body, AI request/response, attachment content.
- **It is prohibited to rely on in-process status for production recovery** (`C-NO-STATEFUL-RECOVERY`): Restart and continuation (deduplication, sinceState, Streams breakpoints, circuit breaker counts, sessions) are all implemented by external Redis + JMAP reconciliation; the in-process cache is only for performance optimization, and the loss must be safe and reentrant.
- **It is prohibited to rely on in-process status for production recovery** (`C-NO-STATEFUL-RECOVERY`): Restart and continuation (deduplication, sinceState, Streams breakpoints, circuit breaker counts, sessions) are all implemented by external Redis + JMAP reconciliation; the in-process cache is only for performance optimization, and the loss must be safe and reentrant.
- Graceful exit: signal + `CancellationToken`, flush Redis Streams pending entries before exiting (**Do not write local files**, `C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE`).
- Graceful exit: signal + `CancellationToken`, flush Redis Streams pending entries before exiting (**Do not write local files**, `C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE`).
- **Current status**: Configuration guidance, HTTP entry and write entry authentication completed (`R1`/`SAF-AUTH-*`, fail-closed); JMAP session, Email/changes, PushSubscription create/update, Redis Streams worker and `/reconcile` have been connected. `/reconcile` and the Push closed loop still need to complete end-to-end acceptance in the real Stalwart, Redis, and Telegram environments. You cannot claim that the production link has been verified based on local access control alone.
- **Current status**: Configuration guidance, HTTP entry and write entry authentication completed (`R1`/`SAF-AUTH-*`, fail-closed); JMAP session, Email/changes, PushSubscription create/update, Redis Streams worker and `/reconcile` have been connected. `/reconcile` and the Push closed loop still need to complete end-to-end acceptance in the real Stalwart, Redis, and Telegram environments. You cannot claim that the production link has been verified based on local access control alone.
### 5.4 Data flow: new email push (critical path, FLOW-NEW-MAIL)
### 5.4 Data flow: new email push (critical path, FLOW-NEW-MAIL)
```
```
Stalwart JMAP Push → POST /push/jmap (StateChange{Email/EmailDelivery: new_state})
Stalwart JMAP Push → POST /push/jmap (StateChange{Email/EmailDelivery: new_state})
> Key: `Email/changes` lists the new email id in `created` to avoid full `email_query`; `sinceState` is stored in external Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`). When Redis is lost, it will be reconstructed from JMAP by reconciliation, and the **fact source is in JMAP**.
> Key: `Email/changes` lists the new email id in `created` to avoid full `email_query`; `sinceState` is stored in external Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`). When Redis is lost, it will be reconstructed from JMAP by reconciliation, and the **fact source is in JMAP**.
> Notifications only contain sender/subject/time (+number of attachments), the text never appears in the notification (see `docs/charter.md §3` Security Boundary `SAF-NOTIFY-META`).
> Notifications only contain sender/subject/time (+number of attachments), the text never appears in the notification (see `docs/charter.md §3` Security Boundary `SAF-NOTIFY-META`).
There is currently no FSM. The command route is parsed into `Intent` by `parse_intent` in `src/worker.rs`; the AI authorization state is a Boolean expiration time in Redis (see the AI authorization state section of `docs/reference.md` for the key and TTL), not a multi-step confirmation state.
There is currently **no FSM**. `parse_intent` in `src/worker.rs` parses the command line into an `Intent`; the AI consent state is a single boolean plus an expiry in Redis (key and TTL in the AI consent section of `docs/reference.md`), not a multi-step confirmation state.
Invariants that still hold true: AI digests must first be explicitly authorized by the user, and LLM must not be called without authorization. Once the authorization takes effect, the digest will pull the full text of the email body and send it to LLM (`read_email` requests `TextBody` + `BodyValues` and`fetch_text_body_values(true)`, see `src/domain/jmap/client.rs`), but the body will not be sent back to Telegram** - only the summary will be sent outbound, or it will fall back to the first 300 if it fails. characters (`worker.rs:227` Note: body text never reaches Telegram).
The invariant that still holds: an AI summary requires the user's explicit consent first — **without a consent state the LLM is never called**. Once consent is live the summary pulls the full email body and sends it to the LLM (`read_email` requests `TextBody` + `BodyValues`via `fetch_text_body_values(true)`, see `src/domain/jmap/client.rs`), but the body is not sent back to Telegram — outbound sends only the summary, or falls back to the first 300 characters of the body if the LLM call fails (`fallback` in `src/worker.rs`). See also the doc comment on `MetadataWorker`: "body text never reaches Telegram".
The designed 5-state FSM (`Idle` / `AwaitClarify` / `AwaitConfirm` / `Analyzing` / `AwaitFallback`), together with the state transition table and channel neutrality description, can be found in `docs/retired.md`.
The 5-state FSM that was designed (`Idle` / `AwaitClarify` / `AwaitConfirm` / `Analyzing` / `AwaitFallback`), with its state-transition table and channel-neutrality notes, is in `docs/retired.md`.
`/search <keyword>` and the Chinese prefix `search`/`find`/`retrieval` (**only prefix matching**, to avoid "Help me search..." being hijacked into a search) triggers `Intent::Search`, through `JmapService::search_emails(account_id, query, limit)` and `email_query`(`Filter::text`) to get the ID + `SearchSnippet/get` Highlight `subject`/`preview`.
`/search <keyword>`, plus the Chinese prefixes `搜索` / `查找` / `检索` (**prefix match only**, so "help me search…" is not hijacked into a search), route to `Intent::Search`, which goes through `JmapService::search_emails(account_id, query, limit)` with `email_query` (`Filter::text`) for the IDs and `SearchSnippet/get` for highlighted `subject` / `preview`.
Key boundaries:
Key boundaries:
- **Highlight downgrade**: `SearchSnippet/get` does not support (`unknownMethod`) or returns empty snippets instead of an error when it times out; rendering is downgraded to a pure ID list (`highlighted snippets are temporarily unavailable, the following are matching email IDs`), and snippets are not created.
- **Snippet degradation**: `SearchSnippet/get` being unsupported (`unknownMethod`) or timing out with empty snippets instead of an error degrades rendering to a plain ID list (`（高亮片段暂不可用，以下为匹配的邮件 ID）`); no snippets are fabricated.
- **Plain text outbound**: `<mark>`highlighted tags are stripped by `strip_mark_tags` (case-insensitive, unclosed tags are discarded), and then decoded in a single pass by `unescape_html_entities`; tags are stripped first and then entities are decoded to prevent the literal `<mark>` (escaped by the server as `<mark>`) in the mailbox body from being restored to a real tag and accidentally deleted. `subject`/`preview` have 120/160 character truncation upper limit respectively (`truncate_chars`, the same tool as text truncation).
- **Plain text outbound**: `<mark>` tags are stripped by `strip_mark_tags` (case-insensitive, unclosed tags discarded) and then decoded in one pass by `unescape_html_entities`; tags are stripped **before** entities are decoded so that a literal `<mark>` in the mailbox body (escaped by the server as `<mark>`) is not restored to a real tag and then accidentally deleted. `subject` and `preview` are capped at 120 and 160 characters (`truncate_chars`, the same helper as text truncation).
- **Failed mapping**: JMAP side failed → `SearchReply::Retry` → `process_telegram` returns `Err(())` → coordinator 503 + `Retry-After` retry (consistent with `/reconcile`, other JMAP paths), **no panic, no error stack returned to user**.
- **Failed mapping**: JMAP side failed → `SearchReply::Retry` → `process_telegram` returns `Err(())` → coordinator 503 + `Retry-After` retry (consistent with `/reconcile`, other JMAP paths), **no panic, no error stack returned to user**.
- **Empty query**: `/search`(no keywords) → The guidance prompt "Please provide search keywords, for example: /search invoice", no request is sent. No match → `No messages matching "..." were found. `.
- **Empty query**: `/search`with no keywords emits a guidance prompt (`请提供搜索关键词，例如：/search 发票`) and makes no request. No matches returns `没有找到匹配「<query>」的邮件。`.
- **Each hit contains `email_id`**, you can directly access `/summary <email_id>` to enter the AI summary process.
- **Each hit carries `email_id`**, so `/summary <email_id>` jumps straight into the AI summary flow.
- **Body-level highlighting is not possible in locked versions**: jmap-client `0.4.2`’s `SearchSnippet` only models `emailId`/`subject`/`preview`, without `bodyProperties`/`parts`. According to RFC 8621 §5, the body-level `body: String[Id]` is not modeled by this crate and (none) `deny_unknown_fields`) are silently discarded by serde. The text highlighting of each part needs to bypass the crate and be sent directly to the original JMAP, which is not currently implemented.
- **Body-level highlighting is not possible in locked versions**: jmap-client `0.4.2`’s `SearchSnippet` only models `emailId`/`subject`/`preview`, without `bodyProperties`/`parts`. Per RFC 8621 §5 the body-level `body: String[Id]` is not modeled by the crate and, with no `deny_unknown_fields`, is silently dropped by serde. Per-part body highlighting would require bypassing the crate and calling JMAP directly, which is not implemented.
- **No new environment variable**; `/search` will give a friendly error when the configuration is missing.
- **No new environment variable**; when the configuration is missing, `/search` reports a friendly error.
---
---
@ -303,30 +303,30 @@ Key boundaries:
Actual project structure (all code anchors in this document refer to this structure; see `docs/retired.md` for the historical target module splitting plan):
Actual project structure (all code anchors in this document refer to this structure; see `docs/retired.md` for the historical target module splitting plan):
Testing: **No integrated test directory**, and no stand-alone util tool module. All Rust tests are `#[cfg(test)]` unit tests within each module; the only test on the front end is `web/config.test.mjs`.
Testing: **No integrated test directory**, and no stand-alone util tool module. All Rust tests are `#[cfg(test)]` unit tests within each module; the only test on the front end is `web/config.test.mjs`.
@ -407,16 +407,16 @@ Testing: **No integrated test directory**, and no stand-alone util tool module.
### 7.3 Access control
### 7.3 Access control
- **Entry authentication (hard constraints `SAF-AUTH-RECONCILE`/`SAF-AUTH-TG-WEBHOOK`/`SAF-AUTH-JMAP-PUSH`)**: The three write paths must be authenticated first, **fail-closed**——
- **Entry authentication (hard constraints `SAF-AUTH-RECONCILE`/`SAF-AUTH-TG-WEBHOOK`/`SAF-AUTH-JMAP-PUSH`)**: The three write paths must be authenticated first, **fail-closed**——
- `/push/jmap`: Verify Redis short-term status according to `pushSubscriptionId`; StateChange is released only after the first verification is successfully written back by JMAP `PushSubscription/set`.
- `/push/jmap`: Verify Redis short-term status according to `pushSubscriptionId`; StateChange is released only after the first verification is successfully written back by JMAP `PushSubscription/set`.
The comparison uses the **constant time** algorithm (`subtle`, anti-timing side channel); verification failure will always be `401` and **will not produce any side effects/status changes** before the authentication is passed. After the business configuration is completed, the credentials for Webhook, Push, Reconcile and Push registration interfaces must be valid; when the startup boot variable is missing, the configuration boot mode will be entered and authentication will not be bypassed (§7.1).
The comparison uses the **constant time** algorithm (`subtle`, anti-timing side channel); verification failure will always be `401` and **will not produce any side effects/status changes** before the authentication is passed. After the business configuration is completed, the credentials for Webhook, Push, Reconcile and Push registration interfaces must be valid; when the startup boot variable is missing, the configuration boot mode will be entered and authentication will not be bypassed (§7.1).
- **Health probe (`SAF-PROBE-PUBLIC`)**: `/healthz` (`ARCH-HEALTHZ`) and `/ready` are **public probes** - no authentication, only returns health status, **does not contain any sensitive information** (does not echo configuration/key/internal error details).
- **Health probe (`SAF-PROBE-PUBLIC`)**: `/healthz` (`ARCH-HEALTHZ`) and `/ready` are **public probes** - no authentication, only returns health status, **does not contain any sensitive information** (does not echo configuration/key/internal error details).
- `/ready` does end-to-end probing: configuration integrity + Redis reachability + outbound read-only probing (`GET {jmap_origin}/.well-known/jmap`, Basic authentication with configuration; `GET https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/getMe`; each `PROBE_TIMEOUT` = 3000ms, **Parallel** (`tokio::join!`), worst-case scenario 3s); all four pass `200` and readiness report (`{"status":"ready","configured":...,"jmap":...,"telegram":...}`, where `jmap`/`telegram` is the real probe result), any one fails `503` (standard error envelope `{"error":"service_unavailable","request_id":<id>}` + `Retry-After: 30`). The probe is read-only, read-only configuration status, and will not trigger business side effects such as email synchronization, nor will it echo token or third-party response content; `refresh_business_config` only reads Redis, and has no state to write. Therefore `/ready` requires the outbound egress to the JMAP host and `api.telegram.org:443` to be reachable (if the egress requires a proxy, `/ready` is not available, see deployment.md).
- `/ready` does end-to-end probing: configuration integrity + Redis reachability + outbound read-only probing (`GET {jmap_origin}/.well-known/jmap`, Basic authentication with configuration; `GET https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/getMe`; each `PROBE_TIMEOUT` = 3000ms, **Parallel** (`tokio::join!`), worst-case scenario 3s); all four pass `200` and readiness report (`{"status":"ready","configured":...,"jmap":...,"telegram":...}`, where `jmap`/`telegram` is the real probe result), any one fails `503` (standard error envelope `{"error":"service_unavailable","request_id":<id>}` + `Retry-After: 30`). The probe is read-only, read-only configuration status, and will not trigger business side effects such as email synchronization, nor will it echo token or third-party response content; `refresh_business_config` only reads Redis, and has no state to write. Therefore `/ready` requires the outbound egress to the JMAP host and `api.telegram.org:443` to be reachable (if the egress requires a proxy, `/ready` is not available, see deployment.md).
- **chat whitelist (hard constraint `SAF-CHAT-ALLOWLIST`)**: `CHAT_ALLOWLIST` is a **required** configuration; any inbound event (action triggered by TG command/callback) must verify `chat.id ∈ CHAT_ALLOWLIST` before **making any JMAP call, AI call or status change**. If it is not in the whitelist, **directly reject and terminate** (prevent token can be called by anyone after being leaked). Phase 0 has completed the `CHAT_ALLOWLIST` parsing skeleton; the forced rejection logic has been implemented with Telegram channel access (`telegram_webhook` of `src/notify.rs` verifies the whitelist before any JMAP/AI/status operation, and terminates if rejected).
- **chat whitelist (hard constraint `SAF-CHAT-ALLOWLIST`)**: `CHAT_ALLOWLIST` is a **required** configuration; any inbound event (action triggered by TG command/callback) must verify `chat.id ∈ CHAT_ALLOWLIST` before **making any JMAP call, AI call or status change**. If it is not in the whitelist, **directly reject and terminate** (prevent token can be called by anyone after being leaked). Phase 0 has completed the `CHAT_ALLOWLIST` parsing skeleton; the forced rejection logic has been implemented with Telegram channel access (`telegram_webhook` of `src/notify.rs` verifies the whitelist before any JMAP/AI/status operation, and terminates if rejected).
- **Command Minimization**: Only necessary commands are exposed; writing operations such as sending emails must be confirmed twice (sending emails is not currently implemented, see §10.3).
- **Command Minimization**: Only necessary commands are exposed; writing operations such as sending emails must be confirmed twice (sending emails is not currently implemented, see §10.3).
- **Rate**: No local token bucket is built on the outbound side; Telegram's outbound sending is retried according to the Redis operating parameter `max_retries` (see `docs/reference.md` §6.1 for default values and hard upper limits); currently only Redis current limiting is done for Push verification code writing (`ratelimit:push-verify:*`). 429 under the 30 msg/s limit of the Telegram server **Automatic backoff in `parameters.retry_after` seconds** (`channel.rs`, `f4cae00`): `retry_after_ms` is truncated to the 60s budget limit after parsing, and the exponential backoff is used when this field is missing or non-numeric `backoff_delay_ms` (starting from 250ms, capped 4s), the overall retry budget is 60s. There is still no local token bucket current limit - if the budget is exceeded, a failure will be returned directly and the upstream will try again.
- **Rate**: No local token bucket is built on the outbound side; Telegram's outbound sending is retried according to the Redis operating parameter `max_retries` (see `docs/reference.md` §6.1 for default values and hard upper limits); currently only Redis current limiting is done for Push verification code writing (`ratelimit:push-verify:*`). 429 under the 30 msg/s limit of the Telegram server **Automatic backoff in `parameters.retry_after` seconds** (`channel.rs`, `f4cae00`): `retry_after_ms` is truncated to the 60s budget limit after parsing, and the exponential backoff is used when this field is missing or non-numeric `backoff_delay_ms` (starting from 250ms, capped 4s), the overall retry budget is 60s. There is still no local token bucket current limit - if the budget is exceeded, a failure will be returned directly and the upstream will try again.
### 7.3.1 Configuration Management API
### 7.3.1 Configuration Management API
- `GET /` provides a SPA embedded in the Rust binary; `/assets/config.js` and `/assets/styles.css` provide page resources. The service does not read or write local files while running (`C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE`).
- `GET /` provides a SPA embedded in the Rust binary; `/assets/config.js` and `/assets/styles.css` provide page resources. The service does not read or write local files while running (`C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE`).
@ -424,15 +424,15 @@ Testing: **No integrated test directory**, and no stand-alone util tool module.
- `POST /api/admin/session` accepts `Authorization: Bearer <CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY>` and returns `{ "session": "<opaque>", "expires_in": 1800 }`; the admin session only saves the digest in Redis and expires after 1,800 seconds. `POST /api/admin/session/revoke` revokes the current session and returns `204` successfully.
- `POST /api/admin/session` accepts `Authorization: Bearer <CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY>` and returns `{ "session": "<opaque>", "expires_in": 1800 }`; the admin session only saves the digest in Redis and expires after 1,800 seconds. `POST /api/admin/session/revoke` revokes the current session and returns `204` successfully.
- The admin page only saves the session in JavaScript memory. Request settings `credentials: omit`, `cache: no-store`, without using cookies, localStorage or sessionStorage. The admin API accepts a valid admin session; the compatibility path also accepts `WORKER_TOKEN`. Worker transparently transmits the authentication header (`SAF-LB-PASSTHRU`) as it is.
- The admin page only saves the session in JavaScript memory. Request settings `credentials: omit`, `cache: no-store`, without using cookies, localStorage or sessionStorage. The admin API accepts a valid admin session; the compatibility path also accepts `WORKER_TOKEN`. Worker transparently transmits the authentication header (`SAF-LB-PASSTHRU`) as it is.
- `GET /api/config` and `PUT /api/config` only read and write non-sensitive running parameters:
- `GET /api/config` and `PUT /api/config` only read and write non-sensitive running parameters:
```json
```json
{
{
"jmap_timeout_ms": 15000,
"jmap_timeout_ms": 15000,
"telegram_timeout_ms": 10000,
"telegram_timeout_ms": 10000,
"llm_timeout_ms": 30000,
"llm_timeout_ms": 30000,
"max_retries": 3
"max_retries": 3
}
}
```
```
- The three timeout units are all milliseconds; the default value, value range and hard upper limit of `max_retries` are only authoritative with `docs/reference.md` §6.1 (the table below and the example response body above are only for illustration, and the values are not repeated). `max_retries` represents the maximum number of retries beyond the first request. When there is no configuration in Redis, GET returns the default value object; PUT successfully returns the same object after saving and persists to Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`).
- The three timeout units are all milliseconds; the default value, value range and hard upper limit of `max_retries` are only authoritative with `docs/reference.md` §6.1 (the table below and the example response body above are only for illustration, and the values are not repeated). `max_retries` represents the maximum number of retries beyond the first request. When there is no configuration in Redis, GET returns the default value object; PUT successfully returns the same object after saving and persists to Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`).
- `GET /api/business-config` reads back saved configuration for management SPA pre-populated form: returns `{ "configured", "revision", "values", "secrets_present" }`, where `values` is the value of 10 non-key fields and `secrets_present` is 6 Boolean existence of a key (`bot_token`, `jmap_password`, `telegram_webhook_secret`, `reconcile_token`, `worker_token`, `llm_api_key`) - **Never return the key value itself** (`SAF-NO-SECRET-ECHO`). Not yet saved, staleness returns `200` + `configured: false`, `revision: 0`, empty `values` and an existence boolean of all false. SPA therefore has only one code path and does not need to distinguish between first-time configuration and modified configuration.
- `GET /api/business-config` reads back saved configuration for management SPA pre-populated form: returns `{ "configured", "revision", "values", "secrets_present" }`, where `values` is the value of 10 non-key fields and `secrets_present` is 6 Boolean existence of a key (`bot_token`, `jmap_password`, `telegram_webhook_secret`, `reconcile_token`, `worker_token`, `llm_api_key`) - **Never return the key value itself** (`SAF-NO-SECRET-ECHO`). Not yet saved, staleness returns `200` + `configured: false`, `revision: 0`, empty `values` and an existence boolean of all false. SPA therefore has only one code path and does not need to distinguish between first-time configuration and modified configuration.
- `PUT /api/business-config` accepts `BusinessConfigPatch` (complete or partial), **only replaces the fields that appear in the submission body, and the rest inherits the stored values** (`BusinessConfigPatch::apply`); Push verification does not belong to Wire, is dynamically generated by Stalwart and written back by the backend. Verification is the only write gate, and the verification object is the merged configuration rather than the commit itself: patches are never verified individually, and existing complete wires are never discarded. `validate_business_wire` runs first, and returns the real `422` when rejected; if the merge result is legal, the configuration **must** be persisted (the merged Wire is persisted, not the request body), and then the client is built and the worker is switched to run. Therefore, when the dependency is not connected, `200` + `{ "persisted": true, "runtime_applied": false, "warnings": [{"component", "step", "detail"}] }` is returned instead of `503` - the configuration has been saved and the fault is reported truthfully instead of being silently swallowed by an unreachable JMAP. `runtime_applied` is only `true` when the reload submission is successful; in both cases, the `x-business-config-revision` header is returned; the request body can carry `revision` (that is, the `u64` returned by `GET`) as a control field - it does not participate in `apply`, does not enter Wire, and is not used as a saved setting. It is only used to determine whether this submission is based on the latest version. See the next article for the semantics of `409`. The response never echoes configuration or keys. The key is "replaced only after submission": the **omitted** key inherits the existing value, so the form backfilled by `GET` only needs to submit the fields to be changed; but the backend does not distinguish between "unsubmitted" and "submitted empty string", and explicitly submitting `""` will actually clear the key - "leave blank and keep" is a client contract implemented by SPA by discarding blank key fields before submission, not a server-side guarantee. `chat_allowlist` must be a non-empty list, empty arrays will be rejected by `validate_business_wire` (422). Incremental semantics only hold after **existing configuration**: if there is no existing configuration, there is no fallback value, and the patch must come with all required fields, otherwise `422` will be returned (the entry created from scratch is `POST /api/bootstrap`).
- `PUT /api/business-config` accepts `BusinessConfigPatch` (complete or partial), **only replaces the fields that appear in the submission body, and the rest inherits the stored values** (`BusinessConfigPatch::apply`); Push verification does not belong to Wire, is dynamically generated by Stalwart and written back by the backend. Verification is the only write gate, and the verification object is the merged configuration rather than the commit itself: patches are never verified individually, and existing complete wires are never discarded. `validate_business_wire` runs first, and returns the real `422` when rejected; if the merge result is legal, the configuration **must** be persisted (the merged Wire is persisted, not the request body), and then the client is built and the worker is switched to run. Therefore, when the dependency is not connected, `200` + `{ "persisted": true, "runtime_applied": false, "warnings": [{"component", "step", "detail"}] }` is returned instead of `503` - the configuration has been saved and the fault is reported truthfully instead of being silently swallowed by an unreachable JMAP. `runtime_applied` is only `true` when the reload submission is successful; in both cases, the `x-business-config-revision` header is returned; the request body can carry `revision` (that is, the `u64` returned by `GET`) as a control field - it does not participate in `apply`, does not enter Wire, and is not used as a saved setting. It is only used to determine whether this submission is based on the latest version. See the next article for the semantics of `409`. The response never echoes configuration or keys. The key is "replaced only after submission": the **omitted** key inherits the existing value, so the form backfilled by `GET` only needs to submit the fields to be changed; but the backend does not distinguish between "unsubmitted" and "submitted empty string", and explicitly submitting `""` will actually clear the key - "leave blank and keep" is a client contract implemented by SPA by discarding blank key fields before submission, not a server-side guarantee. `chat_allowlist` must be a non-empty list, empty arrays will be rejected by `validate_business_wire` (422). Incremental semantics only hold after **existing configuration**: if there is no existing configuration, there is no fallback value, and the patch must come with all required fields, otherwise `422` will be returned (the entry created from scratch is `POST /api/bootstrap`).
- `POST /api/business-config/preflight` performs exactly the same validation and client build on the submission body, returning component-by-component conclusions, **without writing, without touching the running worker**: `{ "persisted": false, "validation": { "ok", "errors" }, "components": { "jmap": {...}, "llm": ... } }`. Different from PUT, its submission body must be **complete**`BusinessConfigWire` (no patch merging), so SPA must first merge the value read back by `GET` into the local form before pre-verification. `components` is `null` when the verification has failed (rejected Wire does not need to probe the client again); when `llm_enabled`/`llm_allow_net` is false, `llm` is `null` instead of false `ok`. Authentication is consistent with the management session gate (`config_authorized`) and is deliberately not hung after `DEBUG_TOKEN`.
- `POST /api/business-config/preflight` performs exactly the same validation and client build on the submission body, returning component-by-component conclusions, **without writing, without touching the running worker**: `{ "persisted": false, "validation": { "ok", "errors" }, "components": { "jmap": {...}, "llm": ... } }`. Different from PUT, its submission body must be **complete**`BusinessConfigWire` (no patch merging), so SPA must first merge the value read back by `GET` into the local form before pre-verification. `components` is `null` when the verification has failed (rejected Wire does not need to probe the client again); when `llm_enabled`/`llm_allow_net` is false, `llm` is `null` instead of false `ok`. Authentication is consistent with the management session gate (`config_authorized`) and is deliberately not hung after `DEBUG_TOKEN`.
@ -475,14 +475,14 @@ use thiserror::Error;
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum BotError {
pub enum BotError {
#[error("configuration error: {0}")]
#[error("configuration error: {0}")]
Config(String),
Config(String),
#[error("I/O error: {0}")]
#[error("I/O error: {0}")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
#[error("JSON error: {0}")]
#[error("JSON error: {0}")]
Json(#[from] serde_json::Error),
Json(#[from] serde_json::Error),
#[error("state error")]
#[error("state error")]
State(#[from] crate::state::StateError),
State(#[from] crate::state::StateError),
}
}
```
```
@ -531,17 +531,17 @@ The design target form once included six additional variants: `Jmap(#[from] jmap
- Notification deduplication: the same `email_id` will not be pushed repeatedly.
- Notification deduplication: the same `email_id` will not be pushed repeatedly.
- Text escaping: Message text containing `<script>` is escaped in HTML mode.
- Text escaping: Message text containing `<script>` is escaped in HTML mode.
- **Security boundary assertion (hard, see `docs/charter.md §3`)**:
- **Security boundary assertion (hard, see `docs/charter.md §3`)**:
- VIEW/View original text path: mock AI endpoint zero request (LLM client not called);
- VIEW/View original text path: mock AI endpoint zero request (LLM client not called);
- New email notification: There is no body content in the message (assertion leak);
- New email notification: There is no body content in the message (assertion leak);
- Long emails: if the text is > 4000 characters, the full text will not be sent;
- Long emails: if the text is > 4000 characters, the full text will not be sent;
- AI call prefix: LLM zero call before confirmation;
- AI call prefix: LLM zero call before confirmation;
- The analysis results are not saved to disk: no new disk/Redis writing path is added after processing;
- The analysis results are not saved to disk: no new disk/Redis writing path is added after processing;
- AI fails 3 times → circuit breaker confirmation → fallback with "AI unavailable" logo.
- AI fails 3 times → circuit breaker confirmation → fallback with "AI unavailable" logo.
- **Entry Authentication (`SAF-AUTH-*`)**: `/reconcile`, `/webhook/tg`, `/push/jmap` returns `401` under **missing or wrong** credentials, and asserts **no side effects** (no Redis writes, no JMAP/AI calls) when authentication fails; correct credentials are allowed.
- **Entry Authentication (`SAF-AUTH-*`)**: `/reconcile`, `/webhook/tg`, `/push/jmap` returns `401` under **missing or wrong** credentials, and asserts **no side effects** (no Redis writes, no JMAP/AI calls) when authentication fails; correct credentials are allowed.
- **Health Probe (`SAF-PROBE-PUBLIC`)**: `/healthz` returns `200` for process alive; `/ready` returns `200/503` for readiness - checks configuration integrity + Redis reachability + outbound read-only probe (`GET {jmap_origin}/.well-known/jmap` with Basic authentication, `GET https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/getMe`, 3s each, parallel, about 3s at worst), any failure will return the standard error envelope (`service_unavailable` + `Retry-After: 30`), all will return the readiness report JSON; the response body does not contain sensitive information. Uptime Kuma is monitored by status code (`/ready` expects 200) and is not affected by changes in the response body.
- **Health Probe (`SAF-PROBE-PUBLIC`)**: `/healthz` returns `200` for process alive; `/ready` returns `200/503` for readiness - checks configuration integrity + Redis reachability + outbound read-only probe (`GET {jmap_origin}/.well-known/jmap` with Basic authentication, `GET https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/getMe`, 3s each, parallel, about 3s at worst), any failure will return the standard error envelope (`service_unavailable` + `Retry-After: 30`), all will return the readiness report JSON; the response body does not contain sensitive information. Uptime Kuma is monitored by status code (`/ready` expects 200) and is not affected by changes in the response body.
- **Channel decoupling**: No channel SDK types appear in the public interfaces of domain modules (`src/domain.rs` / `src/ai.rs` / `src/worker.rs`); channel assembly is centralized in `src/channel.rs`.
- **Channel decoupling**: No channel SDK types appear in the public interfaces of domain modules (`src/domain.rs` / `src/ai.rs` / `src/worker.rs`); channel assembly is centralized in `src/channel.rs`.
- **JMAP session URL (`REQ-JMAP-SESSION-URL`/`SAF-JMAP-URL`)**: both the base address and the complete `…/.well-known/jmap` are accepted and the normalized results are consistent**, the URL passed to `Client::connect` does not contain duplicate `/.well-known/jmap`**; `http://` Rejected; **Embedded credentials (`https://user:pass@host`) are rejected**; Dangerous queries are rejected; Redirects only trust the origin host in the configuration (Stalwart will 307 jump to `/jmap/session`).
- **JMAP session URL (`REQ-JMAP-SESSION-URL`/`SAF-JMAP-URL`)**: both the base address and the complete `…/.well-known/jmap` are accepted and the normalized results are consistent**, the URL passed to `Client::connect` does not contain duplicate `/.well-known/jmap`**; `http://` Rejected; **Embedded credentials (`https://user:pass@host`) are rejected**; Dangerous queries are rejected; Redirects only trust the origin host in the configuration (Stalwart will 307 jump to `/jmap/session`).
- **JMAP multi-part original text (`REQ-JMAP-RAW-MULTIPART`)**: `read_email` splices the parts with `part_id` and `bodyValue`" for the multi-part text in the order of `text_body`; constructing the "no available part" use case assertion returns **clear error** (non-empty string).
- **JMAP multi-part original text (`REQ-JMAP-RAW-MULTIPART`)**: `read_email` splices the parts with `part_id` and `bodyValue`" for the multi-part text in the order of `text_body`; constructing the "no available part" use case assertion returns **clear error** (non-empty string).
---
---
@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ The design target form once included six additional variants: `Jmap(#[from] jmap
- **Actual dependencies** (Cargo.toml current, `ARCH-DEPS-STAGE0`/`ARCH-DEPS-STAGE1` + `ARCH-DEPS-STAGE4`): `axum 0.8` (single HTTPS entrance), `async-trait`, `secrecy`, `subtle` (constant time authentication comparison), `serde`, `serde_json`, `thiserror`, `tokio`, `tracing`, `tracing-subscriber`, `url` (`JMAP_SESSION_URL` normalized parsing), `jmap-client =0.4.2` (`default-features = false, features = ["async","rustls"]`), `redis 0.27` (Redis XPING/PING liveness detection, `ARCH-STATE-REDIS`), `reqwest 0.13` (JMAP/TG HTTP client); dev-dependencies: `tower 0.5` (routing test). `teloxide` is not introduced (`ARCH-DEPS-STAGE4`): Telegram channel is implemented in `src/channel.rs` using reqwest self-development.
- **Actual dependencies** (Cargo.toml current, `ARCH-DEPS-STAGE0`/`ARCH-DEPS-STAGE1` + `ARCH-DEPS-STAGE4`): `axum 0.8` (single HTTPS entrance), `async-trait`, `secrecy`, `subtle` (constant time authentication comparison), `serde`, `serde_json`, `thiserror`, `tokio`, `tracing`, `tracing-subscriber`, `url` (`JMAP_SESSION_URL` normalized parsing), `jmap-client =0.4.2` (`default-features = false, features = ["async","rustls"]`), `redis 0.27` (Redis XPING/PING liveness detection, `ARCH-STATE-REDIS`), `reqwest 0.13` (JMAP/TG HTTP client); dev-dependencies: `tower 0.5` (routing test). `teloxide` is not introduced (`ARCH-DEPS-STAGE4`): Telegram channel is implemented in `src/channel.rs` using reqwest self-development.
- **Not yet introduced** (Documents must not claim to have been used): `teloxide` and other Telegram Bot frameworks (Telegram outbound is sent directly by `src/channel.rs` and `reqwest`, and the evaluation record is in `docs/retired.md`). **FIGMENT NOT USED**: Configured for manual `std::env` parsing (`ARCH-CONFIG-ENV`, §7.1).
- **Not yet introduced** (Documents must not claim to have been used): `teloxide` and other Telegram Bot frameworks (Telegram outbound is sent directly by `src/channel.rs` and `reqwest`, and the evaluation record is in `docs/retired.md`). **FIGMENT NOT USED**: Configured for manual `std::env` parsing (`ARCH-CONFIG-ENV`, §7.1).
- **Stage 1 dependency status** (`ARCH-DEPS-STAGE1`): `jmap-client`**Introduced** (currently `=0.4.2`, `default-features = false, features = ["async","rustls"]`, version and features **subject to `Cargo.toml`**). ⚠️ Its default features `["async","websockets","aws_lc_rs"]`**includes WebSocket stack**, so the default features must be turned off and `websockets` is not selected; JMAP only uses **HTTPS short requests** (Core/Mail) to comply with `C-NO-LONG-CONN` (no WS/SSE/long polling).
- **Stage 1 dependency status** (`ARCH-DEPS-STAGE1`): `jmap-client`**Introduced** (currently `=0.4.2`, `default-features = false, features = ["async","rustls"]`, version and features **subject to `Cargo.toml`**). ⚠️ Its default features `["async","websockets","aws_lc_rs"]`**includes WebSocket stack**, so the default features must be turned off and `websockets` is not selected; JMAP only uses **HTTPS short requests** (Core/Mail) to comply with `C-NO-LONG-CONN` (no WS/SSE/long polling).
- `ACCOUNT_ID`**optional** (`REQ-SINGLE-ACCOUNT`): **leave blank → take the default/main account** of the JMAP session; explicit values are used after verification; multiple accounts = multiple bot instances.
- `ACCOUNT_ID`**optional** (`REQ-SINGLE-ACCOUNT`): **leave blank → take the default/main account** of the JMAP session; explicit values are used after verification; multiple accounts = multiple bot instances.
- axum adopts **0.8** (`ARCH-AXUM-08`); if subsequent review decides to adjust the version, Cargo.toml will prevail and this section will be synchronized.
- axum adopts **0.8** (`ARCH-AXUM-08`); if subsequent review decides to adjust the version, Cargo.toml will prevail and this section will be synchronized.
- Currently SSE/WebSocket/long polling/SQLite/local volumes (`C-NO-LONG-CONN`/`NG-SQLITE-PERSIST`/`NG-LOCAL-VOLUME`) are not implemented; entrance authentication (`R1`/`SAF-AUTH-*`) is implemented as a fail-closed hard access control, and the Push, Streams worker and `/reconcile` business paths after authentication have been implemented.
- Currently SSE/WebSocket/long polling/SQLite/local volumes (`C-NO-LONG-CONN`/`NG-SQLITE-PERSIST`/`NG-LOCAL-VOLUME`) are not implemented; entrance authentication (`R1`/`SAF-AUTH-*`) is implemented as a fail-closed hard access control, and the Push, Streams worker and `/reconcile` business paths after authentication have been implemented.
@ -643,9 +643,9 @@ Both are wrong, and the real 360s solo lock `lock:push-register:{sha256(callback
Single authority table, this section only retains four "whys" that affect design judgment:
Single authority table, this section only retains four "whys" that affect design judgment:
- **Reconciliation lock TTL 300s, deliberately larger than the upper limit of 120s for a single page**, to avoid lock expiration during the lock period, causing the same account to enter reconciliation repeatedly
- **Reconciliation lock TTL 300s, deliberately larger than the upper limit of 120s for a single page**, to avoid lock expiration during the lock period, causing the same account to enter reconciliation repeatedly
- **push registration solo lock TTL 360s, deliberately larger than the upper limit of 300s for a single outbound request**, otherwise a slow registration will cause repeated requests
- **push registration solo lock TTL 360s, deliberately larger than the upper limit of 300s for a single outbound request**, otherwise a slow registration will cause repeated requests
(`SAF-AUTH-JMAP-PUSH`).
(`SAF-AUTH-JMAP-PUSH`).
- **Reconciliation deduplication 24h is intentionally designed**: the same email will only be notified once within 24h (`MOD-DEDUP`, see 11.5 of this article for the scope).
- **Reconciliation deduplication 24h is intentionally designed**: the same email will only be notified once within 24h (`MOD-DEDUP`, see 11.5 of this article for the scope).
- **If the configuration key is missing, it will be regarded as failed (fail-closed)** and the business path will not be entered.
- **If the configuration key is missing, it will be regarded as failed (fail-closed)** and the business path will not be entered.
@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ There are no pending decisions regarding deployment/platform decisions: `Q-DEP-A
The configuration is loaded in `LlmConfig` in `src/config.rs`, and the runtime parameters are in `OutboundConfig` in `src/state.rs` (delivered by `RuntimeConfigProvider`).
The configuration is loaded in `LlmConfig` in `src/config.rs`, and the runtime parameters are in `OutboundConfig` in `src/state.rs` (delivered by `RuntimeConfigProvider`).
The LLM capability only exists in the `src/ai.rs` file; **no** configuration/fallback/policy/audit layering - circuit breaker, rule fallback, and audit span are all not implemented (see §12.4–12.7).
The LLM capability only exists in the `src/ai.rs` file; **no** configuration/fallback/policy/audit layering - circuit breaker, rule fallback, and audit span are all not implemented (see §12.4–12.7).
@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Original entry: Full code base **12 TTL write points, 17 TTL values**, but only
Three steps closed the issue:
Three steps closed the issue:
1. **True Redis Assertion** (commit `0890eb1`). `real_redis_ttl_tests` of `src/state.rs`, two `#[ignore]`-gated use cases, follow the pattern of `src/domain/jmap/client.rs:522`: skipped and returned when `REDIS_TEST_URL` is missing, the URL will not be logged. Assert actual PTTL for three atomic write points. Run: `REDIS_TEST_URL=… cargo test --locked -- --ignored ttl`.
1. **True Redis Assertion** (commit `0890eb1`). `real_redis_ttl_tests` of `src/state.rs`, two `#[ignore]`-gated use cases, follow the pattern of `src/domain/jmap/client.rs:522`: skipped and returned when `REDIS_TEST_URL` is missing, the URL will not be logged. Assert actual PTTL for three atomic write points. Run: `REDIS_TEST_URL=… cargo test --locked -- --ignored ttl`.
2. **Kill naked literals** (one round after commit `0890eb1`). All 17 values are included in `pub(crate) mod ttl` of `src/state.rs`, the call point changes the constant reference, and a new `ttl_contract_is_pinned` is added to assert the constant table one by one, with two sequential assertions (the heartbeat must be shorter than the lock, and the consent gear must be strictly increasing). Class B Lua embedded values that were out of reach in the original entry have also been connected - `retry_or_dlq` now uses `ttl::RETRY_COUNTER_SECONDS` interpolation to generate script strings, and there is no longer a second literal in the script. Changing the value now = changing the constant + assertion failure, both of which must be reviewed.
2. **Kill naked literals** (one round after commit `0890eb1`). All 17 values are included in `pub(crate) mod ttl` of `src/state.rs`, the call point changes the constant reference, and a new `ttl_contract_is_pinned` is added to assert the constant table one by one, with two sequential assertions (the heartbeat must be shorter than the lock, and the consent gear must be strictly increasing). Class B Lua embedded values that were out of reach in the original entry have also been connected - `retry_or_dlq` now uses `ttl::RETRY_COUNTER_SECONDS` interpolation to generate script strings, and there is no longer a second literal in the script. Changing the value now = changing the constant + assertion failure, both of which must be reviewed.
3. **Real machine green light** (this round, run with Upstash instance). The two assertions were actually connected to the real Redis to read back the PTTL and passed. The Class B Lua embedded value was verified on a real machine for the first time. The process is shown below in "Testing the four TTL test fixes".
3. **Real machine green light** (this round, run with Upstash instance). The two assertions were actually connected to the real Redis to read back the PTTL and passed. The Class B Lua embedded value was verified on a real machine for the first time. The process is shown below in "Testing the four TTL test fixes".
Contract baseline (see `docs/reference.md` §1 for the complete semantics of keys):
Contract baseline (see `docs/reference.md` §1 for the complete semantics of keys):
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Contract baseline (see `docs/reference.md` §1 for the complete semantics of key
Naked TTL literals no longer exist in production code; `worker.rs`'s agreed-upon test assertions still retain numeric literals, which is **deliberate** - use expected values independent of constants to test production code, otherwise if both sides are changed at the same time, the single test will always be green.
Naked TTL literals no longer exist in production code; `worker.rs`'s agreed-upon test assertions still retain numeric literals, which is **deliberate** - use expected values independent of constants to test production code, otherwise if both sides are changed at the same time, the single test will always be green.
This update fixed four bugs in the test itself.
This update fixed four bugs in the test itself.
@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ The fourth is that the real machine asserts that it is unstable. The first three
- The zero value case originally asserted `assert_within(pttl, 1, 500)` - requiring the 1 second floor to be read back within ±500 ms. But the readback occurs after the cross-network TLS round trip, and that second is usually consumed. Running three times in a row got `-2` (key has expired), `269`, `118` ms. There is nothing wrong with the product code itself: `SET … NX EX 1` is indeed implemented, and `-2` just proves that EX takes effect and the keys expire as expected. Change the criterion to "`pttl != -1`" - `-1` is the real regression to prevent (EX is silently discarded, the key never expires), plus "`pttl == -2 || pttl <= 1000 + 2000`" is a judgment that only sets an upper bound, because a value that is still alive will only count down from 1s. After the change, I ran 6 consecutive rounds with all green.
- The zero value case originally asserted `assert_within(pttl, 1, 500)` - requiring the 1 second floor to be read back within ±500 ms. But the readback occurs after the cross-network TLS round trip, and that second is usually consumed. Running three times in a row got `-2` (key has expired), `269`, `118` ms. There is nothing wrong with the product code itself: `SET … NX EX 1` is indeed implemented, and `-2` just proves that EX takes effect and the keys expire as expected. Change the criterion to "`pttl != -1`" - `-1` is the real regression to prevent (EX is silently discarded, the key never expires), plus "`pttl == -2 || pttl <= 1000 + 2000`" is a judgment that only sets an upper bound, because a value that is still alive will only count down from 1s. After the change, I ran 6 consecutive rounds with all green.
**Two TTL assertions have been run on the real Upstash instance (`rediss://`, TLS-only; plaintext `redis://` will receive a null reply after `AUTH` and disconnect, so TLS must be used)**: `SET … NX EX` (`claim_dedup`), `SET … EX 3600` (`set_ai_consent`), Lua embedded `EXPIRE 86400` (`retry_or_dlq`) The actual PTTL of the three atomic write points all fall within the 2s tolerance. Class B Lua embedded values that were out of reach in the original article are now also verified on real machines, not just constant references.
**Two TTL assertions have been run on the real Upstash instance (`rediss://`, TLS-only; plaintext `redis://` will receive a null reply after `AUTH` and disconnect, so TLS must be used)**: `SET … NX EX` (`claim_dedup`), `SET … EX 3600` (`set_ai_consent`), Lua embedded `EXPIRE 86400` (`retry_or_dlq`) The actual PTTL of the three atomic write points all fall within the 2s tolerance. Class B Lua embedded values that were out of reach in the original article are now also verified on real machines, not just constant references.
### 2. `newState` semantics of `Email/changes` (commit `269c8f6`)
### 2. `newState` semantics of `Email/changes` (commit `269c8f6`)
