Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
anonsaber 2da11b9f92 docs+fix: delete the legacy env compat layer; sync every doc that described it
Code (src/config.rs 521->394, src/main.rs 232->200):
- Config::from_env() + required_secret / required_nonblank / env_bool deleted.
  config.rs now performs no std::env read; all business fields come from Redis
  business config (BusinessConfigWire -> validate_business_wire -> validate_nonblank).
- RUN_MODE deleted: variable, Config.run_mode field and the main.rs validation
  block. The two modes never changed runtime behaviour -- webhook and reconcile
  share one router, POST /reconcile is a standalone endpoint.
- jmap_password() accessor deleted; the field name is kept in
  BusinessConfig / BusinessConfigWire because it is real data, not a stub.
- Config.port and Config.redis_url deleted: both had zero readers, and port was
  hardcoded to 8080 in both constructors while the listener binds straight from
  the PORT env var, so the field could silently disagree with the real port.
  Config is now 6 fields: telegram / jmap / account_id / llm / auth / worker_token.
- redis_only() and from_business(value) signatures simplified accordingly.
- #[expect(dead_code)] count in src/ is now 0.

Test coverage: the from_env()-driven startup_rejects_blank_auth_secret case is
gone with the path it tested. The non-leak assertion it carried was reattached
to the real validation route (BusinessConfigWire -> TryFrom -> validate_nonblank)
with a stronger third assertion that the rejected value is not echoed either.

Docs: design.md 7.1 re-scoped to the Redis business config table; reference.md
5.1/5.3 rewritten (no legacy env path); deployment.md 5 and the runtime-mode
table rewritten; retired.md gains section 4 registering every deletion;
README x2, .env.example, charter.md updated.

GATE-P0: fmt / check / clippy -D warnings green, 61 passed / 0 failed / 1
ignored (was 62; the deleted case). GATE-DOCS: PASS 5/5, ANCHOR 247 line-refs /
0, SECTION-REF 216 / 0.
2026-09-29 02:02:44 +08:00
anonsaber b70d188864 docs+fix: sweep stale and phantom references; log the actual bound port
Code (2 sites):
- main.rs logged bootstrap_config.port, which is always the hardcoded 8080 in
  the two-variable production config; the listener actually binds the port
  parsed at main.rs:31-34. Log the bound port.
- That exposed Config.port as genuinely unread (clippy -D warnings), so mark it
  with #[expect(dead_code, reason=...)] instead of silently deleting a
  documented env-parsing site.

Docs, phantom identifiers (names that do not exist in src/):
- RuntimeConfig x3 -> OutboundConfig via RuntimeConfigProvider (state.rs:34/41)
- LlmClient::noop() x2 -> None in Option<Arc<LlmClient>> (main.rs:125)
- main.rs::validate_env_or_exit x2 -> config.rs:338 read, main.rs:75 validation
- TelegramChannel::send_message -> TelegramClient::send_text (channel.rs:134)

Docs, stale facts:
- LLM table: ENABLED and ALLOW_NET defaulted true,true -> false,false;
  API_KEY, BASE_URL, MODE were "required" -> only required when enabled. This
  contradicted design.md:385-387, which already had the correct values.
- design.md:560 said RUN_MODE "is actually consumed"; it is only read and
  validated and never affects behaviour (main.rs:73-74).
- RUN_MODE operator docs (README, reference, deployment, .env.example) now say
  both accepted values produce identical behaviour.
- retired.md: 5 intents -> 6 (/search shipped, worker.rs:517); 4 LLM env vars
  -> 6; main.rs tracing events 6 -> 7.
- design.md:494 tracing count 6 -> 7, debug-gate warning added to the list.
- design.md:350 code-gap count 2 -> 1 (multi-instance window done in 6c99ce5).
- design.md:554 marks the 45-paused stage-0 baseline explicitly as historical.
- .env.example said the Redis ACL password was the bootstrap trust root; it is
  CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY (main.rs:88-91).

Docs, re-anchored after the main.rs shrink (6 refs shifted by -2).

GATE-P0 62 passed / 0 failed / 1 ignored; GATE-DOCS 4/4 clean
(228 line anchors, 211 section refs, 0 errors).
2026-09-28 22:33:27 +08:00
anonsaber afa6cec8ef debug: 新增 /debug/* 远程联调面,双因子门禁默认绝对关闭(01a0e319)
新增 src/debug.rs:/debug/ping、/config、/redis、/jmap、/telegram、/worker 六个只读
探针 + POST /debug/notify 一条测试出站消息。

SAF-DEBUG-GATE 双因子,缺任一即完全不挂载路由(请求落到通用 404,无"未配置即放行"
降级):
- 启动命令带 --debug(main.rs 最小 std::env::args 解析,未新增依赖)
- Secret 环境变量 DEBUG_TOKEN 非空

两层执行点:main.rs 推导 debug_token 并传入 router builder(None 则 debug_router 不被
merge);debug.rs 侧 auth_token 缺失时直接返回空 Router。

SAF-DEBUG-AUTH:每个 handler 先做 Authorization: Bearer DEBUG_TOKEN 常数时间比较
(复用 worker_authorized),失败 401,鉴权通过前不产生任何副作用。

探针只读侧全部复用现成实现,不另写一套:Redis 走 is_enabled,JMAP 走
probe_jmap_session,Telegram 走 probe_telegram_get_me,出站走唯一构造点
business_client(notify.rs 新增 pub(crate))到 send_text,/debug/notify 与
refresh_business_config 共用同一条客户端构造路径。

SAF-NO-SECRET-ECHO / SAF-LOG-PURITY:/debug/config 只回"是否配置"、计数与超时等
运行时参数,bot token / JMAP password / worker / webhook / reconcile token / LLM key
一律不出现在响应体;DEBUG_TOKEN 只在鉴权内部暴露,不回显、不入日志,日志仅一条
"debug endpoints enabled" 且不含令牌值。allowlist 用 chat_allowlist_snapshot 取生效值
(运行时业务配置优先、否则启动值),/debug/notify 显式 chat_id 不在 allowlist 则 403。

ARCH-LB-WORKER 白名单不含 /debug/*,该面仅供直连 origin 联调,公网入口不可达。

AGENTS.md 登记 4 个稳定 ID:MOD-DEBUG / SAF-DEBUG-GATE / SAF-DEBUG-AUTH /
REQ-DEBUG-ENDPOINTS(§2 第 19 条硬边界、§5 测试条、§7 索引 4 行)。

调试路由测试(4 项,notify.rs + debug.rs 内):Bearer 放行 200、缺失/错误令牌 401、
未提供 DEBUG_TOKEN 因子时 /debug/* 完全不注册而落 404、/debug/notify POST 未认证 401。

门禁四段全绿(rust:1-slim-bookworm):cargo fmt --all -- --check / cargo check --locked
/ cargo clippy --locked --all-targets -- -D warnings / cargo test --locked =
49 passed / 0 failed / 1 ignored。
2026-09-28 15:00:49 +08:00
anonsaber 800d6e0d00 notify: SPA 管理凭据改用 CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY,解除与 Redis ACL 密码耦合
原实现把 SPA 管理凭据派生自 REDIS_URL 的 ACL 密码,并在 handler 侧用
`.is_empty()` 直接拒绝空凭据。托管 Redis 常见配置是 TLS-only 无密码,
那种情况下 `.is_empty()` 恒为真,管理界面永久 401 —— `POST /api/bootstrap`
与 `POST /api/admin/session` 双双不可用,无法完成初始化。

改为直接取 CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY:它本就是启动必填 Secret(64 位 hex /
32 字节,见 config::encryption_key_from_env),启动时已校验,因此生产环境
不可能出现空凭据,handler 侧的空串守卫随之失效,一并移除。Redis ACL 密码
回归本职:只用于数据库连接。

- main.rs:env 只读一次(encryption_key_raw),admin_token 与已校验值不可能
  分叉;删除 Url::parse(redis_url).password() 分支。
- notify.rs:AppState 字段 bootstrap_token → admin_token(4 个构造点同步),
  两处 handler 删除空串守卫,bootstrap() 文档不再称 Redis ACL bootstrap。
- 测试更名 bootstrap_rejects_missing_admin_credential:断言语义不变(测试态
  空凭据收到 Bearer 仍 401),名称改为反映新语义。

门禁全绿:cargo fmt --check / check --locked / clippy --all-targets -D warnings
/ test --locked = 45 passed, 0 failed, 1 ignored。
2026-09-28 12:43:33 +08:00
anonsaber 4ecfa44485 fix(redis): install explicit rustls crypto provider 2026-09-25 18:02:21 +08:00
anonsaber 8a24ec7e9e fix: report all missing setup requirements 2026-09-25 09:42:15 +08:00
anonsaber e5ec3aef4c feat: provide configuration setup mode 2026-09-25 09:30:45 +08:00
anonsaber dceecaf2f4 feat: initial MessageWeave release 2026-09-25 09:14:04 +08:00