# Stalwart JMAP ↔ Telegram Bot — Rust solution design > [中文版本 / Chinese version → design.zh-CN.md](design.zh-CN.md) > Status: **Design and implementation have been implemented** (The code can be found in the warehouses `src/`, `web/`, `cloudflare-worker/`; this article also retains the original records of design decisions and selection evaluations. The description of stages 1/2/4 belongs to the historical plan, and the current progress can be found in §10.5) > Author: Cowork (team: MessageWeave) > Date: 2026-09-21 > Target readers: Codex CLI (lead), follow-up AI coding agent, end-user review > > **Related documents** (separation of responsibilities to avoid duplication): > - [docs/charter.md](charter.md) — Project charter: project goals, technology selection, security invariants, implementation phases, prohibited matters, test acceptance and stable ID registry > - [AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md) — Universal, language-independent code writing and environment building specifications (excluding project-specific content) > - [README.md](../README.md) — Deployment, operation and maintenance: HTTPS-only Docker, secrets, Redis (the only state carrier), short-request webhook/push/reconciliation routing, health checks, multi-instance operation > > This document only retains content directly related to **product behavior, code architecture, module interfaces, state machines, data flow, error handling, testing and implementation phases**. Deployment operations and Docker/universal container platform details have been moved to [README.md §6](../README.md); project constraints and security invariants are in `docs/charter.md`; general, language-agnostic code writing and environment building specifications are in `../AGENTS.md`. --- ## 0. Document navigation 1. [Task and Scope](#1-Task and Scope) 2. [jmap-client capability analysis](#2-jmap-client-capability analysis) 3. [Adaptation of authentication and email operations] (#3-Adaptation of authentication and email operations) 4. [Telegram channel implementation selection](#4-telegram-channel implementation selection) 5. [Overall architecture and data flow](#5-Overall architecture and data flow) 6. [Module Division](#6-Module Division) 7. [Configuration and Security](#7-Configuration and Security) 8. [Error Handling and Observability](#8-Error Handling and Observability) 9. [Test Strategy](#9-Test Strategy) 10. [Phase-based implementation plan](#10-Phase-based implementation plan) 11. [Historical issues and decision-making archives (product/architecture category, both have been concluded)] (#11-Historical issues and decision-making archives, product architecture category have been concluded) 12. [AI auxiliary capabilities: architecture, confirmation threshold, failure fallback] (#12-ai-auxiliary capability architecture confirmation threshold failure fallback) > Deployment/platform decisions confirmed (Single Account, App Password+Basic, Redis Hosting+AOF, Platform HTTPS URL, External Cron) and **all converged archive** (including `Q-DEP-A`/`Q-DEP-B`, see the Confirmed Decisions section of `docs/charter.md` §8); **Unfinished code gaps can be found in `docs/opengaps.md`**. --- ## 1. Task and Scope ### 1.1 Goals Build a Telegram robot written in Rust as a **personal email assistant** for Stalwart JMAP mailbox: - Query/read emails, view folders, send emails, manage keywords, etc. through Telegram commands. - Leverage JMAP's **Push HTTPS callback** (+ external Cron reconciliation) to **proactively push to Telegram** when new emails arrive. (EventSource/SSE/long polling is non-target, see `NG-POLLING-SSE`/`NG-LONG-POLLING`/`C-NO-LONG-CONN`.) - Single-user or multi-account deployment (the default is for single-account self-hosting scenarios). ### 1.2 Scope (this stage) - ✅ Research + Plan Design (this document) - ❌ Do not create/modify project code or initialize cargo project - ✅ Output detailed plans for lead and user review, marking key uncertain items ### 1.3 Research basis - [`stalwartlabs/jmap-client`](https://github.com/stalwartlabs/jmap-client) (main branch, as of this research) - Project directory: `/home/okabe/Repo/messageweave/` (see §10.0 and `../AGENTS.md §3.3` for tool chain requirements) --- ## 2. jmap-client capability analysis Source: Read directly from the `stalwartlabs/jmap-client` warehouse `stalwartlabs/jmap-client/src/lib.rs`, `stalwartlabs/jmap-client/src/client.rs`, `stalwartlabs/jmap-client/src/email/`, `stalwartlabs/jmap-client/src/email_submissi on/`, `stalwartlabs/jmap-client/src/event_source/`, `stalwartlabs/jmap-client/Cargo.toml`, `stalwartlabs/jmap-client/README.md`, `stalwartlabs/jmap-client/examples/`. ### 2.1 crate overview | item | value | |---|---| | crate name | `jmap-client` (crates.io) | | Protocol coverage | JMAP Core (RFC 8620), Mail (RFC 8621), WebSocket (RFC 8887), Sieve (draft-12) | | Asynchronous runtime | tokio + reqwest | | License | Apache-2.0 OR MIT | | `forbid(unsafe_code)` | Yes (stated at top of lib.rs)✅ | | Default features | **0.4.2 Tested `default = ["async", "websockets", "aws_lc_rs"]`** (including WebSocket stack `tokio-tungstenite`). ⚠️ `default-features = true` will **implicitly enable WebSocket**, violating `C-NO-LONG-CONN`. **This project actually uses `default-features = false, features = ["async", "rustls"]` (without `websockets`)**, subject to `Cargo.toml`. | ### 2.2 Module structure (`src/`) ``` lib.rs 顶层：URI / Method / DataType / PushObject / Error 枚举 client.rs Client：认证、connect、session、send_request、event_source、ws core/ request / response / get / set / query / query_changes / changes / error / session email/ mod + helpers（email_get/email_query/email_import/email_copy/email_set/email_parse…） email_submission/ helpers（email_submission_get/query/set → 发送邮件 + 状态查询） mailbox/ helpers（mailbox_create/query/get/set/destroy…） thread/ thread/get identity/ Identity（发件身份）get/set blob/ blob 上传/复制（附件） sieve/ SieveScript（服务端过滤脚本） vacation_response/ principal/ Principal（账户/共享） push_subscription/ PushSubscription（HTTP push 回调注册） event_source/ SSE 流：mod / parser / stream client_ws/ WebSocket 客户端（feature = "websockets"） ``` ### 2.3 Key capabilities mapped to this Bot | Bot requirements | jmap-client API | Remarks | |---|---|---| | Login/Session | `Client::new().credentials(...).connect(url)` | Supports Basic and Bearer; connect resolves session URL, capabilities | | Column folder | `mailbox_query` / `mailbox_get` | With `role` to identify INBOX/Important/Draft, etc. | | List emails | `email_query` (Filter + Comparator + anchor paging) | Filter: `subject`/`from`/`to`/`in_mailbox`/`has_keyword`/`after`/`before`… | | Read email text | `email_get` + `Property` selection | `BodyStructure`/`BodyValues`/`Preview`/`TextBody`/`HtmlBody` | | Read attachments | `Blob/get` (blobId) or `email_parse` | Large attachments need to be downloaded in fragments/streaming | | Send email (2 steps) | ① `email_set`/`email_import` create draft ② `email_submission_set` send | submission associate identityId | | Delete/Archive | `email_set` (keywords `$seen`/`$flagged`), `mailbox_destroy` | JMAP has no real "delete", relying on keyword/move | | Search | `email_query` (`Filter::text`) + `SearchSnippet/get` highlighting | `Filter` is a serde single-label enumeration, **no comparator syntax**; `SearchSnippet/get` only returns `emailId`/`subject`/`preview`, **no `bodyProperties`/`parts`**, body-level highlighting in locked version `0.4.2` can't do it (downgraded to a pure list of IDs) | | Real-time notification (Push + reconciliation) | Push HTTPS callback → `StateChange`; external Cron calls `/reconcile` and uses `Email/changes` to make up the difference | Requires public HTTPS entrance (`C-HTTPS-INBOUND`/`FLOW-NEW-MAIL`); Push is not the only reliable source | | SSE / WebSocket (non-target) | `event_source` / `client_ws` | This deployment **does not use** (`NG-POLLING-SSE`/`NG-LONG-POLLING`/`C-NO-LONG-CONN`); only crate capabilities are listed for investigation | ### 2.4 Authentication mechanism (`stalwartlabs/jmap-client/src/client.rs`) - `Credentials::Basic { username, secret }` — username/password, natively supported by Stalwart. - `Credentials::Bearer { token, .. }` — OAuth2 access_token; optional `refresh_token` + `refresh_url` + `refresh_grace`, the client will automatically refresh before expiration. - `connect()` Function: GET session URL → Parse `accounts`/`capabilities`/`download_url`/`upload_url`/`event_source_url`, cache account_id. - Support custom `reqwest::Client` (`Client::new().client(reqwest_client)`): can inject proxy, TLS configuration, timeout, UA. - Support `accept_long_responses` / `event_source(ping, ..)` for long connection keep-alive. ### 2.5 Error model (`Error` enumeration) ``` Transport(reqwest::Error) 网络/TLS/超时 Parse(serde_json::Error) 序列化 Internal(String) 客户端内部 Problem(Box) JMAP problem-details Server(String) Method(MethodError) JMAP method-level 错误（NotJSON/Forbidden/RateLimit/StateMismatch…） Set(SetError) /set 级别错误（每条记录的 creation/update/destroy 失败） WebSocket(...) ws 错误（feature 开启时） ``` - `MethodErrorType` fine-grained: `ServerUnavailable`/`ServerFail`/`RateLimit`/`InvalidArguments`/`Forbidden`/`StateMismatch`/`TooManyChanges`… → Can directly drive Bot’s retry/current limiting/state reset strategy. ### 2.6 Real-time channel decision-making (determined, see docs/charter.md §8) > Deployment target = **Generic HTTPS-only Docker, no long connections** (`C-NO-LONG-CONN`/`C-HTTPS-INBOUND`). > Current channel = JMAP Push HTTPS callback (first explicitly registered by the administrator via `POST /api/push/register`, see §7.3) + external Cron `/reconcile` reconciliation. Push subscriptions are not created automatically, and Push cannot be regarded as the only reliable source. > EventSource/SSE and WebSocket are both marked as **non-target** (`NG-POLLING-SSE`). Only the following table is retained for reference for crate capability research. | Channel | Whether to use | Remarks | |---|---|---| | **Push Subscription (HTTP callback)** | Accessed, explicit registration required | Short request model, suitable for stateless + no long connection; `POST /api/push/register` creates subscription, `/push/jmap` automatically completes Stalwart verification writeback | | EventSource/SSE | ❌ non-target | long connection, conflicts with `C-NO-LONG-CONN` (`NG-POLLING-SSE`) | | WebSocket (RFC 8887) | ❌ Non-target | Long connection, conflicts with `C-NO-LONG-CONN`; and needs server support | Reconciliation: External HTTPS Cron periodically adjusts `/reconcile` (`FLOW-RECONCILE`), uses `Email/changes` + Redis `sinceState` to make up for the difference, and also serves as cursor reconstruction after Redis is lost. --- ## 3. Authentication and email operation adaptation ### 3.1 Authentication Strategy (Confirmed: App Password + Basic) - **Confirm adoption** (`C-AUTH-APP-BASIC`): `Credentials::Basic` (Stalwart account email + **App Password**). App Password can be revoked/expired independently without using a master password. Configuration injection, no code required. - **Not used**: OAuth/OIDC `Bearer` (increases complexity when there is no OIDC requirement, do not select); master password Basic. - **Security**: The password is only saved in the configuration or key manager; wrapped with `secrecy::SecretString` during runtime, the log will never print plain text (see §7.2). - For runtime injection methods, see README.md §3.0 (`C-NO-SECRET-IN-IMAGE`). - **Single Account** (`REQ-SINGLE-ACCOUNT`): This instance only connects to one Stalwart account; multiple accounts = deploy multiple bot instances. ### 3.2 Mailbox operation adaptation layer (JMAP ↔ Bot semantics) It is recommended to encapsulate a layer of domain semantics in the `domain::jmap` module and only expose business verbs to the upper layer: | Bot verb | Wrapper function | Internal JMAP | |---|---|---| | `list_folders()` | → `Vec` | `mailbox_query` + `mailbox_get` (cache role→id) | | `list_emails(folder, page)` | → `Vec` | `email_query`(anchor paging) + `email_get` does not pass `properties` (take the server's default full value, including `From`; the list page must also display the sender) | | `read_email(id, want_body)` | → `EmailBody { text, html, attachments }` | `email_get`([BodyStructure, BodyValues, BlobIds]); **Multiple part original text** (`REQ-JMAP-RAW-MULTIPART`): Filter "parts with `part_id` and `bodyValue`" in order of `text_body` The last **splicing** is `text`; if there is no available part → return **clear error** (do not silently return an empty string). Attachments use `Blob/get` | | `send_email(to, subject, body, attachments)` | → `EmailId` | ① `email_import`/`email_set` Create draft ② `email_submission_set`(onSend) | | `set_flag(id, keyword)` | → () | `email_set` keywords | | `search_emails(account_id, query, limit)` | → `Result, JmapError>` | `email_query` (`Filter::text`, `limit` capped at 100) gets the ID + `SearchSnippet/get` gets the highlight; when the latter does not support (`unknownMethod`/timeout) **downgrade** returns empty snippets Instead of reporting an error, the caller renders a pure ID list | > Design points: `anchor`+`position` paging of `email_query` is JMAP standard practice and is more stable than traditional offset; `sinceState` + `changes` is used for incremental synchronization to avoid repeated pulling of the entire volume. --- ## 4. Telegram channel implementation selection Telegram channel is self-developed and implemented using `reqwest` in `src/channel.rs` (`ARCH-DEPS-STAGE4`), **without introducing third-party Bot framework**. Evaluated `teloxide` but **not adopted**: This project only uses a few calls of the Bot API, and it is not worth introducing the two layers of abstraction of dptree scheduling and built-in session middleware; `throttle` and Redis session capabilities are partially implemented using `src/channel.rs` retries and external Redis TTL. Candidate comparison (`teloxide` / `grammers` / old `telegram-bot`), 6 reasons why we originally preferred `teloxide`, feature set plan and `teloxide-core` downgrade plan, all recorded in `docs/retired.md`. --- ## 5. Overall architecture and data flow ### 5.1 High-level topology ``` ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Telegram │ └───────────────────────┬───────────────────────────┘ Webhook(HTTPS) │ ┌───────────────────────▼───────────────────────────┐ │ HTTP 入口 (axum，单端口 PORT) │ │ POST /webhook/tg · POST /push/jmap · │ │ POST /reconcile · GET /healthz /ready │ │ GET / + admin session + config APIs (管理 SPA) │ └───────────────────────┬───────────────────────────┘ 命令 │ 通知 ↓(Redis Streams worker) ┌───────────────────────▼───────────────────────────┐ │ bot 层 (handlers) │ │ /list /read /send /search /folders /flag ... │ └───────────────────────┬───────────────────────────┘ 领域 │ ┌───────────────────────▼───────────────────────────┐ │ jmap 适配层 (JmapService) │ │ list_folders/list_emails/read_email/send_email… │ │ + sinceState 缓存 → 外部 Redis (MOD-SINCESTATE) │ └───────────────────────┬───────────────────────────┘ JMAP │ HTTPS（短请求） ┌───────────────────────▼───────────────────────────┐ │ Stalwart JMAP Server │ │ session_url / email/* / mailbox/* / submission/* │ └───────────────────────▲───────────────────────────┘ Push 回调(HTTPS)│ + 外部 Cron 对账(FLOW-RECONCILE) ┌───────────────────────┴───────────────────────────┐ │ push handler → Redis Streams(MOD-STREAMS) │ │ worker: Email/changes → 通知 → 发往 TG → 推进游标│ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` > Deployment form = **General HTTPS-only Docker, no long connection** (`C-NO-LONG-CONN`/`C-HTTPS-INBOUND`): > Telegram is Webhook only; JMAP real-time is Push callback only; slow tasks are asynchronously stepped into Redis Streams; reconciliation is triggered by **External HTTPS Cron**. > EventSource/SSE and long polling are non-targets (`NG-POLLING-SSE`/`NG-LONG-POLLING`). > Channel decoupling (see §5.2): The domain layer interacts with the channel layer through domain Command/Notification, and no specific channel SDK type appears in the domain layer; DingTalk/Feishu only retains extension bits and does not implement them in advance. ### 5.2 Channel abstraction and multi-channel expansion strategy - **Status quo**: The first (and currently only) channel is Telegram. The goal is to retain the ability to expand DingTalk/Feishu in parallel, but not to achieve it ahead of time. - **Principle**: Decoupling the domain layer and channel layer - Mail/JMAP/AI/intention state machine ** must not rely on Telegram type**. - **Abstract (not over-engineered)**: No empty traits are reserved. `src/channel.rs` had three zero implementations `#[expect(dead_code)]` Placeholder trait (`Channel` / `Notifier` / `MessageAdapter`, comment readme "Stable ID + Phase 0 placeholder"), **Deleted** (see `docs/retired.md` for registration) - Actual Telegram outbound `channel::telegram::TelegramClient::send_text` (self-developed by `reqwest`), by `worker.rs` `MetadataWorker` and `notify.rs` are held directly and are never passed through these three traits. The command is parsed in `parse_intent` (`src/worker.rs`), rendering logic is scattered in `src/worker.rs` / `src/notify.rs`. What is passed between the domain and the channel is the domain `Notification` (`src/domain.rs`), and the channel only adapts at the edge. - **Constraints**: - The public interface of `jmap` / `llm` / intent state machine / `notify::core` only accepts/returns domain types; - Specific channel SDK types must not appear in the domain layer (the channel layer does not currently introduce third-party Bot frameworks, see §4); - Add new channel = new adapter + assembly, do not change the domain layer. When abstraction is really needed, add it with the implementation and leave no empty traits. - **What not to do**: Do not define a polymorphic configuration registry, do not abstract the "channel capability matrix" in advance, do not build a plugins mechanism; evolve on demand (YAGNI). ### 5.3 Running model (short request, no long connection) - Single binary `message-weave`, `#[tokio::main]`. - On startup: 1. Load configuration (`config::Config`). 2. Construct `JmapService` (`Client::connect` completes session parsing, account_id caching, mailbox role→id mapping warm-up); sinceState is restored from external Redis (`MOD-SINCESTATE`). 3. Start the **HTTP portal** (axum, single port `PORT`): `/webhook/tg`, `/push/jmap`, `/reconcile`, `/healthz`, `/ready`; three of the write paths first pass the `SAF-AUTH-*` portal authentication (fail-closed, §7.3), `/healthz`, `/ready` For the public probe (`SAF-PROBE-PUBLIC`); `/ready` has done end-to-end detection (configuration + Redis + outbound read-only detection JMAP session `GET` and TG `getMe`, each 3s, parallel, about 3s at worst). 4. Start **Redis Streams worker** (background task) to consume Push events → `Email/changes` → Notification → Send to TG → Push sinceState → XACK. 5. **Does not hold any long connections and does not build self-timers** (`C-NO-LONG-CONN`); reconciliation is triggered by **external HTTPS Cron** `/reconcile` (`FLOW-RECONCILE`). - Notification sending and command processing share `Arc`, and internal `tokio::sync::RwLock` protects the variable cache; cross-request status always falls to external Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`). - **Multiple instances and load balancing (deployment form, `ARCH-LB-WORKER`)**: Since the state is all external Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`) and the delivery is idempotent (`MOD-DEDUP`), **the same image can be instantiated across multiple serverless platforms**, free Cloudflare Worker is used as the only entrance and failover (`C-LB-SINGLE-REG-URL`); `/reconcile` Use Redis to lock a single instance (`SAF-RECONCILE-LOCK`), and Streams to automatically amortize using the same consumer group (`MOD-STREAMS-GROUP`). See README.md §6.1 for details. **Field/channel logic does not need to be changed. ** - **Production redline (`C-NO-DB` / `C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE` / `C-LOG-STDOUT-ONLY` / `SAF-LOG-PURITY` / `C-NO-STATEFUL-RECOVERY`, see docs/charter.md §3 / docs/reference.md §9.1)**: - **Production uses no database** (`C-NO-DB`): No SQLite/Postgres/MySQL/embedded database; Redis is the only production state store. - **Disable local file/directory writing** (`C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE`): no log files, no data files, no temporary cache, no local volumes mounted. - **Log only writes to stdout/stderr** (`C-LOG-STDOUT-ONLY`): The container/platform is responsible for collecting and placing disk; disable the file log backend. - **Log and Redis write content constraints** (`SAF-LOG-PURITY`): Only structured events, counts, timestamps, desensitized summaries; **Prohibited** key original text, JMAP email body, AI request/response, attachment content. - **It is prohibited to rely on in-process status for production recovery** (`C-NO-STATEFUL-RECOVERY`): Restart and continuation (deduplication, sinceState, Streams breakpoints, circuit breaker counts, sessions) are all implemented by external Redis + JMAP reconciliation; the in-process cache is only for performance optimization, and the loss must be safe and reentrant. - Graceful exit: signal + `CancellationToken`, flush Redis Streams pending entries before exiting (**Do not write local files**, `C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE`). - **Current status**: Configuration guidance, HTTP entry and write entry authentication completed (`R1`/`SAF-AUTH-*`, fail-closed); JMAP session, Email/changes, PushSubscription create/update, Redis Streams worker and `/reconcile` have been connected. `/reconcile` and the Push closed loop still need to complete end-to-end acceptance in the real Stalwart, Redis, and Telegram environments. You cannot claim that the production link has been verified based on local access control alone. ### 5.4 Data flow: new email push (critical path, FLOW-NEW-MAIL) ``` Stalwart JMAP Push → POST /push/jmap (StateChange{Email/EmailDelivery: new_state}) → 校验 pushSubscriptionId + verificationCode → 幂等去重(MOD-DEDUP) → 入 Redis Streams(MOD-STREAMS) → 立即 2xx ACK → worker: XREADGROUP → 用 sinceState(存 Redis, MOD-SINCESTATE) 调 Email/changes → 取 created[] 的 id → read_email 封装 email_get（Subject, Preview, From, TextBody, BodyValues, Size, ReceivedAt, HasAttachment）→ EmailMetadata → notify::core 组装领域 Notification（仅元数据 + 行内按钮意图，绝不含正文） → channel::telegram::TelegramClient::send_notification(chat, notification)（内部渲染文本后经 send_text 发出） → 更新 sinceState（写外部 Redis）→ XACK → 若 Redis 丢失：由外部 Cron 对账(FLOW-RECONCILE) 重建游标并补发 ``` > Key: `Email/changes` lists the new email id in `created` to avoid full `email_query`; `sinceState` is stored in external Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`). When Redis is lost, it will be reconstructed from JMAP by reconciliation, and the **fact source is in JMAP**. > Notifications only contain sender/subject/time (+number of attachments), the text never appears in the notification (see `docs/charter.md §3` Security Boundary `SAF-NOTIFY-META`). > No long connection: Push is a short request callback, reconciliation is triggered by **external HTTPS Cron** (`C-NO-LONG-CONN`), and is not a self-sustaining timer in the container. ### 5.5 Data flow: command `/read ` (long mail branch) ``` TG /read 3 → handler 取会话里的 folder+page 游标 → JmapService.list_emails(folder, page=3) → 取第 3 封 id → read_email(id, body=true) # JMAP 直取，绝不经 LLM → 格式化： 正文 ≤ long_email_char_limit(默认 4000) → 正常发送（HTML escape） 正文 > 阈值 → 不发全文，发 Preview(120) + 发件人/主题/附件概览 + 选项： "[AI 总结](约300字，需确认) / [继续查看原文(截断，标注‘完整请电脑查看’)]" → reply （"AI 总结"分支必须用户确认后才把正文交 LLM 生成 ~300 字摘要；见 §12.3） ``` ### 5.6 Conversation FSM There is currently **no FSM**. `parse_intent` in `src/worker.rs` parses the command line into an `Intent`; the AI consent state is a single boolean plus an expiry in Redis (key and TTL in the AI consent section of `docs/reference.md`), not a multi-step confirmation state. The invariant that still holds: an AI summary requires the user's explicit consent first — **without a consent state the LLM is never called**. Once consent is live the summary pulls the full email body and sends it to the LLM (`read_email` requests `TextBody` + `BodyValues` via `fetch_text_body_values(true)`, see `src/domain/jmap/client.rs`), but the body is not sent back to Telegram — outbound sends only the summary, or falls back to the first 300 characters of the body if the LLM call fails (`fallback` in `src/worker.rs`). See also the doc comment on `MetadataWorker`: "body text never reaches Telegram". The 5-state FSM that was designed (`Idle` / `AwaitClarify` / `AwaitConfirm` / `Analyzing` / `AwaitFallback`), with its state-transition table and channel-neutrality notes, is in `docs/retired.md`. ### 5.7 Email search (`/search`, `bfe0fd8` implemented) `/search `, plus the Chinese prefixes `搜索` / `查找` / `检索` (**prefix match only**, so "help me search…" is not hijacked into a search), route to `Intent::Search`, which goes through `JmapService::search_emails(account_id, query, limit)` with `email_query` (`Filter::text`) for the IDs and `SearchSnippet/get` for highlighted `subject` / `preview`. Key boundaries: - **Snippet degradation**: `SearchSnippet/get` being unsupported (`unknownMethod`) or timing out with empty snippets instead of an error degrades rendering to a plain ID list (`（高亮片段暂不可用，以下为匹配的邮件 ID）`); no snippets are fabricated. - **Plain text outbound**: `` tags are stripped by `strip_mark_tags` (case-insensitive, unclosed tags discarded) and then decoded in one pass by `unescape_html_entities`; tags are stripped **before** entities are decoded so that a literal `` in the mailbox body (escaped by the server as ``) is not restored to a real tag and then accidentally deleted. `subject` and `preview` are capped at 120 and 160 characters (`truncate_chars`, the same helper as text truncation). - **Failed mapping**: JMAP side failed → `SearchReply::Retry` → `process_telegram` returns `Err(())` → coordinator 503 + `Retry-After` retry (consistent with `/reconcile`, other JMAP paths), **no panic, no error stack returned to user**. - **Empty query**: `/search` with no keywords emits a guidance prompt (`请提供搜索关键词，例如：/search 发票`) and makes no request. No matches returns `没有找到匹配「」的邮件。`. - **Each hit carries `email_id`**, so `/summary ` jumps straight into the AI summary flow. - **Body-level highlighting is not possible in locked versions**: jmap-client `0.4.2`’s `SearchSnippet` only models `emailId`/`subject`/`preview`, without `bodyProperties`/`parts`. Per RFC 8621 §5 the body-level `body: String[Id]` is not modeled by the crate and, with no `deny_unknown_fields`, is silently dropped by serde. Per-part body highlighting would require bypassing the crate and calling JMAP directly, which is not implemented. - **No new environment variable**; when the configuration is missing, `/search` reports a friendly error. --- ## 6. Module division Actual project structure (all code anchors in this document refer to this structure; see `docs/retired.md` for the historical target module splitting plan): ``` message-weave/ ├── Cargo.toml # jmap-client 0.4.2 / redis 0.27 / reqwest 0.13；不含 teloxide ├── .env.example # 仅 2 个必填项的占位样例（REDIS_URL / CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY），不含业务配置 ├── .gitignore ├── Dockerfile # 仅本地开发用；生产不执行（C-DEBIAN-SLIM，边界见 README.md §3.4） ├── hoststack.yaml # 生产部署真源（runtime/build/start/healthCheck），非负载均衡器清单，见 §5.1 ├── src/ │ ├── main.rs # tokio main：读 PORT/REDIS_URL/CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY 后启动 webhook HTTP 入口（单入口，无 CLI 子命令） │ ├── config.rs # Redis 业务配置反序列化（serde → BusinessConfigWire → Config）；CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY 解析 │ ├── error.rs # BotError 统一错误（见 §8.1） │ ├── domain.rs # 领域层根（渠道中立，见 §5.2） │ ├── domain/jmap.rs # JmapBackend trait + MockBackend（契约测试不联网） │ ├── domain/jmap/client.rs # 包装 jmap_client::Client（真实只读 adapter，MOD-JMAP-CLIENT） │ ├── state.rs # Redis 读写封装：配置/开关/会话/TTL 键（C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE） │ ├── channel.rs # 渠道层：TelegramClient（reqwest 自研出站）；领域类型在 src/domain.rs │ ├── notify.rs # /push/jmap 校验入队 + Redis Streams worker + /reconcile 对账 │ ├── worker.rs # parse_intent → Intent，命令路由与 AI 授权判定 │ ├── ai.rs # LlmClient / summarize：LLM 摘要调用 │ └── web.rs # /config 静态前端路由 + include_str! 嵌入 + CSP ├── web/ # 前端资源，构建期 include_str! 嵌入二进制（C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE） │ ├── index.html │ ├── styles.css │ ├── config.js │ └── config.test.mjs # Node 原生断言测试（非 cargo 测试） └── cloudflare-worker/ # 边缘反向代理，JS，不在 Rust 工程中 ``` Testing: **No integrated test directory**, and no stand-alone util tool module. All Rust tests are `#[cfg(test)]` unit tests within each module; the only test on the front end is `web/config.test.mjs`. ### 6.1 Module Responsibility Matrix > **Current dependencies**: `jmap-client 0.4.2`, `redis 0.27`, `reqwest 0.13` **have been introduced** (`ARCH-DEPS-STAGE1` / `ARCH-DEPS-STAGE4`, the version is subject to `Cargo.toml`). `teloxide` has been evaluated to be **not introduced**, and the Telegram channel is self-developed using `reqwest` (§4, see `docs/retired.md` for details). Each row in the table below is a real module. | Modules | Dependencies | Output | Testability | Current Status | |---|---|---|---|---| | `config` | secrecy; ring (`session_digest` SHA-256) | `Config` structure (7 fields, all with real readers) | Pure function, easy to test | Implemented (Redis business configuration serde deserialization + `validate_nonblank` fail-closed; startup env is read directly by `main.rs`, no figment/TOML) | | `error` | — | `BotError` (§8.1, 4 variants) | Single test | Implemented | | `domain` + `domain::jmap::client` | **jmap-client 0.4.2** | JMAP read-only semantics; `client` = real read-only adapter (`MOD-JMAP-CLIENT`) | mock JMAP response + `#[ignore]` real machine test | Code has been implemented, waiting for real Stalwart end-to-end verification (`cargo test -- --ignored jmap::`) | | `state` | redis 0.27 | Redis read and write: config/switch/session/TTL key (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`) | Redis mock | implemented | | `channel` | reqwest 0.13; jmap-client | `TelegramClient` (`send_text` / `send_notification`), dual channels of email and TG (event→field `Notification`→rendering) | mock HTTP | Implemented (`src/channel.rs`, self-developed by `reqwest`, no third-party Bot framework) | | `worker` | — | `parse_intent` → `Intent` (6 types, including `Search(query)`: `/search` + `SearchSnippet/get` highlight rendering), command routing and AI authorization determination | Table-driven pure single test | Implemented | | `ai` | reqwest 0.13 | `LlmClient` / `summarize` | mock OpenAI compatible endpoint | implemented | | `notify` | axum; redis | HTTP authentication, global switch, `/push/jmap` enqueue, `Email/changes` reconciliation and cursor submission | webhook verification failure path coverage 403 | The real reconciliation path has been covered; the real Stalwart environment is still required for end-to-end acceptance | | `web` | axum | `/config` static page + `include_str!` embedding + CSP | Front-end covered by `web/config.test.mjs` | Implemented | | `debug` | reqwest 0.13; redis 0.27 | Remote diagnostic surface `/debug/*` (`src/debug.rs`): 6 read-only probes `/debug/ping`, `/debug/config`, `/debug/redis`, `/debug/jmap`, `/debug/telegram`, `/debug/worker` + `POST /debug/notify` (sends a test message through the production outbound path, no independent implementation) | Only `DEBUG_ENABLED` (or `--debug`) + `DEBUG_TOKEN` mounts the route when both factors are present; the module itself is compiled unconditionally | Implemented, does not enter the Worker whitelist (`SAF-DEBUG-ORIGIN-ONLY`) | > Note: The "Current Status" column is **module level** (the module has been implemented), which does not mean that the behavior is complete. Behavioral gaps are not included in this list: `/search`, Telegram 429 backoff, and multi-instance re-delivery windows have all been implemented. `SAF-DEBUG-ALLOWLIST` (`POST /debug/notify` does not intercept any `chat_id` when the list is empty) has never been counted as a behavioral gap and was moved from `docs/opengaps.md` on 2026-09-29: its exposure in production deployments is provided by `SAF-DEBUG-GATE` two-factor mount with Worker routing safelist Hold on, **the two doors are sufficient on their own**, and there is no need for a third layer of lists, so there is no gap. This behavior and residual risks (direct connection to the backend origin can bypass both layers) are described in `docs/reference.md` §3 and `docs/design.md` §7.6. The `/search` path of the `worker` module has been implemented with `bfe0fd8`. --- ## 7. Configuration and Security ### 7.1 Historical configuration reading (migrated to Redis) > **Migration Target (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`)**: Only `REDIS_URL` is retained for the production boot environment. Empty Redis > First-time configuration must be done through a one-time bootstrap/admin session authenticated by `CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY`; > Unauthorized write access must not be provided. This key is only used for constant time comparison and does not echo, record, or write business configuration; > The Redis ACL password is only responsible for the Redis connection itself, not any HTTP authentication credentials. After bootstrap is successful > The administrator session hash and TTL are saved in Redis and can be restored after restarting; the business token is loaded from Redis at startup. > Key GET will never be echoed; after bootstrap/administrator PUT is successful, the client will be built and replaced atomically, and subsequent requests will be immediate. > Use new configuration, keep old instance on failure. This migration replaces the following stage 0 environment variable list. The stage 0 list is only for historical purposes. > Compatibility instructions. > **Actual implementation** (`ARCH-CONFIG-ENV`): process startup read-only **2** process-level credentials plus listening port (`src/main.rs:45` / `:54` / `:63`, > Add optional `DEBUG_TOKEN` in `:107`), directly `std::env::var`, **do not use figment, do not use TOML/configuration file**. > **Business configuration is no longer read from environment variables**: The fields in the following table are all loaded by the `config` layer using serde deserialization through the Redis business configuration. > And do fail-closed verification through `validate_business_wire` / `validate_nonblank`. > Historically existing `Config::from_env()` full env parsing path **removed** (see `docs/retired.md` for registration), > Therefore **the current code reads zero variable names in the following table**; the `RUN_MODE` variable itself has also been deleted entirely (the identifier is no longer in the code), > `webhook` and `reconcile` already share the same set of routing tables, `NG-SERVER-MODE` is retained as a design non-target in `docs/charter.md` §8. > ⚠️ **The following table is the complete variable table of business configuration fields** (the variable names are named after the original environment variables to facilitate comparison with the deployment reference, but there is no longer any reading method in the code**). **The current production deployment only requires `REDIS_URL` + `CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY` two startup variables** (`src/main.rs`); all other business fields are written by `PUT /api/business-config` through Redis business configuration (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`). "Required" in the table refers to the fail-closed constraint (`validate_nonblank`, blank means rejection) of **Redis business configuration**, which is no longer required for the environment variable boot path. | Variable | Required | Default | Description | |---|---|---|---| | `PORT` | No | `8080` | Single listening port (`C-NO-TCP-EXPOSE`) | | `BOT_TOKEN` | Yes | — | Telegram Bot Token(`SecretString`) | | `TG_WEBHOOK_SECRET` | Yes | — | `/webhook/tg` Authentication: Request header `X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token` (`SAF-AUTH-TG-WEBHOOK`; `SecretString`) | | `CHAT_ALLOWLIST` | Yes | — | Comma separated integer chat ids; **Whitelist Hard Constraint** (`SAF-CHAT-ALLOWLIST`) | | `JMAP_SESSION_URL` | Yes | — | Stalwart JMAP session URL (`REQ-JMAP-SESSION-URL`): You can fill in the **service base address** `https://host[:port]` or **complete** `…/.well-known/jmap`; the code is normalized to origin/base and then submitted to `jmap-client` (it is automatically appended `.well-known/jmap`), **paths must not be repeated**. HTTPS only, **URL embedded credentials prohibited** (`SAF-JMAP-URL`) | | `JMAP_USERNAME` | Yes | — | Stalwart Account (Email) | | `JMAP_PASSWORD` | Yes | — | **App Password**(`C-AUTH-APP-BASIC`; `SecretString`) | | Push verification | No | — | Dynamically generated by Stalwart; the backend automatically writes back through `PushSubscription/set` and saves the short-term verification status in Redis | | `REDIS_URL` | Yes | — | External Redis (User-Managed + AOF, `C-REDIS-MANAGED-AOF`; `SecretString`) | | `RECONCILE_TOKEN` | Yes | — | `/reconcile` Authentication: `Authorization: Bearer` (`SAF-AUTH-RECONCILE`; `SecretString`). `/reconcile` route is always mounted, so **required** | | `ACCOUNT_ID` | No | Empty | Single account (`REQ-SINGLE-ACCOUNT`); if left blank, the session main account will be used | | `LLM_ENABLED` | No | `false` | Do not verify `LLM_*` on shutdown (`REQ-LLM-OPENAI-COMPAT`) | | `LLM_ALLOW_NET` | No | `false` | AI outgoing network switch (`REQ-AI-EXTERNAL-CONSENT`) | | `LLM_API_KEY` / `LLM_BASE_URL` / `LLM_MODEL` | Required when `LLM_ENABLED=true` | — | OpenAI-compatible | | `LLM_MAX_RETRIES` | No | — | Fuse threshold (`REQ-AI-FUSE`). **Non** environment variables: managed by Redis running parameters (`OutboundConfig.max_retries`, fall back to default, see `docs/reference.md` §6.1) | | `LLM_SUMMARY_TARGET_CHARS` | No (**constant**) | `300` | Summary target word count (`REQ-LONG-EMAIL`). **Non** configurable items: The `config` layer is hard-coded to 300 in the two constructors and does not enter the business configuration wire | > Currently `config.rs` provides the above fields (including `TelegramConfig` / `JmapConfig` / `LlmConfig`) from Redis business configuration; process-level startup variables are read directly by `src/main.rs` without going through the `config` layer. The introduction of TOML/figment in the future will require separate decisions; the current documentation does not assume that the configuration file exists. > **The entrance authentication key (`TG_WEBHOOK_SECRET`/`RECONCILE_TOKEN`) must be valid after the business configuration is completed** (fail-closed, `SAF-AUTH-*`). The verification code of JMAP Push is dynamically generated by Stalwart after the subscription is created and does not belong to the business configuration. When the startup boot variables are missing, the service enters configuration boot mode and remains accessible to SPA; business success will not be faked due to lack of startup variables, nor will entrance authentication be bypassed. > **JMAP session URL normalization (`REQ-JMAP-SESSION-URL`/`SAF-JMAP-URL`)**: `JMAP_SESSION_URL` accepts both the **service base address** (`https://mail.example.com`) and the **full session URL** (`https://mail.example.com/.well-known/jmap`). The code is unified and normalized to origin/base before calling `jmap_client::Client::connect` **——`jmap-client` will automatically append `/.well-known/jmap`, so **there will be no duplicate paths** (such as `…/.well-known/jmap/.well-known/jmap`). Constraints: **HTTPS only** (http denied); **Disallow URL embedded username/password** (credentials only via `JMAP_USERNAME`/`JMAP_PASSWORD`, `C-AUTH-APP-BASIC`); deny dangerous queries. **Redirect whitelist**: `jmap-client` **denies all redirections** by default, and Stalwart will jump `/.well-known/jmap` 307 to `/jmap/session`, so the origin host itself in the **configuration** is added to the trust list when connecting, and other hosts rewritten by the server are still rejected (`follow_redirects([trusted_redirect_host(base)])`). Known upstream risks: Stalwart's 307 `Location` will write `user:pass` into the URL, and the client will return the URL with credentials - so the transmission error string will not be logged additionally. (Status: D-G1-1 **Code implemented and verified with `cargo test -- --ignored jmap::` with a real Stalwart instance**.) ### 7.2 Key Management - **It is prohibited** to write token/password into the warehouse or any configuration file (this project configuration does not enter the warehouse, `ARCH-CONFIG-ENV`). - Only 2 process-level variables are read during startup (`REDIS_URL`, `CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, directly `std::env::var` from `src/main.rs`; if any one is missing, it will be downgraded to read-only setup mode); the business configuration is deserialized from Redis through the `config` layer (**None** `${VAR}` interpolation/figment/config files, `ARCH-CONFIG-ENV`). - Use `secrecy::SecretString` to wrap it during runtime, and `Debug` to implement `***`. - Log filtering: `tracing` field layer shielding `Authorization`/`password`/`token`. - For the runtime secret injection method (env / `*_FILE` / orchestrator secret), see README.md §3.0 (`C-NO-SECRET-IN-IMAGE`). ### 7.3 Access control - **Entry authentication (hard constraints `SAF-AUTH-RECONCILE`/`SAF-AUTH-TG-WEBHOOK`/`SAF-AUTH-JMAP-PUSH`)**: The three write paths must be authenticated first, **fail-closed**—— - `/reconcile`: Request header `Authorization: Bearer `; - `/webhook/tg`: Request header `X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token == TG_WEBHOOK_SECRET`; - `/push/jmap`: Verify Redis short-term status according to `pushSubscriptionId`; StateChange is released only after the first verification is successfully written back by JMAP `PushSubscription/set`. The comparison uses the **constant time** algorithm (`subtle`, anti-timing side channel); verification failure will always be `401` and **will not produce any side effects/status changes** before the authentication is passed. After the business configuration is completed, the credentials for Webhook, Push, Reconcile and Push registration interfaces must be valid; when the startup boot variable is missing, the configuration boot mode will be entered and authentication will not be bypassed (§7.1). - **Health probe (`SAF-PROBE-PUBLIC`)**: `/healthz` (`ARCH-HEALTHZ`) and `/ready` are **public probes** - no authentication, only returns health status, **does not contain any sensitive information** (does not echo configuration/key/internal error details). - `/healthz` = liveness (process survival), long-term stable semantics. - `/ready` does end-to-end probing: configuration integrity + Redis reachability + outbound read-only probing (`GET {jmap_origin}/.well-known/jmap`, Basic authentication with configuration; `GET https://api.telegram.org/bot/getMe`; each `PROBE_TIMEOUT` = 3000ms, **Parallel** (`tokio::join!`), worst-case scenario 3s); all four pass `200` and readiness report (`{"status":"ready","configured":...,"jmap":...,"telegram":...}`, where `jmap`/`telegram` is the real probe result), any one fails `503` (standard error envelope `{"error":"service_unavailable","request_id":}` + `Retry-After: 30`). The probe is read-only, read-only configuration status, and will not trigger business side effects such as email synchronization, nor will it echo token or third-party response content; `refresh_business_config` only reads Redis, and has no state to write. Therefore `/ready` requires the outbound egress to the JMAP host and `api.telegram.org:443` to be reachable (if the egress requires a proxy, `/ready` is not available, see README.md §3.0). - **chat whitelist (hard constraint `SAF-CHAT-ALLOWLIST`)**: `CHAT_ALLOWLIST` is a **required** configuration; any inbound event (action triggered by TG command/callback) must verify `chat.id ∈ CHAT_ALLOWLIST` before **making any JMAP call, AI call or status change**. If it is not in the whitelist, **directly reject and terminate** (prevent token can be called by anyone after being leaked). Phase 0 has completed the `CHAT_ALLOWLIST` parsing skeleton; the forced rejection logic has been implemented with Telegram channel access (`telegram_webhook` of `src/notify.rs` verifies the whitelist before any JMAP/AI/status operation, and terminates if rejected). - **Command Minimization**: Only necessary commands are exposed; writing operations such as sending emails must be confirmed twice (sending emails is not currently implemented, see §10.3). - **Rate**: No local token bucket is built on the outbound side; Telegram's outbound sending is retried according to the Redis operating parameter `max_retries` (see `docs/reference.md` §6.1 for default values and hard upper limits); currently only Redis current limiting is done for Push verification code writing (`ratelimit:push-verify:*`). 429 under the 30 msg/s limit of the Telegram server **Automatic backoff in `parameters.retry_after` seconds** (`channel.rs`, `f4cae00`): `retry_after_ms` is truncated to the 60s budget limit after parsing, and the exponential backoff is used when this field is missing or non-numeric `backoff_delay_ms` (starting from 250ms, capped 4s), the overall retry budget is 60s. There is still no local token bucket current limit - if the budget is exceeded, a failure will be returned directly and the upstream will try again. ### 7.3.1 Configuration Management API - `GET /` provides a SPA embedded in the Rust binary; `/assets/config.js` and `/assets/styles.css` provide page resources. The service does not read or write local files while running (`C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE`). - `GET /api/status` publicly returns `{ "ready": boolean, "mode": "configured" | "configuration-setup", "missing": string[], "version": string }`, which only lists the missing environment variable names. When `REDIS_URL` or `CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is missing, SPA only displays the configuration boot status and missing variables; the management session authorization area is displayed only after the service status is confirmed to be ready=true. `version` is the `BUILD_VERSION` (`+`) baked by `build.rs` during compilation. The SPA no longer renders it, so the API is the only way to confirm a deployment landed. - `POST /api/admin/session` accepts `Authorization: Bearer ` and returns `{ "session": "", "expires_in": 1800 }`; the admin session only saves the digest in Redis and expires after 1,800 seconds. `POST /api/admin/session/revoke` revokes the current session and returns `204` successfully. - The admin page only saves the session in JavaScript memory. Request settings `credentials: omit`, `cache: no-store`, without using cookies, localStorage or sessionStorage. The admin API accepts a valid admin session; the compatibility path also accepts `WORKER_TOKEN`. Worker transparently transmits the authentication header (`SAF-LB-PASSTHRU`) as it is. - `GET /api/config` and `PUT /api/config` only read and write non-sensitive running parameters: ```json { "jmap_timeout_ms": 15000, "telegram_timeout_ms": 10000, "llm_timeout_ms": 30000, "max_retries": 3 } ``` - The three timeout units are all milliseconds; the default value, value range and hard upper limit of `max_retries` are only authoritative with `docs/reference.md` §6.1 (the table below and the example response body above are only for illustration, and the values are not repeated). `max_retries` represents the maximum number of retries beyond the first request. When there is no configuration in Redis, GET returns the default value object; PUT successfully returns the same object after saving and persists to Redis (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`). - `GET /api/business-config` reads back saved configuration for management SPA pre-populated form: returns `{ "configured", "revision", "values", "secrets_present" }`, where `values` is the value of 10 non-key fields and `secrets_present` is 6 Boolean existence of a key (`bot_token`, `jmap_password`, `telegram_webhook_secret`, `reconcile_token`, `worker_token`, `llm_api_key`) - **Never return the key value itself** (`SAF-NO-SECRET-ECHO`). Not yet saved, staleness returns `200` + `configured: false`, `revision: 0`, empty `values` and an existence boolean of all false. SPA therefore has only one code path and does not need to distinguish between first-time configuration and modified configuration. - `PUT /api/business-config` accepts `BusinessConfigPatch` (complete or partial), **only replaces the fields that appear in the submission body, and the rest inherits the stored values** (`BusinessConfigPatch::apply`); Push verification does not belong to Wire, is dynamically generated by Stalwart and written back by the backend. Verification is the only write gate, and the verification object is the merged configuration rather than the commit itself: patches are never verified individually, and existing complete wires are never discarded. `validate_business_wire` runs first, and returns the real `422` when rejected; if the merge result is legal, the configuration **must** be persisted (the merged Wire is persisted, not the request body), and then the client is built and the worker is switched to run. Therefore, when the dependency is not connected, `200` + `{ "persisted": true, "runtime_applied": false, "warnings": [{"component", "step", "detail"}] }` is returned instead of `503` - the configuration has been saved and the fault is reported truthfully instead of being silently swallowed by an unreachable JMAP. `runtime_applied` is only `true` when the reload submission is successful; in both cases, the `x-business-config-revision` header is returned; the request body can carry `revision` (that is, the `u64` returned by `GET`) as a control field - it does not participate in `apply`, does not enter Wire, and is not used as a saved setting. It is only used to determine whether this submission is based on the latest version. See the next article for the semantics of `409`. The response never echoes configuration or keys. The key is "replaced only after submission": the **omitted** key inherits the existing value, so the form backfilled by `GET` only needs to submit the fields to be changed; but the backend does not distinguish between "unsubmitted" and "submitted empty string", and explicitly submitting `""` will actually clear the key - "leave blank and keep" is a client contract implemented by SPA by discarding blank key fields before submission, not a server-side guarantee. `chat_allowlist` must be a non-empty list, empty arrays will be rejected by `validate_business_wire` (422). Incremental semantics only hold after **existing configuration**: if there is no existing configuration, there is no fallback value, and the patch must come with all required fields, otherwise `422` will be returned (the entry created from scratch is `POST /api/bootstrap`). - `POST /api/business-config/preflight` performs exactly the same validation and client build on the submission body, returning component-by-component conclusions, **without writing, without touching the running worker**: `{ "persisted": false, "validation": { "ok", "errors" }, "components": { "jmap": {...}, "llm": ... } }`. Different from PUT, its submission body must be **complete** `BusinessConfigWire` (no patch merging), so SPA must first merge the value read back by `GET` into the local form before pre-verification. `components` is `null` when the verification has failed (rejected Wire does not need to probe the client again); when `llm_enabled`/`llm_allow_net` is false, `llm` is `null` instead of false `ok`. Authentication is consistent with the management session gate (`config_authorized`) and is deliberately not hung after `DEBUG_TOKEN`. - `POST /api/bootstrap` also accepts **complete** `BusinessConfigWire` (without patch merging), and shares the above semantics of "separation of persistence and error reporting": verification failure is `422`, and build failure after persistence is still `200` + warnings. Because it does not merge, it is the only patch path that can create business configurations from scratch (PUT returns `422` when the existing configuration is missing and the patch is incomplete, see the previous article). - The running parameter errors of `PUT /api/config` use `401` (Unauthorized), `400` (JSON Invalid), `422` (Scope Error), `503` (Redis Unavailable); when GET read fails, `503` also indicates that Redis is unavailable. Business PUT uses `401` (unauthorized), `400` (JSON is invalid), `422` (the patch cannot be parsed, the saved configuration cannot be decrypted, the merge result verification fails, and the patch is incomplete when saving for the first time), `409` (the submitted `revision` has expired), `500` (merge result serialization failed) and `503` (Redis is unreachable, writing failed or reload submission failed); business GET uses `401`, `400`, `422` (the saved configuration cannot be decrypted) and `503` (Redis is unreachable) - note that `Invalid` is 422, not 503, and `Unreachable` is 503. **Business PUT has `409`**: `revision` is a **control field** in the request body** (not a header) - SPA records `revision` when reading the configuration, and each subsequent incremental submission will bring back the same value; the saved revision and the requested revision are not equal and return `409 conflict`, neither writing nor incrementing the revision, SPA receives `409` The saved value will be read back again and allowed to be changed by the operator, so the old page will not silently overwrite the new save. The request body without `revision` maintains last-write-wins, which is compatible with callers that never read revisions. This comparison is **compare first and then write**, and is non-atomic: if two requests compete at the same moment, both will pass, and the later one will overwrite the first one. The cost of optimistic locking without Lua scripts is this residual window, and the patch only takes the fields actually changed by the operator, so the window impact is limited. The remaining occurrences of `409 conflict` are the competition of three locks (`reconcile` and `acquire_lock` of `register_push` / `register_worker_token` return false), which have nothing to do with business configuration writing. Dependent client build failure does not return an error status code, but `200` + warnings (see above). The remaining errors do not echo sensitive data. The management page displays a `503` status when Redis/session initialization is not completed; running parameters are disabled from being saved before re-reading successfully (`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`). When LLM is enabled, the business configuration requires an HTTPS Base URL, a non-empty API key, and a model name. ### 7.4 TLS (code/dependent behavior) - The TLS provider is determined by the dependent feature: **jmap-client 0.4.2 contains `aws_lc_rs` by default (and introduces `rustls`)**, and `default-features = true` is not "rustls default". **The actual `default-features = false, features = ["async","rustls"]`** of this project (`aws_lc_rs`/`websockets` is not enabled), and will ultimately be subject to `Cargo.toml`. - Certificate verification is **mandatory by default** and can be turned off only for testing. - For operation and maintenance details such as the system CA trust store in the image, internal CA injection, inbound webhook TLS termination, etc., see `README.md` §3.0. ### 7.5 Production red line: no database / no local writing / standard output log (README.md §3.0 / docs/reference.md §9.1) This section summarizes the absolute red lines across code and deployment that you must not introduce any "seemingly convenient" local state into your code: | Redline ID | Meaning | Violation Example (Prohibited) | |---|---|---| | `C-NO-DB` | Production does not use any database; Redis is the only production state storage | Add SQLite deduplication table, add Postgres session | | `C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE` | Disable writing of local files/directories; do not mount local volumes | Write logs to local files, write temporary directories, and place session cursors into local status files | | `C-LOG-STDOUT-ONLY` | The log only writes stdout/stderr; the platform is responsible for collection | Introducing `tracing-appender`, `rolling-file`, `FileAppender` | | `SAF-LOG-PURITY` | Log and Redis writing content is limited to structured events, counts, timestamps, desensitized summaries | Log printing JMAP text, AI prompt/completion, key original text, attachment content | | `C-NO-STATEFUL-RECOVERY` | Production recovery does not rely on in-process state | Use `static Mutex` to store dedup and use memory LRU to store sinceState as the only recovery source | **Verification**: No local path constants / `std::fs` non-test calls / file log backends appear in the static inspection code; during runtime, the container `/proc/mounts` and `docker inspect` are used to confirm that there is no local volume mounting; see docs/reference.md §9.1 for the deployment checklist. ### 7.6 Why is the remote joint debugging interface absolutely closed by default? The only reason for this surface to exist is to shorten the production troubleshooting path: when you cannot log in to the container and can only rely on external requests to observe the system, someone needs to be able to detect the JMAP/Telegram connectivity and current business configuration without releasing the version. The price is that its entry softness must be higher than the three write paths - in addition to read-only detection, it also retains a **real outbound send**, and reuses the business whitelist instead of an independent whitelist. Therefore, the design choice is "closed by default" instead of "enabled by default and blocked by the load balancer": the process will only mount this set of routes (`SAF-DEBUG-GATE`) when "`DEBUG_ENABLED` is true or the command line has `--debug`"** and **a non-empty `DEBUG_TOKEN` is set; when the route is missing, the route does not exist at all in the router, and the request falls to axum general `404`, not "Exists but 401" - the latter would leak the route's existence. There is no third state: there is no "open without configuration" fallback, and there is no configuration item to set it to be enabled by default. `DEBUG_ENABLED` uses environment variables instead of startup commands so that the switch can be changed once from the platform console without releasing the version - the startup command remains static. Add another layer of location constraints: it is not in the load balancer's safe routing whitelist. Even if the backend is opened incorrectly, the platform entrance will be rejected by fail-closed. The only reachable path is to directly connect to the backend origin. These four things—two-factor mounting, 404 instead of 401, no default enabled fallback, and unreachable load balancer—together form the architectural decision of “exposure is zero by default.” See docs/reference.md §3 for the enablement method, per-endpoint status code, and deployment confirmation checklist. --- ## 8. Error handling and observability ### 8.1 Unified error enumeration Current implementation (full text of `src/error.rs`, 4 variants): ```rust use thiserror::Error; #[derive(Debug, Error)] pub enum BotError { #[error("configuration error: {0}")] Config(String), #[error("I/O error: {0}")] Io(#[from] std::io::Error), #[error("JSON error: {0}")] Json(#[from] serde_json::Error), #[error("state error")] State(#[from] crate::state::StateError), } ``` The design target form once included six additional variants: `Jmap(#[from] jmap_client::Error)`, `Telegram(#[from] teloxide::errors::RequestError)`, `Storage(#[from] redis::RedisError)`, `RateLimited`, `Unauthorized(i64)`, `Llm(LlmErr)`; `Telegram` comes with `teloxide` They were abandoned without adoption, and the rest have not yet been implemented. For a complete list, see `docs/retired.md`. ### 8.2 Error → User Message Mapping | Low-level errors | Bot behavior | |---|---| | `Transport` / `ServerUnavailable` / `RateLimit` | Exponential backoff retry (`util::retry`), exceeding the threshold gives the user "temporarily unavailable, try again later" | | `Forbidden` / `Unauthorized chat` | Silent rejection; log alert | | `Method(InvalidArguments)` | Reply to "Wrong parameter + correct usage" | | `Set(creation/update/destroy)` | Reply to the specific record-level failure reason | | `StateMismatch` | Reset sinceState → Fill in full once (anti-lost/anti-repair) | | `Llm(*)` | See §12.7 (Break/Fallback/Logo) | ### 8.3 Observability - `tracing` (direct dependency) + `tracing-subscriber` (fmt + EnvFilter). - `tracing` (direct dependency) + `tracing-subscriber` (fmt + EnvFilter). **Currently only recording startup events**: `src/main.rs` 5 `info!`/`warn!` in total (missing startup variables, downgrade to setup mode, startup banner, debug endpoint enabled, JMAP service unavailable, downgrade × 2). Request-level events (Push callbacks, Reconcile pulls, channel pushes, LLM elapsed times) **not implemented yet** - there are no tracing calls in `src/` except `main.rs`, and no named spans (no `#[instrument]` / `span!`). - Metrics (optional `metrics` crate): Number of Push callback arrivals, deduplication hit rate, Redis Streams backlog depth (pending), number of DLQ items, number of reconciliation items, JMAP request delay, push failure rate. **Currently not connected to any metrics backend** (`metrics` is not in `Cargo.toml`). - Graceful exit: **Currently not implemented** - There is no signal processing in `src/` (no `tokio::signal` / `ctrl_c`), and there is no flush logic for Streams pending entries; the process is terminated when the container stops. Redis side `C-NO-STATEFUL-RECOVERY` ensures reconstruction from Redis after restart and does not rely on in-process state. - **Reliability goals and strategies** (Streams ACK/retry, idempotent deduplication, Push retry, reconciliation recovery, indicators/alarms, **≥99.9% notification availability and boundaries**) see README.md §6.3 (`NFR-NOTIFY-SLA`). --- ## 9. Test strategy ### 9.1 Levels | Layers | Location | Content | |---|---|---| | Unit | `#[cfg(test)] mod tests` in `src/*.rs` | `config` parsing, `worker` command routing, `ai` HTTPS verification, `state` Redis encapsulation, `channel` outbound, `notify` verification and deduplication, `main` startup branch | | Contract | `src/domain/jmap.rs` | `JmapBackend` trait + `MockBackend`: validate domain verbs with preset data, not connected to the Internet | | Integration | `src/channel.rs` test module | Use in-process `tokio::net::TcpListener` to start mock HTTP service, verify the path, status code and retry of outbound requests | | Real (manual) | `src/domain/jmap/client.rs` | Marked with `#[ignore]`, you need to explicitly configure the JMAP test server before running `cargo test -- --ignored` | **No integration test directory**; the only test on the front end is `web/config.test.mjs` (Node native assertion). ### 9.2 mock strategy - `JmapService` holds the trait `JmapBackend` (`list_emails` / `read_email` / `send_email` / `changes` etc.), the production implementation wrapper `jmap_client::Client` (`src/domain/jmap/client.rs`), and the test `MockBackend` (`src/domain/jmap.rs`). - Telegram outbound does not introduce any framework mock: `src/channel.rs` starts an in-process `TcpListener`, uses `AtomicUsize` to record the number of requests, and verifies the URL, status code and timeout/retry behavior. - `src/ai.rs` asserts HTTPS enforcement (`llm_requires_https`) by constructing the configuration of `LlmClient`; summary logic validates on mock OpenAI compatible endpoint. - The decoupling of channels and domains relies on type constraints (channel SDK types do not appear in the public interface of `domain.rs`) and does not rely on mock channels. ### 9.3 Key invariant testing - `sinceState` is stored in external Redis: resumes the transfer from the correct cursor after simulating restart; restores the cursor from JMAP through reconciliation (`reconcile`, `FLOW-RECONCILE`) after simulating Redis clearing. - Notification deduplication: the same `email_id` will not be pushed repeatedly. - Text escaping: Message text containing `