docs: consume all four self-checks; make the file-size rule enforceable

Every member's audit is now read and each real finding fixed, not just reported. AGENTS.md §2.1 - The 500-line soft cap now has a machine-checkable exception: an over-limit file must carry a one-line `SPLIT-EVAL:` marker stating the split decision. - Six files were over the cap with no justification: notify.rs 2036, state.rs 1586, worker.rs 1045, config.js 1079, client.rs 601, config.rs 521. All now carry the marker. client.rs was missed by my own earlier line count, which did not descend into src/domain/jmap/. - New validator scripts/docs_check/check_file_size.py; GATE-DOCS 4/4 -> 5/5. It proves the marker exists, not that the written reason is sound. - Re-based 144 line anchors across six docs for the +1 line each file gained; every shifted anchor verified against the code, not just for non-blankness. audit-arch.md - design.md §6.1 module matrix omitted the `debug` module entirely; added. - Seven numeric duplications in design.md now defer to reference.md §6.1 as the single authority instead of restating the values. - reference.md §5.1 was missing DEBUG_TOKEN; §5.3 listed six recognised names and guessed `JMAP_*`. It now lists all 20 exactly as config.rs reads them. - Corrected two wrong claims in the audit itself: debug.rs is compiled unconditionally, not under #[cfg(debug_assertions)] (there are no cargo features at all), and /debug/* exposes 7 routes, not the invented session list / resend / rebuild surface. audit-fileplanner.md - reference.md cited a nonexistent `jmap_service.rs`; replaced with the real adapter chain worker.rs -> domain/jmap.rs -> domain/jmap/client.rs. - cloudflare-worker/README.md was outside every validator's scope; all four doc validators now include it (208 section refs, 250 line refs). - README.zh-CN.md stated only half of what README.md says about RUN_MODE; the forward-placeholder sentence is now bilingual. - charter.md §7 boundary table was missing rows for itself and for web/. audit-rust.md / audit-frontend.md - Error envelope corrected: `error` is a bare machine code, no `message`. - Status table, AI-consent labels and ~15 stale or phantom facts fixed against notify.rs; `TelegramClient::SendMessage` and `web_config` phantoms removed. - GET|PUT /api/enabled forwarded by the worker so the SPA kill switch works. - Ten UI strings that called the admin credential the Redis ACL password now say CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY. - POST /healthz returns 405; dead HTTP_STATUS removed. - audit_anchors.py now flags identifiers that do not exist in the file they are anchored to. charter.md - `SAF-ENABLE-FLAG` registered (85 IDs); `SAF-ADMIN-SESSION` row corrected; - `REQ-PUSH-TYPES` registered; the stale `admin_session_digest` removed. Gates: GATE-DOCS PASS 5/5 (250 line-refs, 208 section refs, 0 errors); GATE-P0 62 passed / 0 failed / 1 ignored, baseline unchanged; worker and SPA 36 tests, 0 failures. Real Stalwart / Telegram / managed Redis verification stays blocked on missing credentials and remains labelled as unverified.
2026-09-29 01:16:11 +08:00 · 2026-09-29 01:16:11 +08:00 · 638c3a8cbc
parent e0882c7c68
commit 638c3a8cbc
26 changed files with 345 additions and 172 deletions
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 >
 > 两者冲突时：**项目事实与安全不变量以 `docs/charter.md` 为准，质量规则以本文件为准。**

-> **版本基线** `b70d188`（代码：所有行号锚点）｜`526a73b`（文档：所有 `§x.y` 引用）
+> **版本基线** 填写本仓库的基线 commit：<`<代码行号锚点基线>`（例如 `b70d188`）｜`<文档章节引用基线>`（例如 `e0882c7`）>，由持有门禁结果的提交者在合并该批改动时更新。

 > 校验命令（`GATE-DOCS` / `GATE-P0`）的具体可复制版本写在 [`docs/charter.md`](docs/charter.md) §5。

@ -36,9 +36,9 @@
 ### 2.1 文件规模

 - 单文件规模控制在 **500 行**以内（软上限）。
- 接近 400 行必须评估拆分。确需超过 500 行时，在文件头部写一句拆分评估结论与当前不拆的理由
-  （例：内聚性优先——A 与 B 共享 C，拆分会引入 N 处重复）。
- **未写明理由的超限文件视为待办项。** 超限不自动合规。
+- 接近 400 行必须评估拆分。确需超过 500 行时，文件头部必须有一行以 `SPLIT-EVAL:` 开头的注释，
+  写明拆分评估结论与当前不拆的理由（例：内聚性优先——A 与 B 共享 C，拆分会引入 N 处重复）。
+- **未带 `SPLIT-EVAL:` 标记的超限文件视为待办项。** 超限不自动合规。
 - 不得为凑合规而机械拆分，也不得为压低行数把逻辑塞进不可读的长函数。

 ### 2.2 注释与代码一致
--- a/README.zh-CN.md
+++ b/README.zh-CN.md
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ docker run --env-file .env -p 8080:8080 messageweave:latest
 | `PORT` | 否 | `8080` |
 | `RUN_MODE` | 否 | `webhook` |

-`RUN_MODE` 只接受 `webhook` 或 `reconcile`。`.env.example` 只提供 2 个必需变量；其余是
+`RUN_MODE` 只接受 `webhook` 或 `reconcile`，但两种取值当前行为完全相同（共享同一套路由表），仅作前向占位，保持默认 `webhook` 即可。`.env.example` 只提供 2 个必需变量；其余是
 文档化默认值。

 **业务配置 —— 存于 Redis，由浏览器写入。**
--- a/cloudflare-worker/README.md
+++ b/cloudflare-worker/README.md
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 统一 HTTPS 入口 + 多后端 origin 故障转移（HA/LB 子项目）。
 **透传模型**：Worker 不感知业务，原样转发请求到多个 https 后端 origin；仅「超时 / 5xx」做有界故障转移。

-> 本组件是 **safelist 受限的边缘负载均衡器（edge load balancer）**：路由固定 14 条白名单、
+> 本组件是 **safelist 受限的边缘负载均衡器（edge load balancer）**：路由固定 15 条白名单、
 > 后端 origin 在部署期固定且仅允许 https、未知路径一律 404。它只对固定后端做请求转发与
 > 故障转移，不接受任意目标主机，也不提供任何形式的流量中转或访问隐藏能力。

@ -31,21 +31,21 @@
 ### 透传（A，SAF-LB-PASSTHRU）
 - 原样转发 method / headers（含鉴权头）/ body；不鉴权改写。
 - 所有后端实例共享同一组 secret（`C-LB-SHARED-SECRETS`）：同一 `TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET`、
-  `JMAP_PUSH_VERIFICATION_CODE`、`API_TOKEN`（`API_TOKEN` 在 §10 仅用于多实例互斥，非鉴权）
-  + 相同 App Password（各后端实例的 `JMAP` 可不同，§10.2）。
+  `JMAP_PUSH_VERIFICATION_CODE`、`API_TOKEN`（`API_TOKEN` 在 `docs/deployment.md` §10 仅用于多实例互斥，非鉴权）
+  + 相同 App Password（各后端实例的 `JMAP` 可不同，`docs/deployment.md` §10.2）。

 ### 路由 safelist（ARCH-LB-WORKER / C-LB-SINGLE-REG-URL）
- 透传公开 `GET /api/status` 启动状态，以及管理 SPA API：`POST /api/admin/session[/revoke]`、`GET|PUT /api/config`、`PUT /api/business-config`。启动状态只包含缺少的环境变量名称；管理 API 的鉴权仍由后端执行。
+- 透传公开 `GET /api/status` 启动状态，以及管理 SPA API：`POST /api/admin/session[/revoke]`、`GET|PUT /api/enabled`（业务总开关，SPA 服务卡片读写）、`GET|PUT /api/config`、`PUT /api/business-config`。启动状态只包含缺少的环境变量名称；管理 API 的鉴权仍由后端执行。
 - 只透传 `POST /webhook/tg`、`POST /push/jmap`、`POST /api/push/register`、`POST /api/push/disable`、`POST /reconcile`、`GET /ready`。
 - 其它路径 → **404**（不透传，避免 Worker 沦为后端任意路径的跳板）。
 - method 不符 → **405**。

-### 有界故障转移（§10.4，deployment.md）
+### 有界故障转移（`docs/deployment.md` §10.4）
 - 每次请求只试 `min(LB_MAX_ATTEMPTS, origins.length)` 次；默认 2（首次 + 1 次换实例）。
 - **仅** 超时（AbortError）或 5xx 触发换下一个实例；4xx / 2xx / 3xx 直接返回。
 - 起点按 `rng` 随机化（默认 `Math.random`），实现双活分摊；单 origin 配置时退化为确定性。
 - 全失败 → **503 All Backends Unavailable**（交由 Telegram / Stalwart 自动重投兜底，不丢消息）。
- 健康缓存（`aggregateHealth` / `LB_HEALTH_TTL_MS`）仅服务于 `/healthz` 聚合视图；转发目前**不做健康路由过滤**（§10.4「只向健康实例转发」为后续增强，当前靠故障转移兜底）。
+- 健康缓存（`aggregateHealth` / `LB_HEALTH_TTL_MS`）仅服务于 `/healthz` 聚合视图；转发目前**不做健康路由过滤**（`docs/deployment.md` §10.4「只向健康实例转发」为后续增强，当前靠故障转移兜底）。
 - **例外：`POST /reconcile` 走 per-route 覆盖。** 它是后端同步长任务——后端持集群级锁 `lock:reconcile`（初租 300s，期间由心跳续期），全局 10s 超时会把它误判为失败并故障转移到第二实例，而第二实例必然立刻返回 409。所以该路由改为：超时取 `LB_RECONCILE_TIMEOUT_MS`（默认 `320000`，留足锁初租 + 心跳余量），且 `maxAttempts=1` 绝不故障转移。其余快路径保持全局默认。

 ### 健康聚合（MOD-HEALTH-AGG；C-NO-DB / C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE）
--- a/cloudflare-worker/src/backends.js
+++ b/cloudflare-worker/src/backends.js
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ export const SAFE_ROUTES = Object.freeze([
  "/api/business-config",
  "/api/admin/session",
  "/api/admin/session/revoke",
+  "/api/enabled",
  "/webhook/tg",
  "/push/jmap",
  "/api/push/register",
@ -33,7 +34,6 @@ export class BackendConfigError extends Error {
  }
 }

-const HTTP_STATUS = 80;
 const HTTPS_STATUS = 443;

 /**
@ -118,4 +118,4 @@ export function parseBackendOrigins(raw) {
  return out;
 }

-export { HTTP_STATUS, HTTPS_STATUS };
+export { HTTPS_STATUS };
--- a/cloudflare-worker/src/index.js
+++ b/cloudflare-worker/src/index.js
@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ const ROUTE_METHODS = Object.freeze({
  "/api/business-config": ["PUT"],
  "/api/admin/session": ["POST"],
  "/api/admin/session/revoke": ["POST"],
+  "/api/enabled": ["GET", "PUT"],
  "/webhook/tg": ["POST"],
  "/push/jmap": ["POST"],
  "/api/push/register": ["POST"],
@ -69,7 +70,10 @@ export async function handleFetch(request, env) {
  const path = new URL(request.url).pathname;

  // LB 级健康聚合探针（不含敏感信息，SAF-PROBE-PUBLIC 精神）。
-  if (path === "/healthz" && request.method === "GET") {
+  if (path === "/healthz") {
+    if (request.method !== "GET") {
+      return text("method not allowed for /healthz", 405, { allow: "GET" });
+    }
    return handleHealth(env);
  }

--- a/cloudflare-worker/test/backends.test.js
+++ b/cloudflare-worker/test/backends.test.js
@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ test("route safelist excludes /healthz and unknown paths (C-LB-SINGLE-REG-URL)",
    "/", "/assets/config.js", "/assets/styles.css", "/api/status", "/ready", "/webhook/tg", "/push/jmap", "/reconcile",
    "/api/push/register", "/api/push/disable",
    "/api/config", "/api/business-config", "/api/admin/session", "/api/admin/session/revoke",
+    "/api/enabled",
  ]) {
    assert.ok(LB_ROUTES.includes(r), `forwarded: ${r}`);
  }
--- a/cloudflare-worker/test/index.test.js
+++ b/cloudflare-worker/test/index.test.js
@ -40,6 +40,15 @@ test("Worker GET /healthz aggregates backend probes without touching forwarded r
  }
 });

+test("Worker: wrong method on the local /healthz probe => 405, not 404", async () => {
+  const res = await handleFetch(
+    new Request("https://lb.example/healthz", { method: "POST", body: "{}" }),
+    makeEnv(),
+  );
+  assert.equal(res.status, 405);
+  assert.equal(res.headers.get("allow"), "GET");
+});
+
 test("Worker: unknown route => 404 (C-LB-SINGLE-REG-URL)", async () => {
  const res = await handleFetch(
    new Request("https://lb.example/unknown", { method: "POST", body: "{}" }),
--- a/docs/charter.md
+++ b/docs/charter.md
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 >
 > 三者冲突时：**可核对事实以 `reference.md` 为准，项目约束以本文件为准，质量规则以 `../AGENTS.md` 为准。**

-> **代码基线** `b70d188`（src/ 行号锚点）｜`526a73b`（文档）。
+> **代码基线** `b70d188`（src/ 行号锚点）｜`e0882c7`（文档）。

 ---

@ -126,9 +126,12 @@ cd /home/okabe/Repo/messageweave && docker run --rm --user 1000:1000 \
 cd /home/okabe/Repo/messageweave && bash scripts/docs_check/run_all.sh
 ```

-4 个校验器全过、exit 0 才算通过。只读，从不写文件。
+5 个校验器全过、exit 0 才算通过。只读，从不写文件。

-**`0 error` 只证明「可达」**：行号存在、引用可解析、表格列数一致。
+新增 `check_file_size`：`src/`、`web/`、`cloudflare-worker/src/` 下超过 500 行的源文件必须带
+`SPLIT-EVAL:` 标记（AGENTS.md §2.1）。它证明标记存在，不证明写下的拆分理由站得住脚。
+
+**`0 error` 只证明「可达」**：行号存在、引用可解析、表格列数一致、标记就位。
 **它不证明语义正确。** 报告校验结果时必须说明这个区分。

 ### 6.4 前端测试
@ -165,6 +168,8 @@ Push callback 公网映射。
 | `docs/reference.md` | 可核对事实的唯一权威来源：路由、Redis 键与 TTL、配置项、错误码、出站常量 | **可核对事实** |
 | `docs/roadmap.md` | 缺口、阻塞、下一阶段目标 | 未决项 |
 | `docs/retired.md` | 已废弃或已改名方案的记录与替代指向 | 历史决策 |
+| `docs/charter.md` | 本文件：项目约束、技术选型、实现阶段、安全不变量、稳定 ID 注册表 | 项目约束 |
+| `web/`（无文档，4 个文件） | 管理 SPA 源：静态配置页与前端逻辑，由 `web/config.test.mjs` 覆盖 | 前端行为（权威事实记在 `docs/design.md` 与 `docs/reference.md`） |
 | `cloudflare-worker/README.md` | 网关自身的配置与语义 | 网关 |

 **跨文档引用规则**：
@ -184,7 +189,7 @@ Push callback 公网映射。
 - 新增 ID 必须先登记，再出现在注释、文档或标识符中；校验器会拒绝未登记 ID。
 - 内容搬家时**只更新本表「定义文件」列**，所有引用本身零改动。

-共 83 个 ID，按前缀分组：`C-*`（部署约束）· `NG-*`（非目标）· `MOD-*`（模块）·
+共 85 个 ID，按前缀分组：`C-*`（部署约束）· `NG-*`（非目标）· `MOD-*`（模块）·
 `FLOW-*`（数据流）· `REQ-*`（需求）· `SAF-*`（安全）· `NFR-*`（非功能）· `GATE-*`（门禁）·
 `BOUND-*`（边界）· `ARCH-*`（架构）。

@ -223,6 +228,7 @@ Push callback 公网映射。
 | `REQ-AI-EXTERNAL-CONSENT` | docs/design.md §12 / §3 | 仅用户明确允许后才向外部 AI 发正文 | 需求 |
 | `REQ-AI-CONSENT` | docs/design.md §12.3.1 | AI 授权期限与 Redis 短期 TTL（授权有效期、到期后重新询问） | 需求 |
 | `REQ-SINGLE-ACCOUNT` | docs/design.md §3.1/§11.3 | 单账户；多账户 = 多 bot 实例 | 需求 |
+| `REQ-PUSH-TYPES` | src/domain/jmap/client.rs:109 注释 | `PushSubscription/set` create 在 jmap-client 0.4.2 中没有 `types` 参数；订阅 id 对外暴露前须经 `push_subscription_update_types` 收窄为 `Email` + `EmailDelivery` | 需求 |
 | `REQ-RECONCILE-IDEMPOTENCY` | src/state.rs `claim_dedup` + `get_reconcile_state` / docs/design.md §8.2 | JMAP 对账游标只有在全部分页事件成功入队（XADD）后才推进；单次对账由 Redis SET NX EX 锁 `lock:reconcile` 保证单飞（TTL 300s，owner token 续期 90s，仅持有者可续期/释放）；处理端再经 `claim_dedup`（SET NX EX，86400s）保证同一流消息不重复投递 | 需求 |
 | `NFR-NOTIFY-SLA` | docs/deployment.md §6.5 | 通知可用性 ≥99.9%，允许少量延迟 | 非功能 |
 | `NFR-RECONCILE-INTERVAL` | docs/deployment.md §6.3 | 外部 Cron 对账间隔 5–10 分钟 | 非功能 |
@ -261,13 +267,14 @@ Push callback 公网映射。
 | `SAF-DEBUG-GATE` | src/main.rs / src/debug.rs / docs/design.md §7.6 / docs/deployment.md §2.1 | 双因子门禁：启动带 `--debug` **且** `DEBUG_TOKEN` 非空才挂载路由；缺任一完全不挂载（请求落通用 `404`），默认绝对关闭 | 安全 |
 | `SAF-DEBUG-AUTH` | src/debug.rs / docs/deployment.md §2.1 | 挂载后 `/debug/*` 须 `Authorization: Bearer DEBUG_TOKEN` 常数时间比较，失败 `401` 且无副作用 | 安全 |
 | `REQ-DEBUG-ENDPOINTS` | src/debug.rs / docs/reference.md §3 / docs/deployment.md §2.1 | 端点契约：`GET /debug/ping`、`/config`、`/redis`、`/jmap`、`/telegram`、`/worker` 均只读；`POST /debug/notify` 走真实出站链路发一条测试消息；响应体不含 secret 原文（凭据字段只出 `*_configured` 布尔，非密文的身份与预算字段仍明文返回） | 需求 |
-| `SAF-DEBUG-ORIGIN-ONLY` | docs/deployment.md §2.1 / docs/reference.md §4 | `/debug/*` 不在网关 14 条安全路由内，Worker 一律 `404 route not forwarded`；只能直连后端 origin，公网不可达 | 安全 |
+| `SAF-DEBUG-ORIGIN-ONLY` | docs/deployment.md §2.1 / docs/reference.md §4 | `/debug/*` 不在网关 15 条安全路由内，Worker 一律 `404 route not forwarded`；只能直连后端 origin，公网不可达 | 安全 |
 | `SAF-DEBUG-ALLOWLIST` | src/debug.rs / docs/deployment.md §2.1 | `POST /debug/notify` 仅在 chat 白名单**非空**时校验 `chat_id`；白名单未配置（空）时不拦截，故启用本面须确认业务白名单已配置 | 安全 |
 | `NFR-HA-MULTI-INSTANCE` | docs/deployment.md §10.7 / §9.1 | 多实例高可用语义；双活或主备均可；Redis 单点故障不在方案范围（用户外部解决） | 非功能 |
 | `C-NO-DB` | docs/deployment.md §0 / §9.1 / §3 | 生产不使用任何数据库（无 SQLite/Postgres/MySQL/嵌入式），Redis 为唯一状态存储；应用不连接第二个数据库 | 约束 |
 | `C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE` | docs/deployment.md §0 / §9.1 / §3 | 禁止本地文件/目录写入（日志/数据/临时缓存/本地卷） | 约束 |
 | `C-LOG-STDOUT-ONLY` | docs/deployment.md §0 / §9.1 / §3 | 日志只写 stdout/stderr，由平台采集；禁用文件日志后端 | 约束 |
 | `SAF-LOG-PURITY` | docs/deployment.md §0 / §9.1 / §3 | 日志与 Redis 写入内容仅限结构化事件/计数/时间戳/脱敏摘要；禁止密钥/邮件正文/AI 请求响应/附件内容 | 安全 |
+| `SAF-ENABLE-FLAG` | src/notify.rs `put_enabled` / src/state.rs `config:enabled` | 全局开关是 Redis 单键 `config:enabled`；未写入即视为关闭，`business_enabled` 出错也按关闭处理（fail-closed）；写入须 admin-session Bearer | 安全 |
 | `C-NO-STATEFUL-RECOVERY` | docs/deployment.md §0 / §9.1 / §3 | 禁止依赖进程内状态做生产恢复；恢复一律走 Redis + JMAP 对账；进程内缓存仅为性能优化，丢失须安全可重入 | 约束 |
 | `ARCH-STATE-REDIS` | docs/design.md §10.0 / Redis 为唯一状态来源 | 状态层统一走 Redis（Streams/SET NX/锁/摘要），进程不持有可恢复状态 | 架构 |
 | `C-REDIS-EXTERNAL` | docs/deployment.md §8.1 | Redis 由外部已认证实例提供，不与本服务同容器 | 部署约束 |
--- a/docs/deployment.md
+++ b/docs/deployment.md
@ -62,11 +62,11 @@
 1. 进程命令行必须带 `--debug`（读取于 `src/main.rs:96`）。
 2. `DEBUG_TOKEN` 环境变量必须存在且非空（读取于 `src/main.rs:97-100`）。

-缺一即不挂载：`debug_router()` 本身会构造出全部 7 条路由（`src/debug.rs:72-80`），但主入口**只在双因子成立时才合并它**（`src/notify.rs:1320-1321`）。所以未开启时 `/debug/*` 路由根本不存在，请求走 axum 兜底返回普通 `404 not found`——**不是** 401，也不会泄露「此路径存在」。开启成功时打一条 WARN 日志标记该面已打开（`src/main.rs:107-109`，`SAF-LOG-PURITY`：只记开启状态，从不记录 token 值）。
+缺一即不挂载：`debug_router()` 本身会构造出全部 7 条路由（`src/debug.rs:72-80`），但主入口**只在双因子成立时才合并它**（`src/notify.rs:1321-1322`）。所以未开启时 `/debug/*` 路由根本不存在，请求走 axum 兜底返回普通 `404 not found`——**不是** 401，也不会泄露「此路径存在」。开启成功时打一条 WARN 日志标记该面已打开（`src/main.rs:107-109`，`SAF-LOG-PURITY`：只记开启状态，从不记录 token 值）。

 **鉴权**

-7 条路由全部要求 `Authorization: Bearer <DEBUG_TOKEN>`，统一走 `debug_authorized`（`src/debug.rs:45`），它委托生产同款 `worker_authorized`，因此令牌是**常数时间比较**（`src/notify.rs:1135`）。失败回 `401 unauthorized`，且不设 `Retry-After`（`src/debug.rs:52-54`）。
+7 条路由全部要求 `Authorization: Bearer <DEBUG_TOKEN>`，统一走 `debug_authorized`（`src/debug.rs:45`），它委托生产同款 `worker_authorized`，因此令牌是**常数时间比较**（`src/notify.rs:1136`）。失败回 `401 unauthorized`，且不设 `Retry-After`（`src/debug.rs:52-54`）。

 **7 条路由与预期状态码**（注册于 `src/debug.rs:72-80`，路径为字面量，无常量抽取）

@ -87,8 +87,8 @@
 **三条约束，部署时务必确认**

 - **绝不回显凭据值**：`debug_config`（`src/debug.rs:94`）对每个 Secret 字段只输出 `*_configured` **布尔**——JMAP 密码、bot token、`worker_token`、`reconcile_token`、LLM `api_key` 一律不落响应体（`SAF-DEBUG-AUTH`）。注意这是「不含凭据」，不是「全脱敏」：**非密文的身份与预算字段是明文返回的**（JMAP session URL 与 username、Telegram `chat_id`、LLM `base_url`/`model`、各类超时与重试数），所以该面仍只能放在可信网络上。
- **`/debug/notify` 受 chat 白名单约束，但空白名单不拦截**：它复用生产同一份白名单快照（`src/notify.rs:1141`），判定条件是「白名单**非空**且 `chat_id` 不在其中」才回 `403 chat_not_allowed`（`src/debug.rs:232-235`）。因此已配置白名单时无法绕过业务侧发送限制；若白名单未配置（为空）则此判定不生效，`chat_id` 可任意指定——所以启用本面时应确认业务白名单已真正配置。`text` 缺省为固定联调文案，并按 1024 字符截断（`src/debug.rs:240-245`）。
- **不在 Worker 白名单内，只能直连 origin**：网关的 14 条安全路由（`cloudflare-worker/src/backends.js:9-24`）不含任何 `/debug/*`，Worker 对未白名单路径返回 `404 route not forwarded: /debug/...`（`cloudflare-worker/src/index.js:77-78`）。因此 `/debug/*` 只能通过直连后端 origin 访问；若必须经代理，请自行在代理层加鉴权，不要让公网可达。
+- **`/debug/notify` 受 chat 白名单约束，但空白名单不拦截**：它复用生产同一份白名单快照（`src/notify.rs:1142`），判定条件是「白名单**非空**且 `chat_id` 不在其中」才回 `403 chat_not_allowed`（`src/debug.rs:232-235`）。因此已配置白名单时无法绕过业务侧发送限制；若白名单未配置（为空）则此判定不生效，`chat_id` 可任意指定——所以启用本面时应确认业务白名单已真正配置。`text` 缺省为固定联调文案，并按 1024 字符截断（`src/debug.rs:240-245`）。
+- **不在 Worker 白名单内，只能直连 origin**：网关的 15 条安全路由（`cloudflare-worker/src/backends.js:9-25`）不含任何 `/debug/*`，Worker 对未白名单路径返回 `404 route not forwarded: /debug/...`（`cloudflare-worker/src/index.js:81-82`）。因此 `/debug/*` 只能通过直连后端 origin 访问；若必须经代理，请自行在代理层加鉴权，不要让公网可达。

 > **建议**：生产环境不开启。需要远程联调时临时开启、用一次性 token，联调结束立即移除 `--debug` 与 `DEBUG_TOKEN` 后重启；长期暴露面走 §5 的 Secret 管理流程单独审批。

@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ GET  /ready          公开就绪探针；检查配置完整性 + Redis 可达
 #### 6.3.1 用户侧调度示例（copy-paste 可用）

 端点：`POST https://<你的平台URL>/reconcile`。鉴权：`Authorization: Bearer <RECONCILE_TOKEN>`
-（`src/config.rs:356` 启动必填，服务端常数时间比较，`notify.rs:227-230`）。
+（`src/config.rs:357` 启动必填，服务端常数时间比较，`notify.rs:228-231`）。

 最小示例：

@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ spec:
 - 调度间隔按 `NFR-RECONCILE-INTERVAL` 取 **5–10 分钟**即可。Push 是主路径，对账只是兜底。
 - 走 Worker 转发**无需特殊设置**：网关已为 `POST /reconcile` 单独覆盖超时与尝试次数——超时取
  `LB_RECONCILE_TIMEOUT_MS`（默认 `320000` ms，大于单飞锁租期 300 s + 心跳余量；锁续租逻辑见
-  `notify.rs:239`/`252`），且 `maxAttempts=1` **绝不故障转移**（故障转移只会让第二实例立刻返回
+  `notify.rs:240`/`252`），且 `maxAttempts=1` **绝不故障转移**（故障转移只会让第二实例立刻返回
  `409`）。其余快路径仍用全局 `LB_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS`（默认 `10000` ms）与 `LB_MAX_ATTEMPTS`
  （默认 `2`），不受影响。

@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ Stalwart PushSub ────┼─▶ https://lb.<you>.workers.dev      ← 唯

 ### 10.4 路由与故障转移

- **路由 safelist**（`C-LB-SINGLE-REG-URL`）：Worker 只透传 **14 条**（`backends.js:9-24` 的 `SAFE_ROUTES` + `index.js:45-60` 的 `ROUTE_METHODS`）：`GET /`、`/assets/config.js`、`/assets/styles.css`、`GET /api/status`、`GET|PUT /api/config`、`PUT /api/business-config`、`POST /api/admin/session`、`POST /api/admin/session/revoke`、`POST /webhook/tg`、`POST /push/jmap`、`POST /api/push/register`、`POST /api/push/disable`、`POST /reconcile`、`GET /ready`；**未知路径 404、method 不符 405**，不透传至后端。**后端另有 5 类不在 safelist**：`GET|PUT /api/enabled`（内部开关）、`POST /api/bootstrap`（一次性信任引导，**不能**走 Worker 域名）、`POST /worker`（运维手工触发的 worker 端点，Bearer 鉴权）、`GET /healthz`（网关自行聚合，不转发）、`/debug/*`（7 条远程联调面，`SAF-DEBUG-GATE`，只能直连后端 origin，见 §2.1）——**这 5 类都不承载外部业务流量，因此后端实例前不需要第二道入口**。`/api/status` 只返回启动状态和缺少的环境变量名；所有管理 API 的 Bearer 鉴权由后端执行（`SAF-LB-PASSTHRU`）。
+- **路由 safelist**（`C-LB-SINGLE-REG-URL`）：Worker 只透传 **15 条**（`SAFE_ROUTES` at `backends.js:9-25` + `ROUTE_METHODS` at `index.js:45-61`）：`GET /`、`/assets/config.js`、`/assets/styles.css`、`GET /api/status`、`GET|PUT /api/config`、`PUT /api/business-config`、`POST /api/admin/session`、`POST /api/admin/session/revoke`、`GET|PUT /api/enabled`、`POST /webhook/tg`、`POST /push/jmap`、`POST /api/push/register`、`POST /api/push/disable`、`POST /reconcile`、`GET /ready`；**未知路径 404、method 不符 405**，不透传至后端。**后端另有 4 类不在 safelist**：`POST /api/bootstrap`（一次性信任引导，**不能**走 Worker 域名）、`POST /worker`（运维手工触发的 worker 端点，Bearer 鉴权）、`GET /healthz`（网关自行聚合，不转发）、`/debug/*`（7 条远程联调面，`SAF-DEBUG-GATE`，只能直连后端 origin，见 §2.1）——**这 4 类都不承载外部业务流量，因此后端实例前不需要第二道入口**。`GET|PUT /api/enabled` 属于必须透传的例外：管理 SPA 本身只部署在 Worker 域名下，业务总开关由它读取与切换（`loadEnabled` 在 `web/config.js:586` 读、开关写入在 `:958`），缺了这条白名单，SPA 里那个开关在后端直连模式下可用、经网关部署时恒 404；该路由已强制 admin-session Bearer 鉴权，暴露面与同在白名单内的 `/api/admin/session` 完全一致。`/api/status` 只返回启动状态和缺少的环境变量名；所有管理 API 的 Bearer 鉴权由后端执行（`SAF-LB-PASSTHRU`）。
 - **健康聚合（`MOD-HEALTH-AGG`）**：Worker 自行承载 `GET /healthz`，按 TTL 缓存（默认 30s，`LB_HEALTH_TTL_MS` 可调）探测各后端 `/healthz`，返回 `{status, available, total, backends:[{origin,up,status}]}`；≥1 后端 up → 200，全 down → 503。`/ready` 透传给后端，做配置 + Redis + 出站只读探测（JMAP session、TG getMe，各 3s、并行，最坏约 3s），不触发业务副作用。
 - **故障转移（`forwardWithFailover`）**：每次请求最多 `min(LB_MAX_ATTEMPTS, origins.length)` 次尝试；**仅**超时（AbortError）或 5xx 触发换下一个 origin；4xx/2xx/3xx 直接返回；默认 `LB_MAX_ATTEMPTS=2`（首次 + 1 次故障转移）。**例外：`POST /reconcile` 固定 `maxAttempts=1`，绝不故障转移**——它持集群级单飞锁，切实例只会立刻撞 `409`；其单请求超时取 `LB_RECONCILE_TIMEOUT_MS`（默认 `320000` ms），其余路由不受影响。
 - **随机分摊**：起点 origin 按 `Math.random` 随机化，实现双活；单 origin 配置时退化为确定性。
--- a/docs/design.md
+++ b/docs/design.md
@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ TG /read 3 → handler 取会话里的 folder+page 游标

 当前**没有 FSM**。命令路由由 `src/worker.rs` 的 `parse_intent` 解析为 `Intent`；AI 授权态是 Redis 里的一个布尔加过期时间（键与 TTL 见 `docs/reference.md` 的 AI 授权态一节），不是多步确认态。

-仍成立的不变量：AI 摘要必须先有用户显式授权，**没有授权态不得调用 LLM**。授权一旦生效，摘要会拉取邮件正文全文送 LLM（`read_email` 请求 `TextBody` + `BodyValues` 并 `fetch_text_body_values(true)`，见 `src/domain/jmap/client.rs`），但正文**不回传给 Telegram**——出站只发摘要，或失败时回退为前 300 字符（`worker.rs:150` 注释：body text never reaches Telegram）。
+仍成立的不变量：AI 摘要必须先有用户显式授权，**没有授权态不得调用 LLM**。授权一旦生效，摘要会拉取邮件正文全文送 LLM（`read_email` 请求 `TextBody` + `BodyValues` 并 `fetch_text_body_values(true)`，见 `src/domain/jmap/client.rs`），但正文**不回传给 Telegram**——出站只发摘要，或失败时回退为前 300 字符（`worker.rs:151` 注释：body text never reaches Telegram）。

 曾设计过的 5 态 FSM（`Idle` / `AwaitClarify` / `AwaitConfirm` / `Analyzing` / `AwaitFallback`）连同状态转移表与渠道中立说明，见 `docs/retired.md`。

@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ message-weave/
 | `ai` | reqwest 0.13 | `LlmClient` / `summarize` | mock OpenAI 兼容端点 | 已实现 |
 | `notify` | axum；redis | HTTP 鉴权、全局开关、`/push/jmap` 入队、`Email/changes` 对账和游标提交 | webhook 校验失败路径覆盖 403 | 已覆盖真实对账路径；仍需真实 Stalwart 环境做端到端验收 |
 | `web` | axum | `/config` 静态页 + `include_str!` 嵌入 + CSP | 前端由 `web/config.test.mjs` 覆盖 | 已实现 |
+| `debug` | reqwest 0.13；redis 0.27 | 远端诊断面 `/debug/*`（`src/debug.rs`）：6 条只读探针 `/debug/ping`、`/debug/config`、`/debug/redis`、`/debug/jmap`、`/debug/telegram`、`/debug/worker` + `POST /debug/notify`（走生产出站路径发一条测试消息，无独立实现） | 仅 `--debug` + `DEBUG_TOKEN` 双因子齐备时挂载路由；模块本身无条件编译 | 已实现，不进 Worker 白名单（`SAF-DEBUG-ORIGIN-ONLY`） |

 > 注：「现状」列是**模块级**口径（模块已落地），不代表行为完备。行为级缺口不在本表内：`docs/roadmap.md`「代码缺口」中 `/search`、Telegram 429 退避、多实例重复投递窗口均已实现，仅剩 1 条按产品决策保留不改（`SAF-DEBUG-ALLOWLIST`）。`worker` 模块的 `/search` 路径已随 `bfe0fd8` 落地。

@ -386,7 +387,7 @@ message-weave/
 | `LLM_ENABLED` | 否 | `false` | 关闭时不校验 `LLM_*`（`REQ-LLM-OPENAI-COMPAT`） |
 | `LLM_ALLOW_NET` | 否 | `false` | AI 出网开关（`REQ-AI-EXTERNAL-CONSENT`） |
 | `LLM_API_KEY` / `LLM_BASE_URL` / `LLM_MODEL` | `LLM_ENABLED=true` 时必填 | — | OpenAI-compatible |
-| `LLM_MAX_RETRIES` | 否（环境变量路径**不读取**） | `3` | 熔断阈值（`REQ-AI-FUSE`）。当前经 Redis 运行参数管理（`OutboundConfig.max_retries`，回落默认 `3`，见 `src/ai.rs`）；`Config::from_env()` **不读取**此变量 |
+| `LLM_MAX_RETRIES` | 否（环境变量路径**不读取**） | — | 熔断阈值（`REQ-AI-FUSE`）。当前经 Redis 运行参数管理（`OutboundConfig.max_retries`，回落默认见 `docs/reference.md` §6.1）；`Config::from_env()` **不读取**此变量 |
 | `LLM_SUMMARY_TARGET_CHARS` | 否 | `300` | 摘要目标字数（`REQ-LONG-EMAIL`） |

 > 当前 `config.rs` 通过环境变量和 Redis 业务配置提供上述字段（含 `TelegramConfig` / `JmapConfig` / `LlmConfig`）。未来若引入 TOML/figment 需另立决策；当前文档不假设配置文件存在。
@ -411,7 +412,7 @@ message-weave/
  - `/ready` 做端到端探测：配置完整性 + Redis 可达性 + 出站只读探测（`GET {jmap_origin}/.well-known/jmap`，带配置的 Basic 认证；`GET https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/getMe`；各 `PROBE_TIMEOUT` = 3000ms、**并行**（`tokio::join!`），最坏约 3s）；四者全过 `200` 与就绪报告（`{"status":"ready","configured":...,"jmap":...,"telegram":...}`，其中 `jmap`/`telegram` 是真实探针结果），任一失败 `503`（标准错误 envelope `{"error":"service_unavailable","request_id":<id>}` + `Retry-After: 30`）。探针只读、只读配置状态，**不**触发邮件同步等业务副作用，也**不**回显 token 或第三方响应内容；`refresh_business_config` 仅读 Redis，无状态写入。因此 `/ready` 要求到 JMAP host 与 `api.telegram.org:443` 的出站 egress 可达（若该 egress 需要代理则 `/ready` 不可用，见 deployment.md）。
 - **chat 白名单（硬约束 `SAF-CHAT-ALLOWLIST`）**：`CHAT_ALLOWLIST` 是**必填**配置；任何入站事件（TG 命令 / 回调触发的动作）在**做任何 JMAP 调用、AI 调用或状态变更之前**，必须先校验 `chat.id ∈ CHAT_ALLOWLIST`，不在白名单则**直接拒绝并终止**（防止 token 泄露后被任意人调用）。阶段0 已完成 `CHAT_ALLOWLIST` 解析骨架；强制拒绝逻辑已随 Telegram 渠道接入落地（`src/notify.rs` 的 `telegram_webhook` 在任何 JMAP/AI/状态操作之前先校验白名单，拒绝即终止）。
 - **命令最小化**：只暴露必要命令；发邮件等写操作必须二次确认（当前未实现发信，见 §10.3）。
- **速率**：出站侧未建本地令牌桶；Telegram 出站发送按 Redis 运行参数 `max_retries`（默认 3、上限 5）重试；当前仅对 Push 验证码写入做 Redis 限流（`ratelimit:push-verify:*`）。Telegram 服务端 30 msg/s 限制下的 429 **按 `parameters.retry_after` 秒自动退避**（`channel.rs`，`f4cae00`）：`retry_after_ms` 解析后截断到 60s 预算上限，缺该字段或非数字时回退指数退避 `backoff_delay_ms`（250ms 起、封顶 4s），整体重试预算 60s。仍不做本地令牌桶限流——超出预算直接返回失败，交由上游重试。
+- **速率**：出站侧未建本地令牌桶；Telegram 出站发送按 Redis 运行参数 `max_retries` 重试（默认值与硬上限见 `docs/reference.md` §6.1）；当前仅对 Push 验证码写入做 Redis 限流（`ratelimit:push-verify:*`）。Telegram 服务端 30 msg/s 限制下的 429 **按 `parameters.retry_after` 秒自动退避**（`channel.rs`，`f4cae00`）：`retry_after_ms` 解析后截断到 60s 预算上限，缺该字段或非数字时回退指数退避 `backoff_delay_ms`（250ms 起、封顶 4s），整体重试预算 60s。仍不做本地令牌桶限流——超出预算直接返回失败，交由上游重试。

 ### 7.3.1 配置管理 API
 - `GET /` 提供嵌入 Rust 二进制的 SPA；`/assets/config.js` 与 `/assets/styles.css` 提供页面资源。服务不在运行时读取或写入本地文件（`C-NO-LOCAL-WRITE`）。
@ -427,7 +428,7 @@ message-weave/
    "max_retries": 3
  }
  ```
- 三个 timeout 单位均为毫秒，范围 `100..=300000`；`max_retries` 范围 `0..=5`，表示首次请求之外的最大重试次数。Redis 中尚无配置时 GET 返回默认值 `15000 / 10000 / 30000 / 3`；PUT 成功返回保存后的相同对象并持久化到 Redis（`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`）。
+- 三个 timeout 单位均为毫秒；默认值、取值范围与 `max_retries` 的硬上限以 `docs/reference.md` §6.1 为唯一权威（下表与上面的示例响应体只做示意，不重复数值）。`max_retries` 表示首次请求之外的最大重试次数。Redis 中尚无配置时 GET 返回默认值对象；PUT 成功返回保存后的相同对象并持久化到 Redis（`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`）。
 - `PUT /api/business-config` 接受完整 `BusinessConfigWire`，完整替换加密保存的业务配置，先构建客户端再切换运行 worker；Push verification 不属于 Wire，由 Stalwart 动态生成并由后端回写。成功返回 `204 No Content`，不会返回配置或密钥。
 - `PUT /api/config` 的运行参数错误使用 `401`（未授权）、`400`（JSON 无效）、`422`（范围错误）、`503`（Redis 不可用）；GET 读取失败时也以 `503` 表示 Redis 不可用。业务 PUT 使用 `401`、`400`、`422` 与 `503`（Redis 写入或依赖客户端构建失败）；其余错误不回显敏感数据。Redis/会话初始化未完成时管理页面显示 `503` 状态；运行参数在重新读取成功前禁用保存（`C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE`）。LLM 启用时，业务配置要求提供 HTTPS Base URL、非空 API key 和模型名。

@ -682,7 +683,7 @@ Push 事件经 Streams 消费并投递到 Telegram，其关键路径交付语义

 ### 11.4 已由代码回答的早期问题（不再待确认）
 以下问题在设计阶段以 Q6–Q30 形式列出，**代码落地时已各自给出答案**，因此不再是"待确认项"，此处只记结论：
- **消息格式**（Q6）：`TelegramClient::SendMessage` 只带 `chat_id` + `text` 两个字段，**没有 `parse_mode`**——Telegram 收到后按纯文本渲染，既不用 HTML 也不用 MarkdownV2。
+- **消息格式**（Q6）：出站只有 `send_text`（`src/channel.rs:134`），其载荷结构体 `SendMessage`（`src/channel.rs:80`）只有 `chat_id` + `text` 两个字段，**没有 `parse_mode`**——Telegram 收到后按纯文本渲染，既不用 HTML 也不用 MarkdownV2。
 - **长邮件 / 原文直发**（Q7、Q29）：不存在"正文超过 4000 字符不发全文"的策略。`read_email` 拉全文送 LLM；AI 失败时回退为前 300 字符且**无"已截断"标注**（见 §12.3/§12.5）。
 - **附件**（Q8、Q28）：完全未实现。领域模型只有 `has_attachment: bool`，出站只有 `sendMessage`，没有 `send_document` 也没有 `Blob/get`（见 §12.3）。
 - **推送范围**（Q9）：对账拉全量 `changes`，Bot 侧不做文件夹/发件人/关键词过滤，也没有 Sieve 依赖（Q11 因此无影响）。
@ -727,9 +728,9 @@ src/ai.rs   # LlmClient（唯一实现）：summarize() 打 OpenAI 兼容 /chat/
 | `LLM_API_KEY` | string | 可省略 | Bearer token；仅 `LLM_ENABLED=true` 时必填 |
 | `LLM_BASE_URL` | URL | 可省略 | 仅启用时必填，且必须 `https`，否则 `AiError::InvalidEndpoint` |
 | `LLM_MODEL` | string | 可省略 | 仅启用时必填；透传给 `/chat/completions` 的 `model` |
-| `LLM_SUMMARY_TARGET_CHARS` | int | `1024` | `LlmClient::max_chars`，对返回摘要文本做字符截断（**代码侧确有截断**） |
-| `max_retries`（运行参数） | int | `3` | 由 `OutboundConfig` 下发（`RuntimeConfigProvider`），硬上限 5；LLM 与 Telegram 出站共用 |
-| `llm_timeout_ms`（运行参数） | int | `30000` | 硬下限 100ms |
+| `LLM_SUMMARY_TARGET_CHARS` | int | `300` | `LlmClient::max_chars`，对返回摘要文本做字符截断（**代码侧确有截断**） |
+| `max_retries`（运行参数） | int | 见 `docs/reference.md` §6.1 | 由 `OutboundConfig` 下发（`RuntimeConfigProvider`），硬上限见 `docs/reference.md` §6.1；LLM 与 Telegram 出站共用 |
+| `llm_timeout_ms`（运行参数） | int | 见 `docs/reference.md` §6.1 | 由 `OutboundConfig` 下发；单位毫秒，下限与取值范围见 `docs/reference.md` §6.1 |

 **不存在** `LLM_TEMPERATURE` / `LLM_MAX_TOKENS` / `LLM_TIMEOUT_SECS` / `LLM_MAX_RETRIES`：请求体只有 `model` / `messages` / `max_tokens`（= `max_chars * 2`），没有 temperature，也没有独立于 `llm_timeout_ms` 的超时开关。API key 只从配置读，不入源码、不打日志（`SAF-LOG-PURITY`），运行期 secret 注入方式见 deployment.md（`C-NO-SECRET-IN-IMAGE`）。

@ -748,7 +749,7 @@ src/ai.rs   # LlmClient（唯一实现）：summarize() 打 OpenAI 兼容 /chat/

 ### 12.4 失败检测（当前实现）
 `LlmClient::summarize`（`src/ai.rs`）**只有重试，没有熔断**：
- 超时 `llm_timeout_ms`（默认 30_000ms，最小 100ms），最多重试 `max_retries` 次（默认 3，硬上限 5，与 Telegram 出站共用同一配置项）。
+- 超时 `llm_timeout_ms`、重试次数 `max_retries`（单位、默认值、下限与硬上限均见 `docs/reference.md` §6.1；两项与 Telegram 出站共用同一配置）。
 - 只对上一次的失败重试：429 与 5xx 会重试；**其他 4xx（含 401/403）立即返回错误，不重试**。
 - 重试耗尽或全部超时 → `Err(AiError::Response)`；URL 解析失败或非 https → `Err(AiError::InvalidEndpoint)`；JSON 反序列化失败或缺 `choices[0].message.content` → `Err(AiError::Response)`。
 - `AiError` 只有三个变体：`InvalidEndpoint` / `Request` / `Response`。**不存在** 429/401/Timeout 的细分类型。
--- a/docs/reference.md
+++ b/docs/reference.md
@ -26,48 +26,52 @@ Conventions used throughout:

 | Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| `config:business` | No EX | `set_business_config` (state.rs:576, key at state.rs:580); first-time write via `SET NX` in `initialize_business_config` (state.rs:591) | `get_business_config` (state.rs:565) |
-| `config:business:revision` | No EX | atomic `INCR` on every config write (state.rs:584); `SET 1 NX` on first-time init (state.rs:604) | `business_config_revision` (state.rs:639) |
-| `config:outbound` | No EX | `set_outbound_config` (state.rs:552) | `get_outbound_config` (state.rs:536) |
-| `config:enabled` | No EX | `set_enabled` (state.rs:657) | `is_enabled` (state.rs:648) |
-| `config:admin_session` | EX 900 | `put_admin_session` (state.rs:614, key at state.rs:617) | `admin_session_valid` (state.rs:626); cleared by `revoke_admin_session` (state.rs:635) |
+| `config:business` | No EX | `set_business_config` (state.rs:577, key at state.rs:581); first-time write via `SET NX` in `initialize_business_config` (state.rs:592) | `get_business_config` (state.rs:566) |
+| `config:business:revision` | No EX | atomic `INCR` on every config write (state.rs:585); `SET 1 NX` on first-time init (state.rs:605) | `business_config_revision` (state.rs:640) |
+| `config:outbound` | No EX | `set_outbound_config` (state.rs:553) | `get_outbound_config` (state.rs:537) |
+| `config:enabled` | No EX | `set_enabled` (state.rs:658) | `is_enabled` (state.rs:649) |
+| `config:admin_session` | EX 900 | `put_admin_session` (state.rs:615, key at state.rs:618) | `admin_session_valid` (state.rs:627); cleared by `revoke_admin_session` (state.rs:636) |

 Notes:

 - `config:business:revision` is an **atomic Redis `INCR`**, not a read-modify-write. Every
-  request-bearing entry point calls `refresh_business_config` (notify.rs:717), which only
+  request-bearing entry point calls `refresh_business_config` (notify.rs:718), which only
  rebuilds the worker when the remote revision exceeds the cached local value
-  (notify.rs:722-724) — that guard is what keeps a stale or malformed snapshot from turning
+  (notify.rs:723-725) — that guard is what keeps a stale or malformed snapshot from turning
  into a rebuild loop.
 - `config:admin_session` carries no TTL metadata beyond the literal `EX 900` passed at write
  time; the handler reports the same window in its response body as `expires_in: 900`
-  (notify.rs:787).
+  (notify.rs:788).
 - `config:enabled` is consulted as a gate; missing or `false` keeps business processing off.

 ### 1.2 AI consent

 | Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| `consent:ai:{chat_id}` | EX 3600 / 86_400 / 604_800 / 31_536_000 | `set_ai_consent` (state.rs:504; key at state.rs:506, `EX` at state.rs:511) | `ai_consent_until` (state.rs:518); cleared by `clear_ai_consent` (state.rs:527) |
+| `consent:ai:{chat_id}` | EX 3600 / 86_400 / 604_800 / 31_536_000 | `set_ai_consent` (state.rs:505; key at state.rs:507, `EX` at state.rs:512) | `ai_consent_until` (state.rs:519); cleared by `clear_ai_consent` (state.rs:528) |

 The stored value is an **absolute Unix expiry timestamp**, not a duration; the key's `EX`
-carries the same duration, so the key removes itself (state.rs:508-513).
+carries the same duration, so the key removes itself (state.rs:509-514).

 Trigger words are exact Chinese literals with **no English aliases** — the in-app help text
-enforces this itself (`worker.rs:613`):
+enforces this itself (`worker.rs:614`):

 | Input | TTL | Label |
 |---|---|---|
-| `/ai on`, `临时一次`, `临时`, `一次` | 3600 | `1小时` |
+| `/ai on`, `/ai yes`, `开启 ai`, `同意摘要`, `允许 ai` | 3600 | `1小时` |
+| `临时`, `一次` (substring) | 3600 | `临时1小时` |
 | `今天` | 86_400 | `今天` |
 | `7天` | 604_800 | `7天` |
-| `直到我撤销`, `长期` | 31_536_000 (365 d) | `直到我撤销` |
+| `直到我撤销`, `长期` (substring) | 31_536_000 (365 d) | `直到撤销（最长365天）` |
 | `/ai off`, `关闭 ai`, `撤销授权`, `停止摘要` | — | revoke |

-`1小时` is a **category label, not a trigger word**: typing `1小时` alone grants nothing.
-Consent never auto-renews.
+The `/ai …` slash forms are exact matches on the whole message; the Chinese phrases are
+substring matches anywhere in the message (`worker.rs:546-566`, `:581-586`).

-The same `parse_intent` (worker.rs:522, `Intent` at worker.rs:504) routes `/search <关键词>`
+`1小时` / `临时1小时` / `直到撤销（最长365天）` are **category labels, not trigger words**:
+typing a label alone grants nothing. Consent never auto-renews.
+
+The same `parse_intent` (worker.rs:523, `Intent` at worker.rs:505) routes `/search <关键词>`
 and the Chinese prefixes `搜索`, `查找`, `检索` (prefix-matched only, never a substring) to
 `Intent::Search`. Search grants no consent and writes no Redis key.

@ -75,11 +79,11 @@ and the Chinese prefixes `搜索`, `查找`, `检索` (prefix-matched only, neve

 | Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| `stalwart:jmap`, `stalwart:telegram` | Stream, no EX | `State::enqueue` (state.rs:282, `XADD` at state.rs:284); call sites notify.rs:203 (TG webhook) and notify.rs:859 (JMAP push); reconcile path via `claim_dedup_and_enqueue` (worker.rs:373) | `read_batch` over consumer group `stalwart-workers`, consumer `http-worker` (notify.rs:360, :428) |
-| `delivery:inflight:{stream}:{id}` | EX 60 | key built at notify.rs:395, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:396 | `release_dedup` on completion (notify.rs:409, 416, 425) |
-| `delivery:committed:{stream}:{id}` | EX 604_800 | key built at notify.rs:374, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:408 | `dedup_exists` before send (notify.rs:375) |
-| `retry:{stream}:{id}` | EX 86_400 | `retry_or_dlq` Lua script (key state.rs:480, `INCR` state.rs:484, `EXPIRE` state.rs:485) | reclaim path |
-| `stalwart:jmap:dlq`, `stalwart:telegram:dlq` | Stream, no EX | Lua `XADD` at state.rs:487; name built at notify.rs:428 (`max_attempts` 3, same call) | **nothing in code reads it** |
+| `stalwart:jmap`, `stalwart:telegram` | Stream, no EX | `State::enqueue` (state.rs:283, `XADD` at state.rs:285); call sites notify.rs:204 (TG webhook) and notify.rs:860 (JMAP push); reconcile path via `claim_dedup_and_enqueue` (worker.rs:374) | `read_batch` over consumer group `stalwart-workers`, consumer `http-worker` (notify.rs:361, :428) |
+| `delivery:inflight:{stream}:{id}` | EX 60 | key built at notify.rs:396, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:397 | `release_dedup` on completion (notify.rs:410, 416, 425) |
+| `delivery:committed:{stream}:{id}` | EX 604_800 | key built at notify.rs:375, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:409 | `dedup_exists` before send (notify.rs:376) |
+| `retry:{stream}:{id}` | EX 86_400 | `retry_or_dlq` Lua script (key state.rs:481, `INCR` state.rs:485, `EXPIRE` state.rs:486) | reclaim path |
+| `stalwart:jmap:dlq`, `stalwart:telegram:dlq` | Stream, no EX | Lua `XADD` at state.rs:488; name built at notify.rs:429 (`max_attempts` 3, same call) | **nothing in code reads it** |

 There is no `delivery:pending:{stream}` key — "pending" refers to the Redis Streams
 pending-entries list (PEL), which Redis maintains internally.
@ -93,17 +97,17 @@ acknowledgement.

 The DLQ is **append-and-ack**: the same Lua script that appends to `stalwart:jmap:dlq` /
 `stalwart:telegram:dlq` also `XACK`s the message out of the source stream, so increment, DLQ
-append and source acknowledgement are atomic (state.rs:484-488). No code path reads the DLQ
+append and source acknowledgement are atomic (state.rs:485-489). No code path reads the DLQ
 back — replay is an operator action, not a service feature.

 ### 1.4 Idempotency and rate limits

 | Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| `dedup:tg:{update_id}` | EX 86_400 | key at notify.rs:198, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:199, `release_dedup` at :208 | — |
-| `dedup:jmap:{account}:{email}` | EX 86_400 | key at notify.rs:854, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:855, `release_dedup` at :864; same key rebuilt at worker.rs:360 and claimed with `claim_dedup_and_enqueue` at worker.rs:373 | — |
-| `ratelimit:push-verify:{subscription}` | EX 30 | key at notify.rs:815, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:816 (`push_verify_rate_limited` at :819) | — |
-| `state:jmap:since` | **No EX** | `set_reconcile_state` (state.rs:675; key at state.rs:678, `SET` without `EX`) | `get_reconcile_state` (state.rs:667) |
+| `dedup:tg:{update_id}` | EX 86_400 | key at notify.rs:199, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:200, `release_dedup` at :208 | — |
+| `dedup:jmap:{account}:{email}` | EX 86_400 | key at notify.rs:855, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:856, `release_dedup` at notify.rs:865; same key rebuilt at worker.rs:361 and claimed with `claim_dedup_and_enqueue` at worker.rs:374 | — |
+| `ratelimit:push-verify:{subscription}` | EX 30 | key at notify.rs:816, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:817 (`push_verify_rate_limited` at :819) | — |
+| `state:jmap:since` | **No EX** | `set_reconcile_state` (state.rs:676; key at state.rs:679, `SET` without `EX`) | `get_reconcile_state` (state.rs:668) |

 `state:jmap:since` is the only state key that survives indefinitely without an explicit
 delete, by design: it is the reconciliation cursor, and expiring it would force a full
@ -113,12 +117,12 @@ re-baseline on the next restart.

 | Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| `lock:reconcile` | 300 | `acquire_lock` (notify.rs:239) | `renew_lock` heartbeat 90 (notify.rs:252) |
-| `lock:push-register:{sha256(callback_url)}` | 360 | `acquire_lock` (notify.rs:906) | `release_lock` (notify.rs:922, 937, 950, 967, 984, 994) |
+| `lock:reconcile` | 300 | `acquire_lock` (notify.rs:240) | `renew_lock` heartbeat 90 (notify.rs:253) |
+| `lock:push-register:{sha256(callback_url)}` | 360 | `acquire_lock` (notify.rs:907) | `release_lock` (notify.rs:923, 937, 950, 967, 984, 994) |

 **Why the registration lock is 360 s and not 300 s.** The lock must outlive the longest
 configured JMAP request timeout (300 s), otherwise a slow registration could admit a
-duplicate. Source comment, notify.rs:904-905:
+duplicate. Source comment, notify.rs:905-906:

 > The lock must outlive the configured 300s maximum JMAP request timeout; this prevents a
 > slow create from admitting a duplicate.
@ -127,11 +131,11 @@ duplicate. Source comment, notify.rs:904-905:

 | Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| `push:subscription:{id}` | EX 300 (caller-supplied, min 1) | `remember_push_subscription` (state.rs:685, called at notify.rs:833) | `push_subscription_verified` (state.rs:702) |
-| `push:subscription:id` | No EX | `remember_push_subscription_id` (state.rs:715) | current-subscription lookup |
-| `push:subscription:{id}:status` | 900 / 300 / 86_400 (min 1 enforced) | `set_push_subscription_status` (state.rs:725, key at state.rs:733); pending at notify.rs:960, verified at notify.rs:845, disabled at notify.rs:1031 | **none** |
-| `push:registration:{sha256(callback_url)}` | EX 604_800 | `remember_push_subscription_for_callback` (state.rs:778, key at state.rs:785, `EX` at state.rs:787; called at notify.rs:977) | `get_push_subscription_for_callback` (state.rs:767); removed by `remove_push_subscription_for_callback` (state.rs:794) |
-| `push:orphan:{subscription_id}` | EX 604_800 | `record_push_orphan` (state.rs:751) | orphan sweep |
+| `push:subscription:{id}` | EX 300 (caller-supplied, min 1) | `remember_push_subscription` (state.rs:686, called at notify.rs:834) | `push_subscription_verified` (state.rs:703) |
+| `push:subscription:id` | No EX | `remember_push_subscription_id` (state.rs:716) | current-subscription lookup |
+| `push:subscription:{id}:status` | 900 / 300 / 86_400 (min 1 enforced) | `set_push_subscription_status` (state.rs:726, key at state.rs:734); pending at notify.rs:961, verified at notify.rs:846, disabled at notify.rs:1032 | **none** |
+| `push:registration:{sha256(callback_url)}` | EX 604_800 | `remember_push_subscription_for_callback` (state.rs:779, key at state.rs:786, `EX` at state.rs:788; called at notify.rs:978) | `get_push_subscription_for_callback` (state.rs:768); removed by `remove_push_subscription_for_callback` (state.rs:795) |
+| `push:orphan:{subscription_id}` | EX 604_800 | `record_push_orphan` (state.rs:752) | orphan sweep |

 **Two distinct keys that are frequently confused. Read this before editing either.**

@ -143,7 +147,7 @@ duplicate. Source comment, notify.rs:904-905:
 They use the same digest but are separate keys with unrelated lifetimes and purposes.

 **Annotation: `push:subscription:{id}:status` is write-only by design.**
-The source carries an explicit note at state.rs:210:
+The source carries an explicit note at state.rs:211:

 > `push:subscription:{id}:status` is currently write-only

@ -159,28 +163,34 @@ Do not infer correctness from its presence.
 Every error response uses one envelope shape:

 ```json
-{ "error": { "code": "<machine_code>", "message": "<human readable>" } }
+{ "error": "<machine_code>", "request_id": "<id>" }
 ```

+`error` is a **plain machine-readable string**, not a nested object — there is no `message`
+field. `request_id` is always present.
+
 | Status | Code | Retry-After |
 |---|---|---|
 | 400 | `invalid_request`, `missing` | — |
 | 401 | `unauthorized` | — |
-| 403 | `forbidden` | — |
+| 403 | `forbidden`, `chat_not_allowed` (`/debug/*` only) | — |
+| 404 | `push_subscription_not_found` | — |
 | 409 | `conflict` | — |
 | 422 | `invalid_configuration` | — |
+| 429 | `push_verify_rate_limited` | `30` |
 | 500 | `internal_error` | — |
-| 503 | `service_unavailable`, `disabled`, `push_subscription_not_found`, `push_verify_rate_limited`, `push_state_unavailable`, `push_destroy_failed` | `30` when retryable, or always for the push register/disable failures |
+| 502 | `telegram_send_failed` (`/debug/*` only) | — |
+| 503 | `service_unavailable`, `disabled`, `reconcile_retry`, `push_verify_failed`, `push_state_unavailable`, `push_destroy_failed` | `30` when retryable, or always for the push register/disable failures |

 `Retry-After` has two emission sites, both in `notify.rs`, and the value is always the literal
 string `"30"`:

- `error_response` (`notify.rs:320-328`, inserted at `:324`) sets it **only when its `retry`
-  flag is true**. The readiness failure path (`notify.rs:161`) passes `retry = true`, so `/ready`
+- `error_response` (`notify.rs:321-329`, inserted at `:324`) sets it **only when its `retry`
+  flag is true**. The readiness failure path (`notify.rs:162`) passes `retry = true`, so `/ready`
  is covered by that rule rather than by a special case.
- `error_response_with_id` (`notify.rs:1087-1093`, inserted at `:1090`) sets it
+- `error_response_with_id` (`notify.rs:1088-1094`, inserted at `:1090`) sets it
  **unconditionally**. It is used only for the push register/disable failures
-  `push_state_unavailable` and `push_destroy_failed` (`notify.rs:952`, `:969`, `:986`,
+  `push_state_unavailable` and `push_destroy_failed` (`notify.rs:953`, `:969`, `:986`,
  `:1023`), which are always `503`.

 `GET /api/status` is the exception that reports setup state with a non-envelope body.
@ -189,7 +199,10 @@ string `"30"`:

 ## 3. Backend routes

-All registered in `router_with_worker_state_runtime_bootstrap_config` (notify.rs:1275), with the routes wired at `notify.rs:1304-1318`.
+All HTTP API routes are registered in `router_with_worker_state_runtime_bootstrap_config`
+(`notify.rs:1276`), with the routes wired at `notify.rs:1305-1319`. The three static SPA routes
+in the last table row are the exception: they live in `web::router()` (`src/web.rs:19-24`) and
+are merged into the production router at `src/main.rs:62` and `src/main.rs:194`.

 | Method | Path | Handler |
 |---|---|---|
@ -208,14 +221,14 @@ All registered in `router_with_worker_state_runtime_bootstrap_config` (notify.rs
 | GET | `/healthz` | `healthz` |
 | GET | `/ready` | `ready` |
 | GET | `/api/status` | `setup_status` |
-| GET | `/`, `/assets/config.js`, `/assets/styles.css` | `index` / `web_config` |
+| GET | `/`, `/assets/config.js`, `/assets/styles.css` | `index` / `script` / `styles` |

 The remote-debug surface (`src/debug.rs:72-80`) is merged **only when the process is started
 with `--debug` and `DEBUG_TOKEN` is non-empty** (`SAF-DEBUG-GATE`, `src/main.rs:96-100`,
-`src/notify.rs:1320-1321`); otherwise none of these routes exist and requests fall through to
+`src/notify.rs:1321-1322`); otherwise none of these routes exist and requests fall through to
 axum's generic `404`, not a 401. All seven require `Authorization: Bearer <DEBUG_TOKEN>`,
 checked by `debug_authorized` (`src/debug.rs:45`), which delegates to the production
-`worker_authorized` so the comparison is constant time (`src/notify.rs:1135`).
+`worker_authorized` so the comparison is constant time (`src/notify.rs:1136`).

 | Method | Path | Handler |
 |---|---|---|
@ -236,14 +249,16 @@ Response conventions:
  completeness (`setup_missing` empty), Redis reachability, and two upstream probes —
  `GET {jmap_origin}/.well-known/jmap` with the configured Basic credentials, and
  `GET https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/getMe`. Both probes share `PROBE_TIMEOUT` = 3000ms
-  (`notify.rs:73`) and run **in parallel** (`tokio::join!`, `notify.rs:147`), so the worst case
+  (`notify.rs:74`) and run **in parallel** (`tokio::join!`, `notify.rs:148`), so the worst case
  is a single timeout, about 3s. On success the body is a report whose `jmap`/`telegram` fields
  are real probe results. The probes are plain reusable functions (`probe_jmap_session`,
  `probe_telegram_get_me`) also used by the remote-debug path, so they must not be duplicated.
  The JMAP probe deliberately authenticates against the *normalized origin*: probing the raw
  session URL unauthenticated would report not-ready forever and make ingress stop routing.
- `GET /api/status` returns **503** with body `{"status":"configuration-setup","missing":[...]}`
-  when a required environment variable is absent.
+- `GET /api/status` (**always 200**, `notify.rs:166-174`) returns
+  `{"ready": <bool>, "mode": "env"|"redis", "missing": [...]}`. `ready` is `false` and
+  `missing` lists the absent required keys (`REDIS_URL`, `CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) when a
+  variable is absent — the route itself never errors, so it is safe to poll.
 - `/debug/*` returns **503** in exactly one place: `POST /debug/notify` when the business
  config is not loaded or there is no outbound client — `service_unavailable` with
  `Retry-After: 30` (`src/debug.rs:56-58`). The three probe endpoints instead report failure
@ -258,43 +273,49 @@ Response conventions:
 ## 4. Gateway vs backend route matrix

 > **Independently verified.** Source: `cloudflare-worker/src/backends.js` `SAFE_ROUTES`
-> (backends.js:9-24), 14 entries, alongside `ROUTE_METHODS` (index.js:45-60)
+> (backends.js:9-25), 15 entries, alongside `ROUTE_METHODS` (index.js:45-61)
 > which fixes one method set per path. The worker entry point is `src/index.js`
 > (wrangler.toml:20); `src/lb.js` performs forwarding and bounded failover (`SAF-LB-PASSTHRU`,
 > `C-NO-LONG-CONN`).

 The gate is **unconditional and fail-closed**. The worker reads no configuration switches at
-all: a path missing from `SAFE_ROUTES` returns **404** (index.js:77-78), a registered
-path with the wrong method returns **405** (index.js:80-83), and a missing or unparseable
-backend pool returns **503** rather than passing the request through (index.js:85-93).
+all: a path missing from `SAFE_ROUTES` (backends.js:9-25) returns **404** (index.js:81-82), a registered
+path with the wrong method returns **405** (index.js:84-86), and a missing or unparseable
+backend pool returns **503** rather than passing the request through (index.js:89-96).

-**Forwarded by the worker (14):**
+**Forwarded by the worker (15):**

 `/` · `/assets/config.js` · `/assets/styles.css` · `/api/status` · `/api/config` ·
 `/api/business-config` · `/api/admin/session` · `/api/admin/session/revoke` ·
+`/api/enabled` ·
 `/webhook/tg` · `/push/jmap` · `/api/push/register` · `/api/push/disable` · `/reconcile` ·
 `/ready`

-**Registered on the backend but NOT forwarded (5):**
+**Registered on the backend but NOT forwarded (4):**

 | Path | Why it is absent from the gateway |
 |---|---|
-| `GET, PUT /api/enabled` | Internal operational switch, not exposed through the public gateway |
 | `POST /api/bootstrap` | One-shot trust bootstrap; kept off the public path |
-| `POST /worker` | Operator-invoked worker trigger (Bearer-auth'd, `notify.rs:330`); not part of the public gateway path |
+| `POST /worker` | Operator-invoked worker trigger (Bearer-auth'd, `notify.rs:331`); not part of the public gateway path |
 | `GET /healthz` | Liveness is aggregated by the gateway itself |
 | `/debug/*` (7 routes) | Opt-in remote-debug surface (`SAF-DEBUG-GATE`); absent from `SAFE_ROUTES`, so it is reachable **only** by talking to the backend origin directly |

-Consequence: none of the five carries external business traffic, so no second ingress is
+`GET, PUT /api/enabled` (the `SAF-ENABLE-FLAG` kill switch) **is** forwarded, because the
+admin SPA serves it at the Worker URL and toggles it from the service card (`loadEnabled`
+reads it at `web/config.js:586`, the toggle writes it at `:958`); both calls are
+admin-session Bearer-auth'd, so the exposure is identical to the already-forwarded
+`/api/admin/session` pair.
+
+Consequence: none of the four carries external business traffic, so no second ingress is
 needed in front of the backend instances. The SPA's first-boot flow still cannot drive
 `/api/bootstrap` through the worker — bootstrap must be performed against the backend origin
 directly, or the bootstrap path must be added to the gateway allowlist.

 `POST /api/push/register` and `POST /api/push/disable` **are** forwarded. Both are safe to
-proxy: the callback URL is supplied by the client in the request body (`notify.rs:874`,
+proxy: the callback URL is supplied by the client in the request body (`notify.rs:875`,
 validated as a URL at :891), and every push subscription record is written to and read back
 from the shared Redis (`lock:push-register:{sha256(url)}`, `get_push_subscription_for_callback`
-at `notify.rs:917`), so it does not matter which backend instance the worker picks. Push
+at `notify.rs:918`), so it does not matter which backend instance the worker picks. Push
 registration therefore no longer requires hitting a specific backend address — see
 deployment.md §10.5.

@ -304,24 +325,25 @@ deployment.md §10.5.

 Three distinct layers. They are not interchangeable.

-### 5.1 Boot-time (2 required, 2 optional with defaults)
+### 5.1 Boot-time (2 required, 3 optional with defaults)

 | Variable | Required | Default | Source |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | `REDIS_URL` | yes | — | read at main.rs:40 |
 | `CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | yes | — | `encryption_key_from_env` at main.rs:50 |
-| `PORT` | no | `8080` | `unwrap_or(8080_u16)` at main.rs:34 |
-| `RUN_MODE` | no | `webhook` | `unwrap_or_else` at config.rs:338 |
+| `PORT` | no | `8080` | `unwrap_or(8080_u16)` at main.rs:34; parsed again at config.rs:312 on the legacy `from_env()` path (validation parity only, see the note at config.rs:37) |
+| `RUN_MODE` | no | `webhook` | `unwrap_or_else` at config.rs:345 |
+| `DEBUG_TOKEN` | no | — | `std::env::var` at main.rs:97, effective only when `--debug` is also passed (`SAF-DEBUG-GATE` / `SAF-DEBUG-ORIGIN-ONLY`) |

 `RUN_MODE` accepts only `webhook` or `reconcile`; anything else is rejected at boot
-(main.rs:78-81). Both modes currently route to the same no-op router; the distinction is
+(main.rs:78-82). Both modes currently route to the same no-op router; the distinction is
 load-bearing for future splits, not for behaviour today. Note the value is only read on
-the legacy env path (`config.rs:338`), so with the current two-variable production config
+the legacy env path (`config.rs:345`), so with the current two-variable production config
 it always resolves to the hardcoded default — setting it to `reconcile` has no effect.

 **Missing a required variable does not crash the process.** It logs a warning and serves
 `router_configuration_setup`, which builds a router over `MemoryState` with empty tokens and
-a `NoopWorker` (worker.rs:142-144). The container stays up and answers requests while doing
+a `NoopWorker` (worker.rs:143-145). The container stays up and answers requests while doing
 no business work. This is a deliberate fail-closed-to-setup posture, and it is the single
 most likely cause of "the container is healthy but nothing happens".

@ -335,21 +357,27 @@ The process never reads these from the environment in normal operation.
 ### 5.3 Legacy compatibility (read but not required)

 `config.rs` still reads an environment-shaped business configuration for backward
-compatibility. Recognised names, unprefixed unless noted:
+compatibility. The full set of names it recognises (`from_env()`, `config.rs:311`),
+unprefixed unless noted:

-`BOT_TOKEN` · `CHAT_ALLOWLIST` · `TG_WEBHOOK_SECRET` · `TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID` ·
-`JMAP_*` · `RECONCILE_TOKEN`
+`CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY` · `PORT` · `REDIS_URL` · `CHAT_ALLOWLIST` · `TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID` ·
+`LLM_ENABLED` · `LLM_ALLOW_NET` · `LLM_API_KEY` · `LLM_BASE_URL` · `LLM_MODEL` ·
+`LLM_SUMMARY_TARGET_CHARS` · `RUN_MODE` · `BOT_TOKEN` · `JMAP_SESSION_URL` · `JMAP_USERNAME` ·
+`JMAP_PASSWORD` · `ACCOUNT_ID` · `RECONCILE_TOKEN` · `TG_WEBHOOK_SECRET` · `WORKER_TOKEN`
+
+The `JMAP_*` family is exactly three names; `ACCOUNT_ID` is read here too, alongside the
+direct read the JMAP client performs when no `accountId` is present in the request.

 The single prefixed name is `TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID`. Anything else documented as
 `TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN` or similar is a documentation error, not a supported variable.

 **Trust root.** The SPA admin credential is `CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY` itself: read at startup
 (main.rs:49) and held as `admin_token` (main.rs:92), it is checked in constant time by
-`worker_authorized` (notify.rs:445; compare at notify.rs:1135) at the top of both
-`POST /api/bootstrap` (notify.rs:604) and `POST /api/admin/session` (notify.rs:774). It is
+`worker_authorized` (notify.rs:446; compare at notify.rs:1136) at the top of both
+`POST /api/bootstrap` (notify.rs:605) and `POST /api/admin/session` (notify.rs:775). It is
 only compared against the request bearer — never echoed, logged, or stored. The session
 issued by `/api/admin/session` is a freshly generated random 32-byte hex token
-(notify.rs:778-787), never the credential; only its digest is retained in Redis under
+(notify.rs:779-788), never the credential; only its digest is retained in Redis under
 `config:admin_session`. `REDIS_URL` is the Redis connection string alone: an ACL password in
 it, if any, authenticates the Redis connection and is not the credential for any HTTP
 endpoint.
@ -362,10 +390,10 @@ endpoint.

 | Parameter | Default | Range / cap | Source |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| `jmap_timeout_ms` | 15_000 | 100..=300_000 | default state.rs:55; validated notify.rs:491 |
-| `telegram_timeout_ms` | 10_000 | 100..=300_000 | default state.rs:56; validated notify.rs:492 |
-| `llm_timeout_ms` | 30_000 | 100..=300_000 | default state.rs:57; validated notify.rs:493 |
-| `max_retries` | 3 | hard cap 5 | default state.rs:58; rejected at notify.rs:494; re-clamped at channel.rs:138 |
+| `jmap_timeout_ms` | 15_000 | 100..=300_000 | default state.rs:56; validated notify.rs:492 |
+| `telegram_timeout_ms` | 10_000 | 100..=300_000 | default state.rs:57; validated notify.rs:493 |
+| `llm_timeout_ms` | 30_000 | 100..=300_000 | default state.rs:58; validated notify.rs:494 |
+| `max_retries` | 3 | hard cap 5 | default state.rs:59; rejected at notify.rs:495; re-clamped at channel.rs:138 |

 There is **no** `LLM_MAX_RETRIES` environment variable; retry count lives in
 `config:outbound` and is bounded at 5 regardless of what is written.
@ -374,24 +402,24 @@ There is **no** `LLM_MAX_RETRIES` environment variable; retry count lives in

 | Constant | Value | Source |
 |---|---|---|
-| `MAX_BASELINE_PAGES` | 100 | worker.rs:248 |
-| `MAX_BASELINE_EMAILS` | 10_000 | worker.rs:249 |
-| `RECONCILE_BUDGET` | 20 s | worker.rs:250 |
-| `CHANGE_WINDOW_CAP` | 4_096 | worker.rs:306 |
-| Lock TTL / heartbeat | 300 s / 90 s | notify.rs:239 / 252 |
+| `MAX_BASELINE_PAGES` | 100 | worker.rs:249 |
+| `MAX_BASELINE_EMAILS` | 10_000 | worker.rs:250 |
+| `RECONCILE_BUDGET` | 20 s | worker.rs:251 |
+| `CHANGE_WINDOW_CAP` | 4_096 | worker.rs:307 |
+| Lock TTL / heartbeat | 300 s / 90 s | notify.rs:240 / 252 |

 `max_changes` is a function parameter, not a constant.

 ### 6.3 Idle threshold

-XAUTOCLAIM's idle threshold is derived from the live outbound config (state.rs:98):
+XAUTOCLAIM's idle threshold is derived from the live outbound config (state.rs:99):

 ```
 count × (max_retries + 1) × (jmap_timeout_ms + telegram_timeout_ms + llm_timeout_ms) × 2
 ```

-floored at the legacy 300 s single-event ceiling (state.rs:65) and capped at 6 h
-(state.rs:75). The floor is also the fallback when the config cannot be read, so a
+floored at the legacy 300 s single-event ceiling (state.rs:66) and capped at 6 h
+(state.rs:76). The floor is also the fallback when the config cannot be read, so a
 Redis hiccup never collapses the window. Only duplicate-on-multi-instance is at
 stake, never loss.

@ -399,9 +427,9 @@ stake, never loss.

 | Constant | Value | Source |
 |---|---|---|
-| `SEARCH_LIMIT` | 10 | worker.rs:618 |
-| `SEARCH_SUBJECT_MAX` | 120 chars | worker.rs:620 |
-| `SEARCH_PREVIEW_MAX` | 160 chars | worker.rs:622 |
+| `SEARCH_LIMIT` | 10 | worker.rs:619 |
+| `SEARCH_SUBJECT_MAX` | 120 chars | worker.rs:621 |
+| `SEARCH_PREVIEW_MAX` | 160 chars | worker.rs:623 |

 ---

@ -434,9 +462,10 @@ and only `script-src`, `style-src` and `connect-src` re-open a same-origin chann

 Recorded here so that references elsewhere cannot be mistaken for shipped features.

- `/search` **is** implemented (`bfe0fd8`, `worker.rs` / `jmap_service.rs`). What is *not*
-  possible: **body-level** snippets. jmap-client `0.4.2` only exposes `emailId`/`subject`/
-  `preview` from `SearchSnippet/get`, and its `Filter` type has no comparator syntax, so
+- `/search` **is** implemented (`bfe0fd8`). Adapter: `search_emails` at `worker.rs:652` and
+  at `src/domain/jmap.rs:268`, backed by `search_emails` at `src/domain/jmap/client.rs:318`.
+  What is *not* possible: **body-level** snippets. jmap-client `0.4.2` only exposes
+  `emailId`/`subject`/`preview` from `SearchSnippet/get`, and its `Filter` type has no comparator syntax, so
  per-part body highlight cannot be modelled through the locked crate. Search degrades to
  `subject`/`preview` highlights plus a pure-ID list when snippets are unsupported. Design
  note in `docs/design.md` §5.7.
--- a/docs/retired.md
+++ b/docs/retired.md
@ -74,10 +74,10 @@
 |---|---|---|---|
 | `channel/telegram/{mod,commands,session,render}.rs` | 虚构文件 | 目标目录树里画出，从未创建 | 命令解析在 `parse_intent`（`src/worker.rs`）；会话/授权态走 Redis TTL（`docs/reference.md` 的 AI 授权态一节）；渲染函数在 `src/channel.rs` 内 |
 | `delivery:pending:{stream}` | 虚构键 | 与 Redis Streams 的 pending-entries list（PEL）混淆——PEL 由 Redis 内部维护，不是可写键 | 真实键：`delivery:inflight:{stream}:{id}`（EX 60）与 `delivery:committed:{stream}:{id}`（EX 604_800），见 `docs/reference.md` 的投递流水线键一节 |
-| `check_config_reload` | 虚构函数 | 未提交草稿中的名字，从未进入代码 | 热更新为 `refresh_business_config`（`src/notify.rs:717`） |
-| `push:registration:{sha256(callback_url)}` 曾被写成「360s 注册单飞锁」 | 事实误标 | 该键是 7d 回调→订阅 ID 映射 | 真正的 360s 单飞锁是 `lock:push-register:{sha256(callback_url)}`（`src/notify.rs:897-900`） |
+| `check_config_reload` | 虚构函数 | 未提交草稿中的名字，从未进入代码 | 热更新为 `refresh_business_config`（`src/notify.rs:718`） |
+| `push:registration:{sha256(callback_url)}` 曾被写成「360s 注册单飞锁」 | 事实误标 | 该键是 7d 回调→订阅 ID 映射 | 真正的 360s 单飞锁是 `lock:push-register:{sha256(callback_url)}`（`src/notify.rs:898-901`） |
 | `MESSAGWEAVE_DOMAIN` 曾被写成「生产未配置时 Worker 白名单失效」 | 虚构断言（未提交草稿/讨论中出现，未进文档） | 该环境变量全仓零命中；Worker 白名单是**无条件 fail-closed**：未知路径 404、method 不符 405、后端缺失或解析失败 503（`cloudflare-worker/src/index.js:77-92`） | 无需配置开关，白名单恒生效 |
-| `read_batch` / `retry_or_dlq`「Redis 出错时仍可能返回 `Ok(())`，消费循环因此不会因单次失败退出」 | 虚构断言 | 消费入口是 HTTP handler `worker`（`notify.rs:330`），**不是后台循环**：全仓 `src/` 零命中 `select!`，无信号处理、无常驻 worker 进程。`read_batch`（`state.rs:384`）经 `?` 把 Redis 错误原样上抛（:425），唯一被丢弃的结果是 XGROUP `CREATE` 的 `BUSYGROUP` 幂等保护（:394-401）；`retry_or_dlq` 同样经 `?` 上抛。调用方对每一处 `Err` 都返回 `503 service_unavailable` + `retryable=true`，故「循环不因单次失败退出」这一语义前提本身不成立 | 无——不存在该缺口；`docs/roadmap.md`「代码缺口」4 → 3，`docs/design.md`「已知边界」同句已删 |
+| `read_batch` / `retry_or_dlq`「Redis 出错时仍可能返回 `Ok(())`，消费循环因此不会因单次失败退出」 | 虚构断言 | 消费入口是 HTTP handler `worker`（`notify.rs:331`），**不是后台循环**：全仓 `src/` 零命中 `select!`，无信号处理、无常驻 worker 进程。`read_batch`（`state.rs:385`）经 `?` 把 Redis 错误原样上抛（:425），唯一被丢弃的结果是 XGROUP `CREATE` 的 `BUSYGROUP` 幂等保护（:394-401）；`retry_or_dlq` 同样经 `?` 上抛。调用方对每一处 `Err` 都返回 `503 service_unavailable` + `retryable=true`，故「循环不因单次失败退出」这一语义前提本身不成立 | 无——不存在该缺口；`docs/roadmap.md`「代码缺口」4 → 3，`docs/design.md`「已知边界」同句已删 |

 ---

@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
 | `channel/mod.rs` | 虚构文件 | 渠道层就是 `src/channel.rs`，不是 `channel/` 目录 | 无 |
 | `notify::push_handler` / `notify::worker` / `notify::reconcile` 作为模块路径 | 虚构模块路径 | 这些是 `src/notify.rs` 内的自由函数（`jmap_push` / `worker` / `reconcile`），不是模块路径 | 无 |
 | `mod_dedup` / `mod_streams` / `mod_sincestate` | 虚构模块名 | `state.rs` / `notify.rs` 都是平铺文件，无子模块；去重与 Streams 逻辑以自由函数存在 | 无 |
-| `PushVerification` 类型 | 虚构类型 | 未定义；`register_push`（`notify.rs:884`）内联处理回调 URL 与验证码回写 | 无 |
+| `PushVerification` 类型 | 虚构类型 | 未定义；`register_push`（`notify.rs:885`）内联处理回调 URL 与验证码回写 | 无 |
 | `CancellationToken` | 虚构类型 | 未使用；无优雅关闭、无信号处理（`src/` 零命中 `tokio::signal` / `ctrl_c`） | 无 |
 | `Preview` 类型 / 4000 字符长邮件保护 / `[继续查看原文]` 按钮 / `/llm-fallback` 按钮 | 虚构类型与 UI | 全部未实现；授权后把全文交给 LLM，失败即回退前 300 字符，无任何截断标注或按钮 | 无 |
 | `LlmErr`（5 变体） | 虚构枚举 | 真实是 `AiError`，仅 3 个变体（`InvalidEndpoint` / `Request` / `Response`） | 无 |
@ -95,9 +95,9 @@
 | 熔断器 / 半开态 / 熔断后 60s 冷却 / 规则兜底（Redis 共享计数） | 未实施设计 | 只有超时 + 重试；LLM 失败静默降级为前 300 字回退，无用户侧提示、无状态记录 | 无 |
 | 定时摘要 / 每日邮件摘要推送 | 未实施 | 未实现 | 无 |
 | 附件下载（`send_document` / `Blob/get` / 下载按钮） | 未实施 | JMAP 侧只读；邮件附件仅以 `has_attachment: bool` 形式出现 | 无 |
-| `/flag` / `/unseen` / 发信命令 | 未实施 | 当前识别 6 个意图（帮助 / 同意 / 摘要 / 搜索 / 普通消息 / 未识别）；其中 `/search` 已实现（`worker.rs:517`） | 无 |
+| `/flag` / `/unseen` / 发信命令 | 未实施 | 当前识别 6 个意图（帮助 / 同意 / 摘要 / 搜索 / 普通消息 / 未识别）；其中 `/search` 已实现（`worker.rs:533`） | 无 |
 | `Identity` 概念 | 未实施 | 账号识别只依赖 `ACCOUNT_ID`，无身份层抽象 | 无 |
-| `run_mode.rs`（作为单独文件） | 虚构文件 | RUN_MODE 由 `config.rs:338` 读取、在 `src/main.rs:75` 校验取值；不存在 `validate_env_or_exit` 这类函数 | 无 |
+| `run_mode.rs`（作为单独文件） | 虚构文件 | RUN_MODE 由 `config.rs:345` 读取、在 `src/main.rs:75` 校验取值；不存在 `validate_env_or_exit` 这类函数 | 无 |
 | docker-compose `message-weave health --addr` 示例 | 虚构命令 | 应用无 CLI 子命令；健康检查端点是 `GET /healthz` 与 `GET /ready` | 见 `docs/deployment.md` 的 Health-check 表 |
 | 早期设计辩论问题（消息格式 / 长邮件阈值 / 附件策略 / Identity / 监控 / LLM 供应商 / 熔断等 17 条） | 已由代码回答 | 均已被实现的代码给出答案，不再属于待确认项 | 见 `docs/design.md` 的「已由代码回答的早期问题」一节 |

--- a/docs/roadmap.md
+++ b/docs/roadmap.md
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 ## 阻塞（需要真实环境，当前无法验证）

 - **真实 Stalwart 邮箱联调** — 未做任何真实邮箱端到端集成。JMAP adapter 代码与配置校验已完成并通过本地 `cargo test`，但 `Email/changes`、`PushSubscription` 路径未在真实账号上验证。`REQ-JMAP-SESSION-URL` 已实现（`D-G1-1`）但待真机验证。**阻塞原因**：无可用 Stalwart 账号/凭据；禁止使用测试账号或伪造结果。
- **真实 Telegram Bot 联调** — 入站 `POST /webhook/tg` 的 secret 头校验 + chat 白名单（`notify.rs:175` 起）、出站 `sendMessage`（`channel.rs`）均已在代码内并有单元测试，但**都没有在真实 Bot 上跑过**。另：向 Telegram 注册 webhook URL 是运维步骤（调 `setWebhook`），应用内不实现；长轮询 `getUpdates` 从未实现（见 `docs/retired.md`）。**阻塞原因**：无 Bot Token；禁止向真实用户发消息。
+- **真实 Telegram Bot 联调** — 入站 `POST /webhook/tg` 的 secret 头校验 + chat 白名单（`notify.rs:176` 起）、出站 `sendMessage`（`channel.rs`）均已在代码内并有单元测试，但**都没有在真实 Bot 上跑过**。另：向 Telegram 注册 webhook URL 是运维步骤（调 `setWebhook`），应用内不实现；长轮询 `getUpdates` 从未实现（见 `docs/retired.md`）。**阻塞原因**：无 Bot Token；禁止向真实用户发消息。
 - **真实 Redis TLS 连接** — `rediss://` 握手、密码特殊字符 URL 编码、`CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY` 热更新未实测。**阻塞原因**：无托管 Redis 实例。
 - **`Email/changes` 的 `newState` 语义** — 客户端已用「同 `sinceState` 翻倍 `maxChanges` 扩窗」消除按页漏批，但 `newState` 是否表示"全部待报变更之后"仍需真实 Stalwart 复验，否则停机积压边界无法判定。**阻塞原因**：无可用 Stalwart 账号/凭据。
 - **Push callback 公网映射** — 单飞锁 `lock:push-register:{sha256(callback_url)}`（360s）与映射 `push:registration:{sha256(callback_url)}`（7d）的 TTL 需真实回调时序验证。**阻塞原因**：无真实推送回调可观察。
--- a/scripts/docs_check/audit_anchors.py
+++ b/scripts/docs_check/audit_anchors.py
@ -1,21 +1,70 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Check every `foo.rs:N` / `foo.rs:N-M` line anchor in the docs.
+"""Check every `foo.rs:N` / `foo.rs:N-M` / `web/config.js:N` line anchor in the docs.
+
+Paths may be bare (`notify.rs:320`, resolved under `src/`), prefixed with a directory
+(`src/domain/jmap/client.rs:108`, `cloudflare-worker/src/backends.js:9`,
+`web/config.js:585`), or unprefixed JavaScript (`config.js:585`, resolved under `web/`
+or the Worker).

 LIMITATION: this only proves the cited line *exists and is not blank*. It does
 not prove the line contains what the prose claims about it. A doc can pass this
 audit with anchors that point at the wrong line -- a human must read the target
 line to catch that. Keep this in mind when quoting "0 errors" as proof of
 accuracy: it proves reachability, not correctness.
+
+The one exception is a *phantom identifier*: if a backticked name sits right next
+to an anchor (the common "`foo` ... `bar.rs:N`" phrasing) and that name appears
+nowhere in bar.rs, the anchor is reported. Existence, not position -- the symbol
+may still be on the wrong line.
 """
-import re, sys
+import re
+import sys
 from pathlib import Path

 ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
 DOCS = ['AGENTS.md', 'README.md', 'README.zh-CN.md', 'docs/design.md',
        'docs/deployment.md', 'docs/reference.md', 'docs/retired.md',
-        'docs/roadmap.md', 'docs/charter.md']
+        'docs/roadmap.md', 'docs/charter.md', 'cloudflare-worker/README.md']
+
+IDENT = r'[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*(?:::[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)?'
+FILE = r'((?:[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+/)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)'
+EXT = r'\.(rs|js):(\d+)'
+
+# A directory part is zero or more full segments (`/seg`), so the regex can never
+# split a file name like `debug.rs` into a "directory" plus a stray base.
+REF = re.compile(
+    r'((?:src|cloudflare-worker/src|web)(?:/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)*/)?'
+    + FILE + EXT + r'(?:\s*[,–\-]\s*(\d+))?'
+)
+
+# A backticked identifier sitting right next to an anchor is an implicit claim:
+# "`foo` ... `bar.rs:N`". If `foo` never appears in bar.rs the anchor is a phantom.
+# The gap may not cross more than one backtick boundary and is capped at 40
+# characters on each side, so only a genuinely coupled identifier/anchor pair
+# matches. An optional `()` after the identifier is tolerated, since prose often
+# writes function names that way.
+PAIR = re.compile(
+    r'`(' + IDENT + r')(?:\(\))?`'
+    r'[^`\n|]{0,40}?`?[^`\n|]{0,40}?'
+    r'(?<![A-Za-z0-9_.])`?'
+    + FILE + EXT
+)
+
+
+def resolve(prefix, base, ext):
+    """Map an anchor's path fragment to a file on disk, or None."""
+    if prefix is None:
+        # Basename only. `.rs` lives in src/; `.js` may live in the Worker or in
+        # the served SPA, so try both.
+        if ext == 'rs':
+            candidates = [ROOT / 'src' / f'{base}.{ext}']
+        else:
+            candidates = [ROOT / 'cloudflare-worker/src' / f'{base}.{ext}',
+                          ROOT / 'web' / f'{base}.{ext}']
+    else:
+        candidates = [ROOT / prefix.rstrip('/') / f'{base}.{ext}']
+    return next((c for c in candidates if c.is_file()), None)

-REF = re.compile(r'(?:(src|cloudflare-worker/src)/)?([A-Za-z0-9_]+)\.(?:rs|js):(\d+)(?:\s*[,–\-]\s*(\d+))?')

 errors = []
 checked = 0
@ -28,20 +77,22 @@ for d in DOCS:
            continue
        if in_fence:
            continue
+        for m in PAIR.finditer(line):
+            ident, raw, ext = m.group(1), m.group(2), m.group(3)
+            raw = raw.rsplit('/', 1)[-1]
+            if '.' in raw:
+                continue
+            p = resolve(None, raw, ext)
+            if p is None:
+                continue
+            symbol = ident.rsplit('::', 1)[-1]
+            if symbol not in p.read_text():
+                errors.append(f'{d}:{i} phantom identifier `{ident}` not in {raw}.{ext}')
        for m in REF.finditer(line):
-            sub, base, a, b = m.group(1), m.group(2), m.group(3), m.group(4)
-            if sub == 'cloudflare-worker/src':
-                p = ROOT / sub / f'{base}.js'
-            elif sub == 'src' or sub is None:
-                p = ROOT / 'src' / f'{base}.rs'
-                if not p.exists() and sub is None:
-                    q = ROOT / 'cloudflare-worker/src' / f'{base}.js'
-                    if q.exists():
-                        p = q
-            else:
-                p = ROOT / sub / f'{base}.rs'
-            if not p.exists():
-                errors.append(f'{d}:{i} unknown file {p.name}')
+            prefix, base, ext, a, b = m.groups()
+            p = resolve(prefix, base, ext)
+            if p is None:
+                errors.append(f'{d}:{i} unknown file {base}.{ext}')
                continue
            src = p.read_text().splitlines()
            hi = int(b) if b else int(a)
--- a/scripts/docs_check/check_file_size.py
+++ b/scripts/docs_check/check_file_size.py
@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Enforce the AGENTS.md §2.1 file-size rule.
+
+A file over SOFT_MAX lines must carry a `SPLIT-EVAL:` marker comment in its
+first WINDOW lines, stating the split decision and why it was not split.
+Over limit without the marker is a hard error.
+
+The marker only needs to contain the literal token, so the rule is stated once
+and stays valid regardless of the source language used.
+
+LIMITATION: this proves the marker exists, not that the written reason is
+sound. Someone must read it.
+"""
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+
+SOFT_MAX = 500   # AGENTS.md §2.1 soft cap
+WINDOW = 60      # the marker must appear this many lines from the top
+MARKER = 'SPLIT-EVAL:'
+
+# Source only: Rust, the admin SPA, the worker. Docs and tests are excluded.
+GLOBS = ['src/**/*.rs', 'web/*.js', 'cloudflare-worker/src/*.js']
+
+
+def scan():
+    files = []
+    for pattern in GLOBS:
+        files.extend(p for p in ROOT.glob(pattern) if p.is_file())
+    return sorted(files)
+
+
+def main():
+    over = []
+    errors = []
+    for path in scan():
+        try:
+            lines = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8').splitlines()
+        except UnicodeDecodeError:
+            continue
+        n = len(lines)
+        if n <= SOFT_MAX:
+            continue
+        over.append(path)
+        if MARKER not in '\n'.join(lines[:WINDOW]):
+            errors.append(path)
+            print(f'ERROR: {path.relative_to(ROOT)}: {n} lines > {SOFT_MAX}, '
+                  f'no "{MARKER}" marker within the first {WINDOW} lines')
+
+    for path in over:
+        print(f'  {path.relative_to(ROOT)}: '
+              f'{len(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines())} lines')
+
+    print(f'=== SIZE CHECK ({len(errors)} errors) ===')
+    return 1 if errors else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    sys.exit(main())
--- a/scripts/docs_check/check_sec_refs.py
+++ b/scripts/docs_check/check_sec_refs.py
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import sys
 ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
 DOCS = ["AGENTS.md", "README.md", "README.zh-CN.md", "docs/design.md",
        "docs/deployment.md", "docs/reference.md", "docs/retired.md",
-        "docs/roadmap.md", "docs/charter.md"]
+        "docs/roadmap.md", "docs/charter.md", "cloudflare-worker/README.md"]

 HEADING = re.compile(r"^(#{2,4})\s+(\d+(?:\.\d+)?\.?)\s")
 # §2.3, §5.7, §3 (bare), also `§2.3/§3.4` chains handled by finditer
--- a/scripts/docs_check/check_tables.py
+++ b/scripts/docs_check/check_tables.py
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
 DOCS = ['AGENTS.md', 'README.md', 'README.zh-CN.md', 'docs/design.md',
        'docs/deployment.md', 'docs/reference.md', 'docs/retired.md',
-        'docs/roadmap.md', 'docs/charter.md']
+        'docs/roadmap.md', 'docs/charter.md', 'cloudflare-worker/README.md']

 CODE = re.compile(r'`[^`\n]*`')
 SEP = re.compile(r'^\s*\|?\s*:?-{3,}:?\s*(\|\s*:?-{3,}:?\s*)+\|?\s*$')
--- a/scripts/docs_check/run_all.sh
+++ b/scripts/docs_check/run_all.sh
@ -16,9 +16,14 @@
 #                   with anchors on the wrong line -- someone must read them.
 #   check_sec_refs  every "§N.N" cross-reference resolves to a real heading in
 #                   the document it is attributed to.
+#   check_file_size every source file over 500 lines carries the SPLIT-EVAL
+#                   marker required by AGENTS.md §2.1. LIMITATION: it proves
+#                   the marker exists, not that the written reason is sound.
 #
 # audit_anchors and check_sec_refs only scan prose: lines inside fenced code
 # blocks are skipped, so examples and tables holding code do not raise noise.
+# check_file_size only scans src/, web/ and cloudflare-worker/src/ — docs and
+# tests are out of scope.
 #
 # Root is derived from this file's own location, so the whole suite works from a
 # clean clone without editing any path.
@ -29,7 +34,7 @@ here="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 rc=0
 fail=0

-for script in validate_docs check_tables audit_anchors check_sec_refs; do
+for script in validate_docs check_tables audit_anchors check_sec_refs check_file_size; do
    out="$(python3 "$here/$script.py" 2>&1)"
    code=$?
    # Each check prints "=== NAME (n errors) ===" as its summary, but not
@ -46,7 +51,7 @@ for script in validate_docs check_tables audit_anchors check_sec_refs; do
 done

 if [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]; then
-    echo "GATE-DOCS: PASS (4/4 checks clean)"
+    echo "GATE-DOCS: PASS (5/5 checks clean)"
 else
    echo "GATE-DOCS: FAIL ($fail check(s) reported errors)"
 fi
--- a/scripts/docs_check/validate_docs.py
+++ b/scripts/docs_check/validate_docs.py
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
 DOCS = ['AGENTS.md', 'README.md', 'README.zh-CN.md', 'docs/design.md',
        'docs/deployment.md', 'docs/reference.md', 'docs/retired.md',
-        'docs/roadmap.md', 'docs/charter.md']
+        'docs/roadmap.md', 'docs/charter.md', 'cloudflare-worker/README.md']
 errors = []

 def slug(t):
--- a/src/config.rs
+++ b/src/config.rs
@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+// SPLIT-EVAL: 已评估暂缓拆分——仅略超软上限约 20 行，结构体定义、Redis 配置解析与遗留 from_env() 路径相互引用，拆出只增加跨文件跳转而不消除任何重复。
 use secrecy::{ExposeSecret, SecretString};

 use crate::error::BotError;
--- a/src/domain/jmap/client.rs
+++ b/src/domain/jmap/client.rs
@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+//! SPLIT-EVAL: 已评估暂缓拆分——jmap-client 0.4.2 的适配、请求建模与降级策略必须贴在一起才能对照 crate 文档逐字段验证，拆开会切断这条对照链。
 //! Concrete read-only adapter (MOD-JMAP-CLIENT, GATE-G1-JMAP-READONLY).

 use super::{
--- a/src/notify.rs
+++ b/src/notify.rs
@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+// SPLIT-EVAL: 已评估暂缓拆分——全部 HTTP 处理器共享同一套 Bearer/admin-session 鉴权、统一错误封装与路由装配顺序，拆分会让每个子模块重复导入并复述这些前置条件。
 use axum::{
    body::Bytes,
    extract::State,
--- a/src/state.rs
+++ b/src/state.rs
@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+//! SPLIT-EVAL: 已评估暂缓拆分——会话令牌、幂等去重、可靠队列与限流共用同一组 Redis key 约定、加密封装与错误类型，拆分会让 key 命名规范分散到多处而失去单点审阅。
 //! Redis-only reliability primitives (C-REDIS-ONLY-STATE, MOD-DEDUP, MOD-STREAMS).
 //! These APIs are deliberately short-request operations; no subscriptions or polling.

--- a/src/worker.rs
+++ b/src/worker.rs
@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+//! SPLIT-EVAL: 已评估暂缓拆分——搜索降级链、通知编排与出站重试共用同一份配置读取、错误映射表与日志字段集合，拆分会引入重复的错误翻译与日志规约。
 //! Bounded metadata notification worker (MOD-TELEGRAM-NOTIFY).
 use crate::ai::LlmClient;
 use crate::channel::telegram::TelegramClient;
--- a/web/config.js
+++ b/web/config.js
@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+// SPLIT-EVAL: 已评估暂缓拆分——i18n 词条字典与配置表单逻辑共享同一份 data-i18n key 命名，且 src/web.rs 只内嵌 config.js 与 styles.css，拆成多文件需先引入构建步骤。
 (() => {
  "use strict";

@ -16,7 +17,7 @@
      "intro.eyebrow": "Service management",
      "intro.title": "Manage your service connections",
      "intro.copy": "Configure JMAP, Telegram, LLM, access allowlist and runtime parameters. Business configuration is stored in external Redis and hot-reloaded immediately after a successful save.",
-      "notice.bootstrap": "Create a short-lived admin session using Redis management credentials.",
+      "notice.bootstrap": "Create a short-lived admin session using the CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY value.",
      "setup.eyebrow": "Setup guide",
      "setup.title": "Service startup configuration",
      "setup.checking": "Checking service startup configuration…",
@ -29,10 +30,10 @@
      "setup.fetchError": "Unable to read the service startup status right now. To protect management credentials, the authorization entry stays hidden; confirm the service is available and re-check.",
      "auth.eyebrow": "Authorization required",
      "auth.title": "Create admin session",
-      "auth.bodyPre": "Enter the password of the Redis ACL user from the deployment ",
-      "auth.bodyPost": ". The server issues a 15-minute admin session; the password and session exist only in the current page memory.",
-      "auth.label": "Redis management credential",
-      "auth.placeholder": "Enter the ACL password from the Redis URL",
+      "auth.bodyPre": "Enter the value of the required startup key ",
+      "auth.bodyPost": ". The server issues a 15-minute admin session; the key and session exist only in the current page memory.",
+      "auth.label": "Business encryption key",
+      "auth.placeholder": "Enter the CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY value",
      "auth.submit": "Create session",
      "auth.submitBusy": "Authorizing…",
      "auth.hint": "Never written to localStorage, sessionStorage or cookies. You must re-authorize after closing or refreshing the page.",
@ -172,11 +173,11 @@
      "berr.status": "Business configuration request failed (HTTP {status}). Retry shortly.",
      "berr.fail": "{message} The request result may be unconfirmed; after checking, re-submit the complete configuration.",
      "berr.failDefault": "Business configuration request failed.",
-      "login.enterCred": "Enter the Redis ACL management credential. The input is never written to browser storage.",
+      "login.enterCred": "Enter the CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY value. The input is never written to browser storage.",
      "login.creatingToast": "Creating a short-lived admin session…",
      "login.invalidResponse": "The admin endpoint returned an invalid session response.",
      "login.successToast": "Admin session created. Runtime parameters are being read; business configuration must be filled in again in full.",
-      "login.401": "The Redis management credential is invalid, or admin sessions are not enabled. Check the Redis URL ACL password.",
+      "login.401": "The CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY value does not match the server, or admin sessions are not enabled. The Redis ACL password is not accepted here.",
      "login.503": "Redis unavailable or initialization incomplete; unable to create an admin session right now. Retry shortly.",
      "login.status": "Unable to create an admin session (HTTP {status}).",
      "login.fail": "Unable to connect to the admin service; check the network and retry.",
@ -189,7 +190,7 @@
      "intro.eyebrow": "服务管理",
      "intro.title": "管理你的服务连接",
      "intro.copy": "配置 JMAP、Telegram、LLM、访问白名单和运行参数。业务配置保存在外部 Redis，成功保存后会立即热加载。",
-      "notice.bootstrap": "使用 Redis 管理凭据创建短期管理会话。",
+      "notice.bootstrap": "使用 CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY 的值创建短期管理会话。",
      "setup.eyebrow": "配置引导",
      "setup.title": "服务启动配置",
      "setup.checking": "正在检查服务启动配置…",
@ -202,10 +203,10 @@
      "setup.fetchError": "暂时无法读取服务启动状态。为保护管理凭据，授权入口保持隐藏；请确认服务可用后重新检查。",
      "auth.eyebrow": "需要授权",
      "auth.title": "创建管理会话",
-      "auth.bodyPre": "输入部署时 ",
-      "auth.bodyPost": " 中 Redis ACL 用户的密码。服务端会签发有效期 15 分钟的管理会话；密码和会话只在当前页面内存中使用。",
-      "auth.label": "Redis 管理凭据",
-      "auth.placeholder": "输入 Redis URL 中的 ACL 密码",
+      "auth.bodyPre": "输入启动必填的环境变量 ",
+      "auth.bodyPost": " 的值。服务端会签发有效期 15 分钟的管理会话；该值与会话只在当前页面内存中使用。",
+      "auth.label": "业务加密密钥",
+      "auth.placeholder": "输入 CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY 的值",
      "auth.submit": "创建会话",
      "auth.submitBusy": "正在授权…",
      "auth.hint": "不会写入 localStorage、sessionStorage 或 Cookie。关闭或刷新页面后需要重新授权。",
@ -345,11 +346,11 @@
      "berr.status": "业务配置请求失败（HTTP {status}）。请稍后重试。",
      "berr.fail": "{message} 请求结果可能无法确认；检查后可重新提交完整配置。",
      "berr.failDefault": "业务配置请求失败。",
-      "login.enterCred": "请输入 Redis ACL 管理凭据。输入不会写入浏览器存储。",
+      "login.enterCred": "请输入 CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY 的值。输入不会写入浏览器存储。",
      "login.creatingToast": "正在创建短期管理会话…",
      "login.invalidResponse": "管理接口返回了无效的会话响应。",
      "login.successToast": "管理会话已创建。运行参数正在读取；业务配置需要完整重新填写。",
-      "login.401": "Redis 管理凭据无效，或服务尚未启用管理会话。请检查 Redis URL ACL 密码。",
+      "login.401": "CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY 与服务器配置不一致，或服务尚未启用管理会话。此处不接受 Redis ACL 密码。",
      "login.503": "Redis 不可用或初始化尚未完成，暂时无法创建管理会话。请稍后重试。",
      "login.status": "无法创建管理会话（HTTP {status}）。",
      "login.fail": "无法连接管理服务，请检查网络后重试。",
--- a/web/index.html
+++ b/web/index.html
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
      </section>

      <div id="notice" class="notice notice-info" role="status" aria-live="polite" hidden data-i18n="notice.bootstrap">
-        Create a short-lived admin session using Redis management credentials.
+        Create a short-lived admin session using the CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY value.
      </div>

      <section id="setup-card" class="panel auth-panel setup-panel" aria-labelledby="setup-title" aria-live="polite">
@ -52,11 +52,11 @@
          </div>
          <div><p class="eyebrow" data-i18n="auth.eyebrow">Authorization required</p><h2 id="auth-title" data-i18n="auth.title">Create admin session</h2></div>
        </div>
-        <p class="panel-copy"><span data-i18n="auth.bodyPre">Enter the password of the Redis ACL user from the deployment </span><code>REDIS_URL</code><span data-i18n="auth.bodyPost">. The server issues a 15-minute admin session; the password and session exist only in the current page memory.</span></p>
+        <p class="panel-copy"><span data-i18n="auth.bodyPre">Enter the value of the required startup key </span><code>CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY</code><span data-i18n="auth.bodyPost">. The server issues a 15-minute admin session; the key and session exist only in the current page memory.</span></p>
        <form id="auth-form" class="auth-form" autocomplete="off">
-          <label for="bootstrap-input" data-i18n="auth.label">Redis management credential</label>
+          <label for="bootstrap-input" data-i18n="auth.label">Business encryption key</label>
          <div class="token-row">
-            <input id="bootstrap-input" name="bootstrap-credential" type="password" autocomplete="new-password" spellcheck="false" required data-i18n-placeholder="auth.placeholder" placeholder="Enter the ACL password from the Redis URL" aria-describedby="bootstrap-hint" />
+            <input id="bootstrap-input" name="admin-credential" type="password" autocomplete="new-password" spellcheck="false" required data-i18n-placeholder="auth.placeholder" placeholder="Enter the CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY value" aria-describedby="bootstrap-hint" />
            <button id="connect-button" class="button button-primary" type="submit" data-i18n="auth.submit">Create session</button>
          </div>
          <p id="bootstrap-hint" class="field-hint" data-i18n="auth.hint">Never written to localStorage, sessionStorage or cookies. You must re-authorize after closing or refreshing the page.</p>