Every member's audit is now read and each real finding fixed, not just reported. AGENTS.md §2.1 - The 500-line soft cap now has a machine-checkable exception: an over-limit file must carry a one-line `SPLIT-EVAL:` marker stating the split decision. - Six files were over the cap with no justification: notify.rs 2036, state.rs 1586, worker.rs 1045, config.js 1079, client.rs 601, config.rs 521. All now carry the marker. client.rs was missed by my own earlier line count, which did not descend into src/domain/jmap/. - New validator scripts/docs_check/check_file_size.py; GATE-DOCS 4/4 -> 5/5. It proves the marker exists, not that the written reason is sound. - Re-based 144 line anchors across six docs for the +1 line each file gained; every shifted anchor verified against the code, not just for non-blankness. audit-arch.md - design.md §6.1 module matrix omitted the `debug` module entirely; added. - Seven numeric duplications in design.md now defer to reference.md §6.1 as the single authority instead of restating the values. - reference.md §5.1 was missing DEBUG_TOKEN; §5.3 listed six recognised names and guessed `JMAP_*`. It now lists all 20 exactly as config.rs reads them. - Corrected two wrong claims in the audit itself: debug.rs is compiled unconditionally, not under #[cfg(debug_assertions)] (there are no cargo features at all), and /debug/* exposes 7 routes, not the invented session list / resend / rebuild surface. audit-fileplanner.md - reference.md cited a nonexistent `jmap_service.rs`; replaced with the real adapter chain worker.rs -> domain/jmap.rs -> domain/jmap/client.rs. - cloudflare-worker/README.md was outside every validator's scope; all four doc validators now include it (208 section refs, 250 line refs). - README.zh-CN.md stated only half of what README.md says about RUN_MODE; the forward-placeholder sentence is now bilingual. - charter.md §7 boundary table was missing rows for itself and for web/. audit-rust.md / audit-frontend.md - Error envelope corrected: `error` is a bare machine code, no `message`. - Status table, AI-consent labels and ~15 stale or phantom facts fixed against notify.rs; `TelegramClient::SendMessage` and `web_config` phantoms removed. - GET|PUT /api/enabled forwarded by the worker so the SPA kill switch works. - Ten UI strings that called the admin credential the Redis ACL password now say CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY. - POST /healthz returns 405; dead HTTP_STATUS removed. - audit_anchors.py now flags identifiers that do not exist in the file they are anchored to. charter.md - `SAF-ENABLE-FLAG` registered (85 IDs); `SAF-ADMIN-SESSION` row corrected; - `REQ-PUSH-TYPES` registered; the stale `admin_session_digest` removed. Gates: GATE-DOCS PASS 5/5 (250 line-refs, 208 section refs, 0 errors); GATE-P0 62 passed / 0 failed / 1 ignored, baseline unchanged; worker and SPA 36 tests, 0 failures. Real Stalwart / Telegram / managed Redis verification stays blocked on missing credentials and remains labelled as unverified. |
||
|---|---|---|
| .github/workflows | ||
| cloudflare-worker | ||
| docs | ||
| scripts/docs_check | ||
| src | ||
| web | ||
| .dockerignore | ||
| .env.example | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| Cargo.lock | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| Dockerfile | ||
| README.md | ||
| README.zh-CN.md | ||
| hoststack.yaml | ||
README.md
MessageWeave
中文文档 / Chinese documentation → README.zh-CN.md
One Telegram bot per mailbox. New mail arrives as metadata; the original is always fetched read-only from your own JMAP server.
1. What it is
MessageWeave sits between a JMAP mail server (for example Stalwart) and a Telegram bot.
- Inbound. A JMAP push subscription tells the service that a message changed. Nothing is polled at rest.
- Outbound. Each event becomes a short, metadata-only Telegram notification: sender, subject, timestamp. Mail bodies are never sent to Telegram.
- On demand. When you ask, the service reads the original through a fresh JMAP read call. Nothing is cached in between.
- Optionally summarised. If you explicitly opt in, an OpenAI-compatible LLM returns a short summary. Requests, responses and attachment bytes are never persisted.
State is an architectural boundary here, not a preference.
- Redis is the only state store. No database, no embedded store, no second store.
- The process writes nothing to disk. No log files, no data files, no local volume.
- No long-lived connections. No SSE, no WebSocket, no long polling.
- Logs go to stdout only. The platform's collector owns log storage and retention.
- What it is not. It is not a mail client, not a proxy, and not a relay. It forwards metadata to one bot; it does not read arbitrary URLs, open tunnels, or broker traffic.
2. 5-minute setup
Requires a reachable Redis 7 instance and a JMAP session plus a Telegram bot token.
cp .env.example .env # fill REDIS_URL and CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
docker build -t messageweave:latest .
docker run --env-file .env -p 8080:8080 messageweave:latest
Then open http://localhost:8080 in a browser and enter your CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
value. The SPA exchanges it with POST /api/admin/session for a 900-second admin session,
then writes the business secrets to Redis with PUT /api/business-config. No environment
variable is read or written again for business configuration.
For local builds without Docker: cargo build --locked produces the message-weave binary.
If the service answers requests but does nothing useful, check the logs for a startup warning: a missing required variable does not crash the process. It serves a read-only setup router over in-memory state instead. See §3.
3. Configuration entry points
Three layers. They are not interchangeable.
Boot-time environment — 2 required, 2 optional.
| Variable | Required | Default |
|---|---|---|
REDIS_URL |
yes | — |
CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY |
yes | — |
PORT |
no | 8080 |
RUN_MODE |
no | webhook |
RUN_MODE accepts webhook or reconcile, but both currently produce identical
behavior (the two modes share one router), so it is a forward placeholder: keep the
default webhook. .env.example ships only the two required
variables; the rest are documented defaults.
Business configuration — Redis, written by the browser.
POST /api/bootstrap is the one-shot trust bootstrap; PUT /api/business-config hot-
reloads individual settings within about one second. The process never reads business
secrets from the environment in normal operation.
Health.
GET /healthz returns 200 unconditionally — it is liveness, not readiness. GET /ready
returns 503 until configuration, Redis, and both upstreams (a JMAP session GET and
Telegram getMe, 3s each) are reachable. Probe /ready, not /healthz, when deciding
whether to route traffic — but /ready is the heavier probe (~3s worst case), so a monitor
that must stay cheap should watch the gateway's aggregated /healthz.
Remote debug (opt-in, off by default).
/debug/* is an optional remote-debug surface: live JMAP and Telegram probes, the current
business config, and a single Telegram send. It sits behind a two-factor gate — the process
must be started with --debug and DEBUG_TOKEN must be set; miss either and the routes
do not exist at all (requests fall through to a generic 404). Nothing under /debug/* is on
the gateway allowlist, so it is reachable only on the backend origin itself. The only rule for
running it is to keep it off: leave --debug out of the start command and leave DEBUG_TOKEN
unset. If you do turn it on for a one-off diagnosis, configure the chat allowlist first — with
an empty allowlist the test send is not restricted to any chat. See
docs/deployment.md §2.1.
4. Security boundary, in one sentence
All state lives in Redis; the process reads only two environment variables and writes nothing to disk.
One corollary matters for setup: the SPA admin credential — and therefore the bootstrap
trust root — is CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY itself, the single 32-byte hex value you supply at
startup. It is only compared in constant time, and is never echoed, logged, or stored. The
Redis ACL password, if you have one, authenticates the Redis connection alone and is not
the credential for any HTTP endpoint.
5. Where to read more
| Document | What it answers |
|---|---|
docs/design.md |
Why the system is shaped this way: data flow, JMAP semantics, Redis streams, AI consent rules |
docs/deployment.md |
How to deploy: Dockerfile, secrets, Redis hosting, webhook/push/reconcile routing, multi-instance load balancing |
docs/reference.md |
Single source of truth for verifiable facts — Redis keys and TTLs, error codes, routes, environment layers, budgets |
docs/roadmap.md |
Gaps, blockers and the next phase |
docs/retired.md |
What was tried and dropped — abandoned routes, unreleased designs, and names that never existed |
docs/charter.md |
Project charter: goals, locked technology choices, security invariants, prohibitions, and the stable-ID registry |
AGENTS.md |
Language-agnostic engineering norms: code style, config and secrets, build environment, testing gates, document governance |
Facts that matter are traceable. If two documents disagree, docs/reference.md wins.