The previous commit switched to ConnectionManager but took its config
defaults. Two of them are unusable.
Default number_of_retries is 6, which is not a bounded retry in redis
0.27.6. Measured with a throwaway binary against a refusing host
(127.0.0.1:1, ConnectionManager::new_with_config):
retries = 0 -> returns in ~0.5 ms with IoError
retries = 1 -> returns in ~1.5 s with IoError
retries = 6 -> never returns (still hung at 300 s)
So the crate default is an infinite loop, not "six tries". With it in
place a Redis host that is down at boot makes startup hang forever: no
error, no log, and a container that reports Up while serving nothing.
The code path this replaced (get_multiplexed_async_connection) returned
in about half a millisecond, so the default quietly turned a fail-fast
boot into a silent hang.
Default connection_timeout is None, which leaves each attempt at the OS
connect timeout: roughly two minutes for a host that drops packets
instead of refusing them.
Setting retries to 1 restores fail-fast boot -- an unreachable host now
exits in under two seconds with `State(Redis(Connection refused))` --
while still absorbing a single transient refusal. Anything more is
redundant here: the manager re-enters the connect path on every
subsequent command once the connection drops, so recovery never depended
on one operation retrying many times.
Measured end-to-end against a local redis container, killing the Redis
and restarting it while the app stayed up:
before (retries 6): 61.6 s to recover, and during the outage
/debug/redis hung past a 25 s curl timeout
after (retries 1): 3.0 s to recover, and /debug/redis answers
immediately with detail=io_error
Auto-recovery still works with zero restarts; this only makes it faster
and stops the health endpoint from wedging while Redis is down.
Both values are named constants with the measurements in their docs so
the numbers can be checked and the "why only one retry" question does
not have to be answered again.
Gates: fmt clean, clippy -D warnings clean, cargo test 87 passed,
2 ignored, unchanged from the previous baseline.
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .github/workflows | ||
| cloudflare-worker | ||
| docs | ||
| scripts/docs_check | ||
| src | ||
| web | ||
| .dockerignore | ||
| .env.example | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| Cargo.lock | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| Dockerfile | ||
| README.md | ||
| README.zh-CN.md | ||
| build.rs | ||
| hoststack.yaml | ||
README.md
MessageWeave
中文文档 / Chinese documentation → README.zh-CN.md
One Telegram bot per mailbox. New mail arrives as metadata; the original is always fetched read-only from your own JMAP server.
1. What it is
MessageWeave sits between a JMAP mail server (for example Stalwart) and a Telegram bot.
- Inbound. A JMAP push subscription tells the service that a message changed. Nothing is polled at rest.
- Outbound. Each event becomes a short, metadata-only Telegram notification: sender, subject, timestamp. Mail bodies are never sent to Telegram.
- On demand. When you ask, the service reads the original through a fresh JMAP read call. Nothing is cached in between.
- Optionally summarised. If you explicitly opt in, an OpenAI-compatible LLM returns a short summary. Requests, responses and attachment bytes are never persisted.
State is an architectural boundary here, not a preference.
- Redis is the only state store. No database, no embedded store, no second store.
- The process writes nothing to disk. No log files, no data files, no local volume.
- No long-lived connections. No SSE, no WebSocket, no long polling.
- Logs go to stdout only. The platform's collector owns log storage and retention.
- What it is not. It is not a mail client, not a proxy, and not a relay. It forwards metadata to one bot; it does not read arbitrary URLs, open tunnels, or broker traffic.
2. 5-minute setup
Requires a reachable Redis 7 instance and a JMAP session plus a Telegram bot token.
This is the local/dev path. The repo's Dockerfile is for local docker run only --
production does not execute it. Live deploys run from hoststack.yaml with
runtime: rust, which HostStack builds in its own rust:slim-trixie image and runs in its
own debian:trixie-slim runner, so the Dockerfile's diagnostic tools, ENTRYPOINT and
EXPOSE do not apply there. See docs/deployment.md §3 and §5.1 for the boundary.
cp .env.example .env # fill REDIS_URL and CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
docker build -t messageweave:latest .
docker run --env-file .env -p 8080:8080 messageweave:latest
Then open http://localhost:8080 in a browser and enter your CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
value. The SPA exchanges it with POST /api/admin/session for a 900-second admin session,
then writes the business secrets to Redis with PUT /api/business-config. No environment
variable is read or written again for business configuration.
For local builds without Docker: cargo build --locked produces the message-weave binary.
If the service answers requests but does nothing useful, check the logs for a startup warning: a missing required variable does not crash the process. It serves a read-only setup router over in-memory state instead. See §3.
3. Configuration entry points
Three layers. They are not interchangeable.
Boot-time environment — 2 required, 1 optional.
| Variable | Required | Default |
|---|---|---|
REDIS_URL |
yes | — |
CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY |
yes | — |
PORT |
no | 8080 |
There is no RUN_MODE: the legacy environment parser was removed, and webhook plus
reconcile traffic share one router (POST /reconcile is a standalone endpoint).
.env.example ships only the two required
variables; the rest are documented defaults.
Business configuration — Redis, written by the browser.
POST /api/bootstrap is the one-shot trust bootstrap; PUT /api/business-config hot-
reloads individual settings within about one second. The process never reads business
secrets from the environment in normal operation.
Health.
GET /healthz returns 200 unconditionally — it is liveness, not readiness. GET /ready
returns 503 until configuration, Redis, and both upstreams (a JMAP session GET and
Telegram getMe, 3s each) are reachable. Probe /ready, not /healthz, when deciding
whether to route traffic — but /ready is the heavier probe (~3s worst case), so a monitor
that must stay cheap should watch the gateway's aggregated /healthz.
Remote debug (opt-in, off by default).
/debug/* is an optional remote-debug surface: live JMAP and Telegram probes, the current
business config, and a single Telegram send. It sits behind a two-factor gate — the process
must be started with --debug and DEBUG_TOKEN must be set; miss either and the routes
do not exist at all (requests fall through to a generic 404). Nothing under /debug/* is on
the gateway allowlist, so it is reachable only on the backend origin itself. The only rule for
running it is to keep it off: leave --debug out of the start command and leave DEBUG_TOKEN
unset. If you do turn it on for a one-off diagnosis, configure the chat allowlist first — with
an empty allowlist the test send is not restricted to any chat. See
docs/deployment.md §2.1.
4. Security boundary, in one sentence
All state lives in Redis; the process reads only two environment variables and writes nothing to disk.
One corollary matters for setup: the SPA admin credential — and therefore the bootstrap
trust root — is CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY itself, the single 32-byte hex value you supply at
startup. It is only compared in constant time, and is never echoed, logged, or stored. The
Redis ACL password, if you have one, authenticates the Redis connection alone and is not
the credential for any HTTP endpoint.
5. Where to read more
| Document | What it answers |
|---|---|
docs/design.md |
Why the system is shaped this way: data flow, JMAP semantics, Redis streams, AI consent rules |
docs/deployment.md |
How to deploy: Dockerfile, secrets, Redis hosting, webhook/push/reconcile routing, multi-instance load balancing |
docs/reference.md |
Single source of truth for verifiable facts — Redis keys and TTLs, error codes, routes, environment layers, budgets |
docs/opengaps.md |
Gaps, blockers and the next phase |
docs/retired.md |
What was tried and dropped — abandoned routes, unreleased designs, and names that never existed |
docs/charter.md |
Project charter: goals, locked technology choices, security invariants, prohibitions, and the stable-ID registry |
AGENTS.md |
Language-agnostic engineering norms: code style, config and secrets, build environment, testing gates, document governance |
Facts that matter are traceable. If two documents disagree, docs/reference.md wins.