SAFE_ROUTES has 19 entries (backends.js), not 18. reference.md and
reference.zh-CN.md both said '18 entries'; both now say 19.
reference §4 said the /api/enabled and /api/admin/session calls are
'admin-session Bearer-auth'd'. The code says otherwise: config_authorized
(notify.rs:423) accepts the shared worker token OR a valid admin session,
and create_admin_session (notify.rs:1187) is gated by worker_authorized
against the admin credential CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY — it is what mints the
session, so it cannot be session-auth'd. Both languages now state the two
distinct credentials and why adding /api/enabled opens no new credential
path.
deployment §10.8 said every request-bearing entry point, listing /healthz
and /api/*, calls refresh_business_config. The actual 10 call sites cover
8 distinct paths (/ready, /worker, /reconcile, /push/jmap, /webhook/tg,
/api/config, /api/business-config, /api/telegram/register-webhook). GET
/healthz is a static 200 "ok" and never refreshes; /api/status,
/api/enabled, /api/push/register, /api/push/disable and the
/api/admin/session pair do not either. Both languages now list the real
set and name the exclusions.
design.md §5.7 listed the search trigger prefixes as English
'search'/'find'/'retrieval'; worker.rs:689 accepts the Chinese prefixes
搜索/查找/检索 and the help text states English aliases are not supported.
The two user-facing strings were also mistranslated: the empty-query
guidance prompt is 请提供搜索关键词，例如：/search 发票 (worker.rs:623)
and the no-match reply is 没有找到匹配「<query>」的邮件。
(worker.rs:792). The degraded-rendering marker is likewise a Chinese
string. SEARCH_SUBJECT_MAX=120 / SEARCH_PREVIEW_MAX=160 /
SEARCH_LIMIT=10 verified unchanged.
design.md §5.6/§5.7 were machine-translated from Chinese back into
English and were broken: 'the first 300 if it fails. characters', a
stray closing ** mid-sentence, '(none) deny_unknown_fields)' with a
mismatched paren, and 5 zero-width-space artefacts. charter.md:168 had a
broken '**Tables, lists, or values may not be copied across documents. **'
and opengaps.md had 4. All ZWSPs removed from docs/.
deployment.zh-CN.md §10.5/§10.6 were thin mistranslations: 'Worker 域'
for 'Worker URL', the debug-token requirement dropped entirely, and a
mangled '两者都使用用于验证部署的可用和版本'. Rewritten against the EN.
Also replaced a worker.rs:227 line anchor with the MetadataWorker doc
comment; that drops the repo's line-refs from 72 to 71, so new text no
longer adds to the drift surface.
No code changes; GATE-DOCS 6/6 (71 anchors, 455 section refs, 727 path
refs).
Reframe the Cloudflare Worker gateway across the entry points where a
reader forms an impression of it, in both languages:
- README §2 / §5 (en+zh): the gateway is optional and exists because
Cloudflare's Load Balancer product is not on the free plan. Drop the
comparison row that listed 'only the 19 safelisted paths' against
'every route' as if the safelist were a benefit; replace it with
backend reachability, which is identical either way, and move the
route-count fact to its own neutral row. Add one sentence to §5 that
the gateway is outside the secret boundary.
- deployment.md §10 (en+zh): purpose is load balancing, not protection;
no intent to hide or harden the backends, no access control at the
edge, the allowlist is not a firewall.
- cloudflare-worker README (en+zh): new 'why it exists' / 'why it is
not a security feature' block, plus a 'not a security layer' bullet.
Drop 'access-hiding capability' from the non-capabilities list, since
claiming invisibility as something we refuse to provide implies it is
the interesting axis.
- reference.md §4 / §9.2 (en+zh) and deployment.md zh §2: stop saying
bootstrap and /debug/* are 'not exposed' / 'kept off the public path'.
They are simply not in the route set, which is why a request to the
Worker never reaches them — reachable at the backend's own address
either way.
- charter ARCH-LB-WORKER (en+zh): 'only external entrance' -> 'only
*registered* entrance', which is what C-LB-SINGLE-REG-URL actually
says, and backends stay directly reachable.
SAF-LB-PASSTHRU already records the security-side invariant (no auth
or body rewriting, backend may be directly connected to the public
network), so no new stable ID is needed. No code changes; GATE-DOCS
6/6.
The retire-on-change commit inserted ~500 lines into notify.rs and ~110
into state.rs, shifting every anchor at or after the insertion point.
The ANCHOR audit only proves the referenced line exists and is
non-empty, so all of these passed while pointing at the wrong code:
deployment.md/.zh-CN register_telegram_webhook 1619 -> 1623
register_push 1464 -> 1468 (EN)
register_telegram_webhook 1439 -> 1623 (zh)
register_push 1315 -> 1468 (zh)
retired.md/.zh-CN registration_lock fmt 1328-1330 -> 1481-1483
register_push 1315 -> 1468
state.rs read_batch 491 -> 506
state.rs query_async 531 -> 546
state.rs XGROUP CREATE 499-507 -> 514-522
opengaps.md/.zh-CN get_reconcile_state 777 -> 792
set_reconcile_state 785 -> 800
acquire_lock 1076 -> 1130
Every target was verified against the source before editing: two of the
pre-existing anchors pointed inside a different function than the one
they named, and the EN deployment.md had both register anchors off while
the zh twin still carried the original pre-move numbers.
Also documents the new push:registration:current key in the Redis key
table (writer, readers, TTL, and why its literal suffix cannot collide
with the hex session_digest suffix) and carries the zh twin the EN
version already got. Mirror the retire-on-change contract in
deployment.zh-CN.md - the zh twin has its own callback section, which
the EN update skipped.
Four spots told the operator to read the SPA footer to confirm a
deploy landed. The footer no longer renders a version, so restating
that would send an operator looking at a control that no longer
exists. Point them at /api/status instead; the version field itself is
unchanged.
The previous commit inserted 500+ lines into notify.rs, moving
register_push and register_telegram_webhook. Reanchor the two
deployment.md line refs; the other seven refs in that file are before
the insertion point and are unchanged.
Document the new retire-on-change contract in reference.md.
reference.md: new Section 6.5 explains the bimodal cursor, the two token
classes (Session.state is not an Email-collection token; newState is), why a
truncated walk persists as a walk, and why oldState and destroyed are dropped.
Section 6.2 budget table is renamed to the new constant names and gains
RECONCILE_INITIAL_CHANGES. state:jmap:since is listed as a pipeline key.
opengaps.md: the re-baseline fix is described with the new session_state()
name, and the position-walk note no longer claims a state argument is passed
as None - the None is folder_id, and the method has no state parameter at all.
retired.md: the dead-code removal no longer claims those were the last three
#[expect(dead_code)] attributes in src/; reload_async still has one.
deployment.md / design.md: the 54+14 anchors the code move had shifted by one
hunk are re-anchored, plus two manual corrections (the /reconcile route and the
unconditional 204 return). charter.md: baseline 89 -> 93 passed.
AGENTS.md: the two anchor counts it quotes (60, 44) were stale; they are 54
and 17.
check_sec_refs.py: two-part section refs attributed to an RFC (RFC 8620
Section 2.1) are external, not doc references - the trailing-dot test only
caught the three-part form.
revision becomes a request-body control field on BusinessConfigPatch. It is
never a setting: apply() and is_complete() ignore it, so the stored wire
never gains a revision key, and a PUT body that omits it keeps
last-write-wins for callers that never read the revision back.
The SPA records the revision it read, echoes it on every partial submit, and
on a 409 re-reads the stored values into the form and tells the operator to
recheck what they changed. Without that reload every retry would 409
forever; if the reload itself fails the SPA falls back to last-write-wins
rather than trapping the operator. The control field is excluded from the
empty-patch check so echoing it never counts as a change.
The compare-then-write is deliberately not atomic. Without a Lua script an
optimistic lock still has a residual window in which two requests racing
inside the same tick both pass and the later one wins; the window stays
small because a patch carries only the fields the operator actually changed.
notify.rs gained 18 lines before line 700, so its anchors in deployment.md,
opengaps.md and retired.md shifted by +18. Every one was checked against the
real line content, since the anchor audit only flags blank targets.
Gates: rust fmt/clippy clean, cargo test 87 passed 2 ignored, node --test
web/config.test.mjs 18 passed, docs_check/run_all.sh 6/6.
`docs/reference.md` is the single source of truth and gets touched on every API
change, yet 40 of its 56 `notify.rs` anchors had drifted onto a closing brace,
a doc comment, or the wrong symbol - including one whole line pointing at
`revoke_admin_session` where a jmap dedup key is claimed - while
`scripts/docs_check/audit_anchors.py` reported every one of them clean. Its own
docstring says it only checks that the target line exists and is non-blank.
Remove the anchors rather than correcting them: fixing 40 numbers creates a
treadmill that re-drifts on the next unrelated edit to the same file, and the
file's own convention already called the line number "not an identity". Symbol
names are kept everywhere, which is what the gates and the readers need.
`docs/deployment.md` keeps its line numbers - it is an operator runbook read
mid-incident - and the five anchors that were wrong there are corrected.
docs/reference.md
- Drop the false "Verified against commit b2dbe7c" header claim; the anchors
never matched that commit. Replace it with the design decision and the
reason, and drop the "Only this file carries line numbers" convention that
`deployment.md` was already violating.
- Remove all `*.rs:NNN` and bare `:NNN` anchors, keeping symbol names.
- Fix a wrong fact the anchors were hiding: the session issued by
`POST /api/admin/session` is a fresh CSPRNG token generated per call, not a
"fixed 32-byte hex secret derived from admin_token". The anchor pointed at
`bootstrap`'s body.
docs/deployment.md
- `retry_or_dlq` call site 481 -> 479; `lock:reconcile` acquire 289 -> 290
(twice); heartbeat `renew_lock` 302 -> 303 (twice).
AGENTS.md
- Record the convention: symbol names in docs, line numbers only in
`docs/deployment.md`, plus the audit script's limits so nobody reads its
output as "the anchors are correct".
scripts/docs_check/audit_anchor_semantics.py (new)
- Independent script, not wired into `run_all.sh`, always `exit 0`, prints
candidates only. It flags an anchor whose target line has no relation to the
symbol the doc claims. Candidates go 20 -> 5 and `reference.md` disappears
from the list entirely. It cannot catch a one- or two-line off-by-one - that
still needs a human - and a bare `:NNN` shorthand is not a matchable anchor.
Gates: GATE-DOCS 6/6 clean (ANCHOR AUDIT 324 -> 129 refs, 0 errors).
`src/` is untouched, so the test baseline stands at 86 passed / 0 failed /
2 ignored.
Adds the missing test coverage for the GET /api/business-config read-back
and the partial-patch PUT, then syncs the docs to the behaviour the code
actually has.
src/notify.rs
- PUT response body now carries "revision" alongside the
x-business-config-revision header, which the SPA surfaces in its status line.
- 4 test helpers (a router that returns (Router, MemoryState) so a config can be
seeded first, a full valid wire value, a direct state writer that skips
validation, and a wire value whose JMAP URL fails fast) plus 9 tests:
- GET 401 leaks no business field at all (body is exactly error + request_id)
- GET echoes the 10 non-secret values and returns secrets only as presence
booleans; the serialised body is asserted to contain none of the 6 secret
values (SAF-NO-SECRET-ECHO)
- GET with nothing stored returns 200 configured:false revision:0, not 404
- a first save with an incomplete patch is rejected and writes nothing
- a partial submit replaces only the fields it carries, verified by reading
the merged result back over the same path the SPA uses
- validation runs on the merged result, so changing one field cannot bypass
the rest, and a rejected submit neither persists nor bumps the revision
- telegram_chat_id is accepted as a number or a numeric string and a garbage
string is rejected without overwriting the stored value
- a typo in a field name is rejected rather than silently dropped
src/config.rs
- Pure deserialisation test for de_i64_from_number_or_string, with no router and
no store. This is the only place that separates "the custom deserializer
refuses the string" from "a later validation step refused it" - a real
distinction, since the SPA submits telegram_chat_id as a string on a partial
submit while the read-back model returns a number.
cloudflare-worker/test/index.test.js
- The forwarded-route test asserted a fixed upstream origin, which is not stable:
the LB rotates its start index between tests. Assert the origin is one of the
configured backends and check the path and method exactly instead.
docs
- 17 spots bring the docs in line with the shipped contract: GET is now
documented, PUT as a partial patch, the worker safelist at 16 routes, and the
preflight path listed as forwarded.
- Corrections the docs had backwards: the response field is "configured"
(revision is a u64, 0 when nothing is stored); Invalid returns 422, only
Unreachable returns 503; there is no chat_allowlist_empty error code.
- "Blank keeps the stored value" is now stated as a client-side contract. The
backend does not distinguish an omitted field from an empty string - apply()
uses unwrap_or_else, so an explicitly submitted "" really does clear the
secret (validation then rejects it). Saying it was server-side was wrong.
- POST /worker was listed as a forwarded route though it is not in SAFE_ROUTES,
and the per-category counts did not match the lists they introduced.
- POST /api/bootstrap does not share the patch-merge contract; it deserialises a
full BusinessConfigWire, which is the only path that can create a config from
nothing.
- Re-anchored 9 src/notify.rs line refs that had drifted blank and raised the
baseline to 86 passed / 0 failed / 2 ignored.
Gates: fmt, clippy -D warnings, test 86/0/2 ignored, worker 32/32, SPA 17/17,
GATE-DOCS 6/6 clean.
GET /api/business-config returns the stored values with presence-only secrets, and PUT now merges a patch against the stored config instead of replacing it, so the SPA can show what is already set and send back only the fields that changed.
The SPA marks secrets as set-but-unreadable, edits chat_allowlist as an unordered set, and omits fields it did not touch; blank required fields keep the stored value, blank optional fields clear it. The read-back is Serialize-only, so a client cannot inject secrets_present.
Forward both paths at the gateway: /api/business-config accepted PUT only, so the read-back returned 405, and the preflight path was missing from the safelist entirely, so it returned 404. The SPA is served from the Worker domain, so the whole edit experience was unreachable behind the production gateway. Route methods are now asserted per path, which the safelist test never checked.
Also: /debug/config reports timezone again, the timezone select is styled like the other fields, and the docs follow the new contract.
New reference.md 5.4 pins the user-visible contract: notifications are three
metadata lines only (From / Subject / Received), never the body and never an
LLM summary; the mailbox display form and its fallback literals; the
timezone field, its 16-zone whitelist, the 422 on anything else, and why DST
is not tracked. Registered as REQ-TIMEZONE-DISPLAY in charter 8.
deployment 5 gains the TIMEZONE row, including the SPA section and the
reason DST zones cannot be added.
Opengaps 1 drops two blockers that are verified done and moves the remaining
two to a "what you do / what I do" checklist.
Corrected doc claims that the line-number checker cannot reach:
- reference 6.2 and the Redis key table cited notify.rs 240/253 and
252/253 for lock TTL and heartbeat; the lock is acquired at :289 and
renewed at :302.
- The Redis key table's dedup:tg / dedup:jmap / ratelimit / stream call-site
anchors all pointed into the ready() handler and into unrelated config
helpers. Re-pointed at the real statement lines.
- Both Retry-After helpers were anchored at error_response 321-329 and
error_response_with_id 1088-1094; the real definitions are 370-378 and
1368-1375, and the readiness path passes retry at :210, not :162.
- design claimed summarize() is also called by notify.rs for new-mail
notifications. There is exactly one call site, the /summary branch in
worker.rs; notifications never call the LLM.
- design described list_emails as requesting an explicit property list and
returning Vec<EmailSummary>; the code passes no properties and returns
Vec<EmailMetadata>.
- retired listed 6 intents but only 5; worker.rs:533 for /search is :553.
- Config is 7 fields now that timezone is mirrored into it.
The anchor audit now flags any citation that lands on a bare brace, paren or
comma - the shape these drifted references had.
- opengaps: drop the Telegram inbound callback and Stalwart PushSubscription
blockers, both verified live; 2 items remain (newState semantics, TTL
measurement). The public-callback mapping question is also resolved -- the
integration env has no Worker in front and Stalwart hits the backend origin
directly, while /push/jmap is already in the Worker safelist for production
- deployment 4.1 (new): full setWebhook and /api/push/register procedure,
expected replies, failure symptoms, and the setWebHook rotation trap (the
deployed secret must be re-registered after any TG_WEBHOOK_SECRET change)
- deployment 6.2: the worker is neither a background task nor a separate
container; POST /worker is the only consumer entry point
- deployment 6.3.1: add the /worker drain step to the cron and k8s CronJob
examples, plus a two-endpoint comparison table, ordering requirements, the
10-message batch cap, and the "204 is not a success signal" warning
- deployment 10.4: describe /worker as scheduler-driven, not manually invoked
- reference, retired: /worker anchor notify.rs:331 -> 380; the old value fell
inside the reconcile function body, so the anchor audit passed while being
semantically wrong
- charter 6.6: narrow the blocker list; code baseline b2dbe7c -> fc686ab
- design 11.2: PushSubscription permission now verified; the external Cron
must call both /reconcile and /worker
GATE-P0: cargo fmt / check / clippy clean, 69 passed, 1 ignored
GATE-DOCS: 6/6 clean (ANCHOR 299, SECTION-REF 234, PATH 428)
PUT /api/business-config and POST /api/bootstrap now treat validation as the only
write gate: a valid wire is always persisted, and only then are the clients built
and the running worker swapped. A failed build returns 200 with persisted=true,
runtime_applied=false and a warnings array of {component, step, detail} instead of
503, so an unreachable JMAP/LLM no longer turns a valid configuration into a silent
data loss. The previous worker keeps serving.
POST /api/business-config/preflight runs the same validation and client build
against the submitted wire without writing anything and without touching the
running worker. It answers 200 even when the configuration is bad, because that
is the answer the caller asked for; components is null after a validation
failure, and llm is null rather than vacuously ok when LLM is disabled.
Authentication is the admin-session gate, not DEBUG_TOKEN.
The SPA drops the account_id field (the backend still accepts it; omitted falls
back to the session primary account), adds a Test connection button, and shows
the build fingerprint in the footer, the topbar and the setup card. The
503 message no longer claims JMAP/LLM build failure, which is not what produces
it.
BusinessConfigWire.account_id gains #[serde(default)]; without it, omitting the
field in the wire body made deserialization fail outright.
build.rs bakes BUILD_VERSION (git sha or nogit, plus a UTC build timestamp) which
GET /api/status exposes as version.
jmap-client refuses to follow any redirect unless the target host is on a
trust list that defaults to empty. Stalwart 307-redirects /.well-known/jmap
to /jmap/session, so connect() aborted with "Aborting redirect request to
unknown host 'mail.motofans.club'" and PUT /api/business-config failed with
a 503 carrying no usable detail.
connect_with_runtime now passes the origin host parsed from the normalized
session URL to follow_redirects, trusting that host only -- a target host the
server invents is still refused. An unparseable base yields an empty host,
which matches no target and preserves the previous fail-closed behaviour.
Verified against a real Stalwart instance both ways: the ignored smoke test
session_list_and_read_smoke now passes (session -> folders -> email list ->
read) and fails with the redirect error when the change is reverted.
docs: record the redirect trust under SAF-JMAP-URL, mark G1/D-G1-1 verified
after the real-server run, and refresh two shifted line anchors in client.rs.
The setup router delegated to the full factory, so all 12 business and
admin routes were registered even though not one could ever work:
admin_token is an empty SecretString and constant_time_eq has a
!expected.is_empty() guard, so an empty expected value rejects every
candidate forever. MemoryState could not persist a bootstrap write either.
Those routes answered 401 {"error":"unauthorized"}, which is
indistinguishable from a mistyped credential. An operator or a probe
reads that as "try a different token" when the truth is "these
endpoints do not exist in this mode".
router_configuration_setup now builds its own AppState and mounts only
/api/status, /ready and /healthz. Verified live with no env vars:
healthz 200, ready 503, /api/status 200 with the missing list, and all
12 business/admin routes 404. The SPA is unaffected: /api/status is the
only endpoint it calls at startup, and web/config.js reveals the
admin-session card only when ready === true.
Added configuration_setup_mounts_only_status_and_probes to guard the
route table, and configuration_setup_call as its helper.
Docs: reference.md section 3 and 5.1 now describe the reduced surface
and cite the empty-expected-value guard; deployment.md's probe table had
/api/status listed as 503 {"status":...} when it returns 200 with a
"mode" field; retired.md section 4.1 records the removed route
registrations. Anchors refreshed for the +19 lines in notify.rs.
Four doc headers reference the code commit whose line anchors they were
read against. The trait deletion moved src/channel.rs (361 -> 340) and
src/domain.rs (16 -> 10), so the anchors are re-based to that commit.
GATE-DOCS: PASS 5/5 (VALIDATION 0, TABLE 0, ANCHOR 248 line-refs / 0,
SECTION-REF 216 / 0, SIZE CHECK 0).
Line anchors in reference.md / retired.md were re-read against the compat-cleanup
commit, and the test baseline in charter.md and roadmap.md moves 62 -> 61 to match
the deleted from_env()-driven case.
GATE-DOCS: PASS 5/5, ANCHOR 247 line-refs / 0, SECTION-REF 216 / 0.
Code (src/config.rs 521->394, src/main.rs 232->200):
- Config::from_env() + required_secret / required_nonblank / env_bool deleted.
config.rs now performs no std::env read; all business fields come from Redis
business config (BusinessConfigWire -> validate_business_wire -> validate_nonblank).
- RUN_MODE deleted: variable, Config.run_mode field and the main.rs validation
block. The two modes never changed runtime behaviour -- webhook and reconcile
share one router, POST /reconcile is a standalone endpoint.
- jmap_password() accessor deleted; the field name is kept in
BusinessConfig / BusinessConfigWire because it is real data, not a stub.
- Config.port and Config.redis_url deleted: both had zero readers, and port was
hardcoded to 8080 in both constructors while the listener binds straight from
the PORT env var, so the field could silently disagree with the real port.
Config is now 6 fields: telegram / jmap / account_id / llm / auth / worker_token.
- redis_only() and from_business(value) signatures simplified accordingly.
- #[expect(dead_code)] count in src/ is now 0.
Test coverage: the from_env()-driven startup_rejects_blank_auth_secret case is
gone with the path it tested. The non-leak assertion it carried was reattached
to the real validation route (BusinessConfigWire -> TryFrom -> validate_nonblank)
with a stronger third assertion that the rejected value is not echoed either.
Docs: design.md 7.1 re-scoped to the Redis business config table; reference.md
5.1/5.3 rewritten (no legacy env path); deployment.md 5 and the runtime-mode
table rewritten; retired.md gains section 4 registering every deletion;
README x2, .env.example, charter.md updated.
GATE-P0: fmt / check / clippy -D warnings green, 61 passed / 0 failed / 1
ignored (was 62; the deleted case). GATE-DOCS: PASS 5/5, ANCHOR 247 line-refs /
0, SECTION-REF 216 / 0.
Every member's audit is now read and each real finding fixed, not just reported.
AGENTS.md §2.1
- The 500-line soft cap now has a machine-checkable exception: an over-limit
file must carry a one-line `SPLIT-EVAL:` marker stating the split decision.
- Six files were over the cap with no justification: notify.rs 2036, state.rs
1586, worker.rs 1045, config.js 1079, client.rs 601, config.rs 521. All now
carry the marker. client.rs was missed by my own earlier line count, which
did not descend into src/domain/jmap/.
- New validator scripts/docs_check/check_file_size.py; GATE-DOCS 4/4 -> 5/5.
It proves the marker exists, not that the written reason is sound.
- Re-based 144 line anchors across six docs for the +1 line each file gained;
every shifted anchor verified against the code, not just for non-blankness.
audit-arch.md
- design.md §6.1 module matrix omitted the `debug` module entirely; added.
- Seven numeric duplications in design.md now defer to reference.md §6.1 as
the single authority instead of restating the values.
- reference.md §5.1 was missing DEBUG_TOKEN; §5.3 listed six recognised names
and guessed `JMAP_*`. It now lists all 20 exactly as config.rs reads them.
- Corrected two wrong claims in the audit itself: debug.rs is compiled
unconditionally, not under #[cfg(debug_assertions)] (there are no cargo
features at all), and /debug/* exposes 7 routes, not the invented session
list / resend / rebuild surface.
audit-fileplanner.md
- reference.md cited a nonexistent `jmap_service.rs`; replaced with the real
adapter chain worker.rs -> domain/jmap.rs -> domain/jmap/client.rs.
- cloudflare-worker/README.md was outside every validator's scope; all four
doc validators now include it (208 section refs, 250 line refs).
- README.zh-CN.md stated only half of what README.md says about RUN_MODE; the
forward-placeholder sentence is now bilingual.
- charter.md §7 boundary table was missing rows for itself and for web/.
audit-rust.md / audit-frontend.md
- Error envelope corrected: `error` is a bare machine code, no `message`.
- Status table, AI-consent labels and ~15 stale or phantom facts fixed against
notify.rs; `TelegramClient::SendMessage` and `web_config` phantoms removed.
- GET|PUT /api/enabled forwarded by the worker so the SPA kill switch works.
- Ten UI strings that called the admin credential the Redis ACL password now
say CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY.
- POST /healthz returns 405; dead HTTP_STATUS removed.
- audit_anchors.py now flags identifiers that do not exist in the file they
are anchored to.
charter.md
- `SAF-ENABLE-FLAG` registered (85 IDs); `SAF-ADMIN-SESSION` row corrected;
- `REQ-PUSH-TYPES` registered; the stale `admin_session_digest` removed.
Gates: GATE-DOCS PASS 5/5 (250 line-refs, 208 section refs, 0 errors);
GATE-P0 62 passed / 0 failed / 1 ignored, baseline unchanged; worker and SPA
36 tests, 0 failures.
Real Stalwart / Telegram / managed Redis verification stays blocked on missing
credentials and remains labelled as unverified.
AGENTS.md (276 -> 239 lines) is now a language-agnostic engineering-norms
document: code style, config and secrets handling, build environment,
testing gates, document governance. It states no project fact and names no
language, framework, dependency, or file. Verified: zero hits for JMAP,
Telegram, Redis, axum, Cloudflare, LLM, *.rs, and every project env var.
All project-specific content moved to the new docs/charter.md (~276 lines):
project goals, locked technology choices, 23 numbered security invariants,
implementation stages, prohibitions, test/acceptance gates with the full
GATE-P0 command and baseline, document boundary rules, and the stable ID
registry.
docs/charter.md §8 is the single authority index for stable IDs: 83 rows,
no duplicates, ID | definition file | one-line statement | category. Four
IDs that were referenced across the docs but never registered are now
registered: ARCH-STATE-REDIS, C-REDIS-EXTERNAL, GATE-UPTIME-KUMA, GATE-DOCS.
All previously registered IDs are preserved.
Defect fixed while rebuilding the registry: SAF-ADMIN-SESSION cited
src/config.rs `admin_session_digest`, a name that has 0 hits in src/ -- a
phantom identifier that survived in the authoritative registry since before
this restructure. Corrected to `session_digest` (src/config.rs:7). All 8
distinct backticked symbols in the registry's definition-file column now
verify against src/.
Two false project facts removed from the docs (both claimed the SPA writes
through POST /api/bootstrap, which web/config.js never calls -- 0 hits; the
actual path is PUT /api/business-config): README.md, README.zh-CN.md,
docs/reference.md. The first successful write creates the configuration and
later writes hot-reload it; POST /api/bootstrap remains the one-shot
automation endpoint.
Cross-reference redirections in 9 files: README.md, README.zh-CN.md,
docs/deployment.md, docs/design.md, docs/reference.md,
cloudflare-worker/README.md, cloudflare-worker/src/index.js,
cloudflare-worker/wrangler.toml now point project facts at charter.md and
language-agnostic quality rules at AGENTS.md.
Four validators extended to cover docs/charter.md: DOCS lists in
audit_anchors.py, check_tables.py, validate_docs.py, check_sec_refs.py, plus
charter.md added to check_sec_refs.py's TARGET_BEFORE regex and to
validate_docs.py's index-file cross-doc exemption.
Gates: GATE-DOCS PASS 4/4 (VALIDATION 0 errors, TABLE STRUCTURE 0
mismatches, ANCHOR AUDIT 227 line-refs / 0 errors, SECTION-REF AUDIT 191
refs / 0 errors). GATE-P0 PASS, baseline unchanged 62 passed / 0 failed /
1 ignored. Anchor audit proves line reachability only, not that the line
contains what the prose claims.
Code (2 sites):
- main.rs logged bootstrap_config.port, which is always the hardcoded 8080 in
the two-variable production config; the listener actually binds the port
parsed at main.rs:31-34. Log the bound port.
- That exposed Config.port as genuinely unread (clippy -D warnings), so mark it
with #[expect(dead_code, reason=...)] instead of silently deleting a
documented env-parsing site.
Docs, phantom identifiers (names that do not exist in src/):
- RuntimeConfig x3 -> OutboundConfig via RuntimeConfigProvider (state.rs:34/41)
- LlmClient::noop() x2 -> None in Option<Arc<LlmClient>> (main.rs:125)
- main.rs::validate_env_or_exit x2 -> config.rs:338 read, main.rs:75 validation
- TelegramChannel::send_message -> TelegramClient::send_text (channel.rs:134)
Docs, stale facts:
- LLM table: ENABLED and ALLOW_NET defaulted true,true -> false,false;
API_KEY, BASE_URL, MODE were "required" -> only required when enabled. This
contradicted design.md:385-387, which already had the correct values.
- design.md:560 said RUN_MODE "is actually consumed"; it is only read and
validated and never affects behaviour (main.rs:73-74).
- RUN_MODE operator docs (README, reference, deployment, .env.example) now say
both accepted values produce identical behaviour.
- retired.md: 5 intents -> 6 (/search shipped, worker.rs:517); 4 LLM env vars
-> 6; main.rs tracing events 6 -> 7.
- design.md:494 tracing count 6 -> 7, debug-gate warning added to the list.
- design.md:350 code-gap count 2 -> 1 (multi-instance window done in 6c99ce5).
- design.md:554 marks the 45-paused stage-0 baseline explicitly as historical.
- .env.example said the Redis ACL password was the bootstrap trust root; it is
CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY (main.rs:88-91).
Docs, re-anchored after the main.rs shrink (6 refs shifted by -2).
GATE-P0 62 passed / 0 failed / 1 ignored; GATE-DOCS 4/4 clean
(228 line anchors, 211 section refs, 0 errors).
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