生产镜像此前只有 ca-certificates + tini,容器 rootfs 又只读,运维在容器内既
装不了 apt 也没有 curl/ps,排查只能靠宿主机的 /proc。把只读诊断工具装进
runtime 阶段,实测体积 +7.7 MB:
curl procps(ps/pgrep/free) iproute2(ss/ip) jq bind9-dnsutils(dig) netcat-openbsd(nc)
全部是只读查询能力,不引入包管理之外的写能力,也不新增 shell 解释器。
顺手修掉四处已被事实推翻的表述:
1. Dockerfile 的 ENV RUN_MODE=webhook 是死变量——该标识符随 Config::from_env()
删除后代码零读取,文档 5 处都记着已删除,镜像却还在设。删掉并留注释防回退。
2. deployment.md 说「runtime 只装了 ca-certificates tini」「镜像内没有 curl/wget」,
两处都是健康检查建议的承重理由,随内置 curl 一起更新为「技术上可行但不建议」。
3. deployment.md 说非 root 用户是 uid 1000,实际 useradd --system 给 uid 999,
已实测修正。
4. retired.md 里 compose healthcheck 示例的删除理由把「镜像无 curl」当主因,
真正的承重原因是 src/main.rs 没有 CLI 子命令解析,已改写并标注 curl 已内置。
同时补齐 hoststack.yaml 缺失的 install 段(cargo fetch --locked),并在 start 段
写清临时开 --debug 的确切改法与「必须在容器内探、别走公网域名」的约束。
验证:
- 包名与安装步骤在同一 debian:bookworm-slim 基础镜像内实测通过
- useradd 实测输出 uid=999,与设计一致
- docker build --check 无告警
- GATE-DOCS PASS 6/6(SECTION-REF 217 / 0,PATH AUDIT 364 / 0)
注:install: { command: ... } 的键名是按现有 build:/start: 的同构推断的,
若 HostStack 拒绝该键,删掉这两行即可,不影响 build/start。
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .github/workflows | ||
| cloudflare-worker | ||
| docs | ||
| scripts/docs_check | ||
| src | ||
| web | ||
| .dockerignore | ||
| .env.example | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| Cargo.lock | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| Dockerfile | ||
| README.md | ||
| README.zh-CN.md | ||
| hoststack.yaml | ||
README.md
MessageWeave
中文文档 / Chinese documentation → README.zh-CN.md
One Telegram bot per mailbox. New mail arrives as metadata; the original is always fetched read-only from your own JMAP server.
1. What it is
MessageWeave sits between a JMAP mail server (for example Stalwart) and a Telegram bot.
- Inbound. A JMAP push subscription tells the service that a message changed. Nothing is polled at rest.
- Outbound. Each event becomes a short, metadata-only Telegram notification: sender, subject, timestamp. Mail bodies are never sent to Telegram.
- On demand. When you ask, the service reads the original through a fresh JMAP read call. Nothing is cached in between.
- Optionally summarised. If you explicitly opt in, an OpenAI-compatible LLM returns a short summary. Requests, responses and attachment bytes are never persisted.
State is an architectural boundary here, not a preference.
- Redis is the only state store. No database, no embedded store, no second store.
- The process writes nothing to disk. No log files, no data files, no local volume.
- No long-lived connections. No SSE, no WebSocket, no long polling.
- Logs go to stdout only. The platform's collector owns log storage and retention.
- What it is not. It is not a mail client, not a proxy, and not a relay. It forwards metadata to one bot; it does not read arbitrary URLs, open tunnels, or broker traffic.
2. 5-minute setup
Requires a reachable Redis 7 instance and a JMAP session plus a Telegram bot token.
cp .env.example .env # fill REDIS_URL and CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
docker build -t messageweave:latest .
docker run --env-file .env -p 8080:8080 messageweave:latest
Then open http://localhost:8080 in a browser and enter your CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
value. The SPA exchanges it with POST /api/admin/session for a 900-second admin session,
then writes the business secrets to Redis with PUT /api/business-config. No environment
variable is read or written again for business configuration.
For local builds without Docker: cargo build --locked produces the message-weave binary.
If the service answers requests but does nothing useful, check the logs for a startup warning: a missing required variable does not crash the process. It serves a read-only setup router over in-memory state instead. See §3.
3. Configuration entry points
Three layers. They are not interchangeable.
Boot-time environment — 2 required, 1 optional.
| Variable | Required | Default |
|---|---|---|
REDIS_URL |
yes | — |
CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY |
yes | — |
PORT |
no | 8080 |
There is no RUN_MODE: the legacy environment parser was removed, and webhook plus
reconcile traffic share one router (POST /reconcile is a standalone endpoint).
.env.example ships only the two required
variables; the rest are documented defaults.
Business configuration — Redis, written by the browser.
POST /api/bootstrap is the one-shot trust bootstrap; PUT /api/business-config hot-
reloads individual settings within about one second. The process never reads business
secrets from the environment in normal operation.
Health.
GET /healthz returns 200 unconditionally — it is liveness, not readiness. GET /ready
returns 503 until configuration, Redis, and both upstreams (a JMAP session GET and
Telegram getMe, 3s each) are reachable. Probe /ready, not /healthz, when deciding
whether to route traffic — but /ready is the heavier probe (~3s worst case), so a monitor
that must stay cheap should watch the gateway's aggregated /healthz.
Remote debug (opt-in, off by default).
/debug/* is an optional remote-debug surface: live JMAP and Telegram probes, the current
business config, and a single Telegram send. It sits behind a two-factor gate — the process
must be started with --debug and DEBUG_TOKEN must be set; miss either and the routes
do not exist at all (requests fall through to a generic 404). Nothing under /debug/* is on
the gateway allowlist, so it is reachable only on the backend origin itself. The only rule for
running it is to keep it off: leave --debug out of the start command and leave DEBUG_TOKEN
unset. If you do turn it on for a one-off diagnosis, configure the chat allowlist first — with
an empty allowlist the test send is not restricted to any chat. See
docs/deployment.md §2.1.
4. Security boundary, in one sentence
All state lives in Redis; the process reads only two environment variables and writes nothing to disk.
One corollary matters for setup: the SPA admin credential — and therefore the bootstrap
trust root — is CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY itself, the single 32-byte hex value you supply at
startup. It is only compared in constant time, and is never echoed, logged, or stored. The
Redis ACL password, if you have one, authenticates the Redis connection alone and is not
the credential for any HTTP endpoint.
5. Where to read more
| Document | What it answers |
|---|---|
docs/design.md |
Why the system is shaped this way: data flow, JMAP semantics, Redis streams, AI consent rules |
docs/deployment.md |
How to deploy: Dockerfile, secrets, Redis hosting, webhook/push/reconcile routing, multi-instance load balancing |
docs/reference.md |
Single source of truth for verifiable facts — Redis keys and TTLs, error codes, routes, environment layers, budgets |
docs/roadmap.md |
Gaps, blockers and the next phase |
docs/retired.md |
What was tried and dropped — abandoned routes, unreleased designs, and names that never existed |
docs/charter.md |
Project charter: goals, locked technology choices, security invariants, prohibitions, and the stable-ID registry |
AGENTS.md |
Language-agnostic engineering norms: code style, config and secrets, build environment, testing gates, document governance |
Facts that matter are traceable. If two documents disagree, docs/reference.md wins.