MessageWeave/docs/reference.md

# MessageWeave — Reference

> **This file is the single source of truth for verifiable facts.**
> When any other document disagrees with this one, this one wins.
>
> **Verified against commit `b70d188`.** Line numbers in this file were read from that
> commit with the working tree clean.
>
> **Maintenance responsibility.** Any change to the public API of `src/config.rs`,
> `src/state.rs`, `src/worker.rs`, or `src/notify.rs`, or to **any Redis key name or TTL**,
> must update this file in the same change. Reviewers: reject a change that touches those
> files without touching this one.

Conventions used throughout:

- **TTL** is in seconds. "No EX" means the key never expires and lives until explicitly deleted.
- **Writer / Reader** name the code symbol that performs the operation; the line number is
  an annotation for fast navigation, not an identity.
- Only this file carries line numbers. All other documents reference symbols by name.

---

## 1. Redis keys

### 1.1 Configuration

| Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
|---|---|---|---|
| `config:business` | No EX | `set_business_config` (state.rs:576, key at state.rs:580); first-time write via `SET NX` in `initialize_business_config` (state.rs:591) | `get_business_config` (state.rs:565) |
| `config:business:revision` | No EX | atomic `INCR` on every config write (state.rs:584); `SET 1 NX` on first-time init (state.rs:604) | `business_config_revision` (state.rs:639) |
| `config:outbound` | No EX | `set_outbound_config` (state.rs:552) | `get_outbound_config` (state.rs:536) |
| `config:enabled` | No EX | `set_enabled` (state.rs:657) | `is_enabled` (state.rs:648) |
| `config:admin_session` | EX 900 | `put_admin_session` (state.rs:614, key at state.rs:617) | `admin_session_valid` (state.rs:626); cleared by `revoke_admin_session` (state.rs:635) |

Notes:

- `config:business:revision` is an **atomic Redis `INCR`**, not a read-modify-write. Every
  request-bearing entry point calls `refresh_business_config` (notify.rs:717), which only
  rebuilds the worker when the remote revision exceeds the cached local value
  (notify.rs:722-724) — that guard is what keeps a stale or malformed snapshot from turning
  into a rebuild loop.
- `config:admin_session` carries no TTL metadata beyond the literal `EX 900` passed at write
  time; the handler reports the same window in its response body as `expires_in: 900`
  (notify.rs:787).
- `config:enabled` is consulted as a gate; missing or `false` keeps business processing off.

### 1.2 AI consent

| Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
|---|---|---|---|
| `consent:ai:{chat_id}` | EX 3600 / 86_400 / 604_800 / 31_536_000 | `set_ai_consent` (state.rs:504; key at state.rs:506, `EX` at state.rs:511) | `ai_consent_until` (state.rs:518); cleared by `clear_ai_consent` (state.rs:527) |

The stored value is an **absolute Unix expiry timestamp**, not a duration; the key's `EX`
carries the same duration, so the key removes itself (state.rs:508-513).

Trigger words are exact Chinese literals with **no English aliases** — the in-app help text
enforces this itself (`worker.rs:613`):

| Input | TTL | Label |
|---|---|---|
| `/ai on`, `临时一次`, `临时`, `一次` | 3600 | `1小时` |
| `今天` | 86_400 | `今天` |
| `7天` | 604_800 | `7天` |
| `直到我撤销`, `长期` | 31_536_000 (365 d) | `直到我撤销` |
| `/ai off`, `关闭 ai`, `撤销授权`, `停止摘要` | — | revoke |

`1小时` is a **category label, not a trigger word**: typing `1小时` alone grants nothing.
Consent never auto-renews.

The same `parse_intent` (worker.rs:522, `Intent` at worker.rs:504) routes `/search <关键词>`
and the Chinese prefixes `搜索`, `查找`, `检索` (prefix-matched only, never a substring) to
`Intent::Search`. Search grants no consent and writes no Redis key.

### 1.3 Delivery pipeline

| Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
|---|---|---|---|
| `stalwart:jmap`, `stalwart:telegram` | Stream, no EX | `State::enqueue` (state.rs:282, `XADD` at state.rs:284); call sites notify.rs:203 (TG webhook) and notify.rs:859 (JMAP push); reconcile path via `claim_dedup_and_enqueue` (worker.rs:373) | `read_batch` over consumer group `stalwart-workers`, consumer `http-worker` (notify.rs:360, :428) |
| `delivery:inflight:{stream}:{id}` | EX 60 | key built at notify.rs:395, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:396 | `release_dedup` on completion (notify.rs:409, 416, 425) |
| `delivery:committed:{stream}:{id}` | EX 604_800 | key built at notify.rs:374, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:408 | `dedup_exists` before send (notify.rs:375) |
| `retry:{stream}:{id}` | EX 86_400 | `retry_or_dlq` Lua script (key state.rs:480, `INCR` state.rs:484, `EXPIRE` state.rs:485) | reclaim path |
| `stalwart:jmap:dlq`, `stalwart:telegram:dlq` | Stream, no EX | Lua `XADD` at state.rs:487; name built at notify.rs:428 (`max_attempts` 3, same call) | **nothing in code reads it** |

There is no `delivery:pending:{stream}` key — "pending" refers to the Redis Streams
pending-entries list (PEL), which Redis maintains internally.
The stream names above are concrete: `stalwart:jmap` and `stalwart:telegram`;
`{stream}` in the remaining keys is one of these two.
The mistake is recorded in `docs/retired.md`.

Delivery is at-most-once per event: the `delivery:inflight` key is claimed with a 60 s window
before the outbound send, and `delivery:committed` extends the guarantee to seven days after
acknowledgement.

The DLQ is **append-and-ack**: the same Lua script that appends to `stalwart:jmap:dlq` /
`stalwart:telegram:dlq` also `XACK`s the message out of the source stream, so increment, DLQ
append and source acknowledgement are atomic (state.rs:484-488). No code path reads the DLQ
back — replay is an operator action, not a service feature.

### 1.4 Idempotency and rate limits

| Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
|---|---|---|---|
| `dedup:tg:{update_id}` | EX 86_400 | key at notify.rs:198, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:199, `release_dedup` at :208 | — |
| `dedup:jmap:{account}:{email}` | EX 86_400 | key at notify.rs:854, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:855, `release_dedup` at :864; same key rebuilt at worker.rs:360 and claimed with `claim_dedup_and_enqueue` at worker.rs:373 | — |
| `ratelimit:push-verify:{subscription}` | EX 30 | key at notify.rs:815, `claim_dedup` at notify.rs:816 (`push_verify_rate_limited` at :819) | — |
| `state:jmap:since` | **No EX** | `set_reconcile_state` (state.rs:675; key at state.rs:678, `SET` without `EX`) | `get_reconcile_state` (state.rs:667) |

`state:jmap:since` is the only state key that survives indefinitely without an explicit
delete, by design: it is the reconciliation cursor, and expiring it would force a full
re-baseline on the next restart.

### 1.5 Locks

| Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
|---|---|---|---|
| `lock:reconcile` | 300 | `acquire_lock` (notify.rs:239) | `renew_lock` heartbeat 90 (notify.rs:252) |
| `lock:push-register:{sha256(callback_url)}` | 360 | `acquire_lock` (notify.rs:906) | `release_lock` (notify.rs:922, 937, 950, 967, 984, 994) |

**Why the registration lock is 360 s and not 300 s.** The lock must outlive the longest
configured JMAP request timeout (300 s), otherwise a slow registration could admit a
duplicate. Source comment, notify.rs:904-905:

> The lock must outlive the configured 300s maximum JMAP request timeout; this prevents a
> slow create from admitting a duplicate.

### 1.6 Push subscription state

| Key | TTL | Writer | Reader |
|---|---|---|---|
| `push:subscription:{id}` | EX 300 (caller-supplied, min 1) | `remember_push_subscription` (state.rs:685, called at notify.rs:833) | `push_subscription_verified` (state.rs:702) |
| `push:subscription:id` | No EX | `remember_push_subscription_id` (state.rs:715) | current-subscription lookup |
| `push:subscription:{id}:status` | 900 / 300 / 86_400 (min 1 enforced) | `set_push_subscription_status` (state.rs:725, key at state.rs:733); pending at notify.rs:960, verified at notify.rs:845, disabled at notify.rs:1031 | **none** |
| `push:registration:{sha256(callback_url)}` | EX 604_800 | `remember_push_subscription_for_callback` (state.rs:778, key at state.rs:785, `EX` at state.rs:787; called at notify.rs:977) | `get_push_subscription_for_callback` (state.rs:767); removed by `remove_push_subscription_for_callback` (state.rs:794) |
| `push:orphan:{subscription_id}` | EX 604_800 | `record_push_orphan` (state.rs:751) | orphan sweep |

**Two distinct keys that are frequently confused. Read this before editing either.**

- `push:registration:{sha256(callback_url)}` is a **mapping from callback URL to
  subscription id**, TTL seven days. It is not a lock.
- `lock:push-register:{sha256(callback_url)}` is the **single-flight registration lock**,
  TTL 360 s. It is not a mapping.

They use the same digest but are separate keys with unrelated lifetimes and purposes.

**Annotation: `push:subscription:{id}:status` is write-only by design.**
The source carries an explicit note at state.rs:210:

> `push:subscription:{id}:status` is currently write-only

It is an ops / observability trail intended for `redis-cli` inspection; it is **not** a gate
and nothing reads it for authorization. The three values ever written are `pending` (900 s),
`verified` (300 s) and `disabled` (86400 s) — see the table above for their call sites.
Do not infer correctness from its presence.

---

## 2. Error envelope

Every error response uses one envelope shape:

```json
{ "error": { "code": "<machine_code>", "message": "<human readable>" } }
```

| Status | Code | Retry-After |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | `invalid_request`, `missing` | — |
| 401 | `unauthorized` | — |
| 403 | `forbidden` | — |
| 409 | `conflict` | — |
| 422 | `invalid_configuration` | — |
| 500 | `internal_error` | — |
| 503 | `service_unavailable`, `disabled`, `push_subscription_not_found`, `push_verify_rate_limited`, `push_state_unavailable`, `push_destroy_failed` | `30` when retryable, or always for the push register/disable failures |

`Retry-After` has two emission sites, both in `notify.rs`, and the value is always the literal
string `"30"`:

- `error_response` (`notify.rs:320-328`, inserted at `:324`) sets it **only when its `retry`
  flag is true**. The readiness failure path (`notify.rs:161`) passes `retry = true`, so `/ready`
  is covered by that rule rather than by a special case.
- `error_response_with_id` (`notify.rs:1087-1093`, inserted at `:1090`) sets it
  **unconditionally**. It is used only for the push register/disable failures
  `push_state_unavailable` and `push_destroy_failed` (`notify.rs:952`, `:969`, `:986`,
  `:1023`), which are always `503`.

`GET /api/status` is the exception that reports setup state with a non-envelope body.

---

## 3. Backend routes

All registered in `router_with_worker_state_runtime_bootstrap_config` (notify.rs:1275), with the routes wired at `notify.rs:1304-1318`.

| Method | Path | Handler |
|---|---|---|
| POST | `/webhook/tg` | `telegram_webhook` |
| POST | `/push/jmap` | `jmap_push` |
| POST | `/api/push/register` | `register_push` |
| POST | `/api/push/disable` | `disable_push` |
| POST | `/reconcile` | `reconcile` |
| POST | `/worker` | `worker` |
| GET, PUT | `/api/config` | `get_config` / `put_config` |
| GET, PUT | `/api/enabled` | `get_enabled` / `put_enabled` |
| PUT | `/api/business-config` | `put_business_config` |
| POST | `/api/bootstrap` | `bootstrap` |
| POST | `/api/admin/session/revoke` | `revoke_admin_session` |
| POST | `/api/admin/session` | `create_admin_session` |
| GET | `/healthz` | `healthz` |
| GET | `/ready` | `ready` |
| GET | `/api/status` | `setup_status` |
| GET | `/`, `/assets/config.js`, `/assets/styles.css` | `index` / `web_config` |

The remote-debug surface (`src/debug.rs:72-80`) is merged **only when the process is started
with `--debug` and `DEBUG_TOKEN` is non-empty** (`SAF-DEBUG-GATE`, `src/main.rs:96-100`,
`src/notify.rs:1320-1321`); otherwise none of these routes exist and requests fall through to
axum's generic `404`, not a 401. All seven require `Authorization: Bearer <DEBUG_TOKEN>`,
checked by `debug_authorized` (`src/debug.rs:45`), which delegates to the production
`worker_authorized` so the comparison is constant time (`src/notify.rs:1135`).

| Method | Path | Handler |
|---|---|---|
| GET | `/debug/ping` | `debug_ping` |
| GET | `/debug/config` | `debug_config` |
| GET | `/debug/redis` | `debug_redis` |
| GET | `/debug/jmap` | `debug_jmap` |
| GET | `/debug/telegram` | `debug_telegram` |
| GET | `/debug/worker` | `debug_worker` |
| POST | `/debug/notify` | `debug_notify` |

Response conventions:

- `GET /healthz` returns **200 unconditionally**. It is a liveness probe and must not be
  used to decide whether to route traffic.
- `GET /ready` returns **503** when configuration, Redis, or an upstream probe is not ready,
  and carries `Retry-After: 30` for not-ready responses. It checks four things: config
  completeness (`setup_missing` empty), Redis reachability, and two upstream probes —
  `GET {jmap_origin}/.well-known/jmap` with the configured Basic credentials, and
  `GET https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/getMe`. Both probes share `PROBE_TIMEOUT` = 3000ms
  (`notify.rs:73`) and run **in parallel** (`tokio::join!`, `notify.rs:147`), so the worst case
  is a single timeout, about 3s. On success the body is a report whose `jmap`/`telegram` fields
  are real probe results. The probes are plain reusable functions (`probe_jmap_session`,
  `probe_telegram_get_me`) also used by the remote-debug path, so they must not be duplicated.
  The JMAP probe deliberately authenticates against the *normalized origin*: probing the raw
  session URL unauthenticated would report not-ready forever and make ingress stop routing.
- `GET /api/status` returns **503** with body `{"status":"configuration-setup","missing":[...]}`
  when a required environment variable is absent.
- `/debug/*` returns **503** in exactly one place: `POST /debug/notify` when the business
  config is not loaded or there is no outbound client — `service_unavailable` with
  `Retry-After: 30` (`src/debug.rs:56-58`). The three probe endpoints instead report failure
  **inside a 200 body** (`{"ok":false,"detail":...}`), so an unreachable upstream never looks
  like an outage. `POST /debug/notify` also returns `403 chat_not_allowed` when the chat is
  outside a *non-empty* allowlist (`src/debug.rs:232-235`) and `502 telegram_send_failed` on
  a send failure (`src/debug.rs:64-66`).
- Static assets are served with a strict CSP; see §7.

---

## 4. Gateway vs backend route matrix

> **Independently verified.** Source: `cloudflare-worker/src/backends.js` `SAFE_ROUTES`
> (backends.js:9-24), 14 entries, alongside `ROUTE_METHODS` (index.js:45-60)
> which fixes one method set per path. The worker entry point is `src/index.js`
> (wrangler.toml:20); `src/lb.js` performs forwarding and bounded failover (`SAF-LB-PASSTHRU`,
> `C-NO-LONG-CONN`).

The gate is **unconditional and fail-closed**. The worker reads no configuration switches at
all: a path missing from `SAFE_ROUTES` returns **404** (index.js:77-78), a registered
path with the wrong method returns **405** (index.js:80-83), and a missing or unparseable
backend pool returns **503** rather than passing the request through (index.js:85-93).

**Forwarded by the worker (14):**

`/` · `/assets/config.js` · `/assets/styles.css` · `/api/status` · `/api/config` ·
`/api/business-config` · `/api/admin/session` · `/api/admin/session/revoke` ·
`/webhook/tg` · `/push/jmap` · `/api/push/register` · `/api/push/disable` · `/reconcile` ·
`/ready`

**Registered on the backend but NOT forwarded (5):**

| Path | Why it is absent from the gateway |
|---|---|
| `GET, PUT /api/enabled` | Internal operational switch, not exposed through the public gateway |
| `POST /api/bootstrap` | One-shot trust bootstrap; kept off the public path |
| `POST /worker` | Operator-invoked worker trigger (Bearer-auth'd, `notify.rs:330`); not part of the public gateway path |
| `GET /healthz` | Liveness is aggregated by the gateway itself |
| `/debug/*` (7 routes) | Opt-in remote-debug surface (`SAF-DEBUG-GATE`); absent from `SAFE_ROUTES`, so it is reachable **only** by talking to the backend origin directly |

Consequence: none of the five carries external business traffic, so no second ingress is
needed in front of the backend instances. The SPA's first-boot flow still cannot drive
`/api/bootstrap` through the worker — bootstrap must be performed against the backend origin
directly, or the bootstrap path must be added to the gateway allowlist.

`POST /api/push/register` and `POST /api/push/disable` **are** forwarded. Both are safe to
proxy: the callback URL is supplied by the client in the request body (`notify.rs:874`,
validated as a URL at :891), and every push subscription record is written to and read back
from the shared Redis (`lock:push-register:{sha256(url)}`, `get_push_subscription_for_callback`
at `notify.rs:917`), so it does not matter which backend instance the worker picks. Push
registration therefore no longer requires hitting a specific backend address — see
deployment.md §10.5.

---

## 5. Environment variables

Three distinct layers. They are not interchangeable.

### 5.1 Boot-time (2 required, 2 optional with defaults)

| Variable | Required | Default | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| `REDIS_URL` | yes | — | read at main.rs:40 |
| `CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | yes | — | `encryption_key_from_env` at main.rs:50 |
| `PORT` | no | `8080` | `unwrap_or(8080_u16)` at main.rs:34 |
| `RUN_MODE` | no | `webhook` | `unwrap_or_else` at config.rs:338 |

`RUN_MODE` accepts only `webhook` or `reconcile`; anything else is rejected at boot
(main.rs:78-81). Both modes currently route to the same no-op router; the distinction is
load-bearing for future splits, not for behaviour today. Note the value is only read on
the legacy env path (`config.rs:338`), so with the current two-variable production config
it always resolves to the hardcoded default — setting it to `reconcile` has no effect.

**Missing a required variable does not crash the process.** It logs a warning and serves
`router_configuration_setup`, which builds a router over `MemoryState` with empty tokens and
a `NoopWorker` (worker.rs:142-144). The container stays up and answers requests while doing
no business work. This is a deliberate fail-closed-to-setup posture, and it is the single
most likely cause of "the container is healthy but nothing happens".

### 5.2 Redis-resident business configuration

Written by the SPA through `PUT /api/business-config` (effective within 1 s); the first
successful write creates the configuration, later writes hot-reload it. The same write is
also exposed as a one-shot `POST /api/bootstrap` against the backend origin for automation.
The process never reads these from the environment in normal operation.

### 5.3 Legacy compatibility (read but not required)

`config.rs` still reads an environment-shaped business configuration for backward
compatibility. Recognised names, unprefixed unless noted:

`BOT_TOKEN` · `CHAT_ALLOWLIST` · `TG_WEBHOOK_SECRET` · `TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID` ·
`JMAP_*` · `RECONCILE_TOKEN`

The single prefixed name is `TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID`. Anything else documented as
`TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN` or similar is a documentation error, not a supported variable.

**Trust root.** The SPA admin credential is `CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY` itself: read at startup
(main.rs:49) and held as `admin_token` (main.rs:92), it is checked in constant time by
`worker_authorized` (notify.rs:445; compare at notify.rs:1135) at the top of both
`POST /api/bootstrap` (notify.rs:604) and `POST /api/admin/session` (notify.rs:774). It is
only compared against the request bearer — never echoed, logged, or stored. The session
issued by `/api/admin/session` is a freshly generated random 32-byte hex token
(notify.rs:778-787), never the credential; only its digest is retained in Redis under
`config:admin_session`. `REDIS_URL` is the Redis connection string alone: an ACL password in
it, if any, authenticates the Redis connection and is not the credential for any HTTP
endpoint.

---

## 6. Outbound and runtime parameters

### 6.1 Outbound

| Parameter | Default | Range / cap | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| `jmap_timeout_ms` | 15_000 | 100..=300_000 | default state.rs:55; validated notify.rs:491 |
| `telegram_timeout_ms` | 10_000 | 100..=300_000 | default state.rs:56; validated notify.rs:492 |
| `llm_timeout_ms` | 30_000 | 100..=300_000 | default state.rs:57; validated notify.rs:493 |
| `max_retries` | 3 | hard cap 5 | default state.rs:58; rejected at notify.rs:494; re-clamped at channel.rs:138 |

There is **no** `LLM_MAX_RETRIES` environment variable; retry count lives in
`config:outbound` and is bounded at 5 regardless of what is written.

### 6.2 Reconcile budgets

| Constant | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| `MAX_BASELINE_PAGES` | 100 | worker.rs:248 |
| `MAX_BASELINE_EMAILS` | 10_000 | worker.rs:249 |
| `RECONCILE_BUDGET` | 20 s | worker.rs:250 |
| `CHANGE_WINDOW_CAP` | 4_096 | worker.rs:306 |
| Lock TTL / heartbeat | 300 s / 90 s | notify.rs:239 / 252 |

`max_changes` is a function parameter, not a constant.

### 6.3 Idle threshold

XAUTOCLAIM's idle threshold is derived from the live outbound config (state.rs:98):

```
count × (max_retries + 1) × (jmap_timeout_ms + telegram_timeout_ms + llm_timeout_ms) × 2
```

floored at the legacy 300 s single-event ceiling (state.rs:65) and capped at 6 h
(state.rs:75). The floor is also the fallback when the config cannot be read, so a
Redis hiccup never collapses the window. Only duplicate-on-multi-instance is at
stake, never loss.

### 6.4 Search limits

| Constant | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| `SEARCH_LIMIT` | 10 | worker.rs:618 |
| `SEARCH_SUBJECT_MAX` | 120 chars | worker.rs:620 |
| `SEARCH_PREVIEW_MAX` | 160 chars | worker.rs:622 |

---

## 7. Static assets and response headers

Served from `src/web.rs`.

- Three routes only: `GET /`, `GET /assets/config.js`, `GET /assets/styles.css` (web.rs:21-23).
  Everything else returns 404.
- Assets are embedded at compile time with `include_str!` (web.rs:15-17). There is no
  filesystem access at runtime.
- Every response carries `Content-Type`, `Cache-Control: no-store`,
  `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` (web.rs:43-51).
- CSP is applied **only to the HTML document**: the constant is at web.rs:39, inserted inside
  an `if html` block (web.rs:53-58):

  ```
  default-src 'none'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; connect-src 'self';
  form-action 'self'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'
  ```

- `X-Frame-Options: DENY` is set alongside the CSP, on the HTML response only (web.rs:58).

`default-src 'none'` is deliberately stricter than `'self'`: the page is closed by default
and only `script-src`, `style-src` and `connect-src` re-open a same-origin channel.

---

## 8. Not implemented

Recorded here so that references elsewhere cannot be mistaken for shipped features.

- `/search` **is** implemented (`bfe0fd8`, `worker.rs` / `jmap_service.rs`). What is *not*
  possible: **body-level** snippets. jmap-client `0.4.2` only exposes `emailId`/`subject`/
  `preview` from `SearchSnippet/get`, and its `Filter` type has no comparator syntax, so
  per-part body highlight cannot be modelled through the locked crate. Search degrades to
  `subject`/`preview` highlights plus a pure-ID list when snippets are unsupported. Design
  note in `docs/design.md` §5.7.
- The Cloudflare Worker contains no Rust: `cloudflare-worker/src/` holds only `index.js`,
  `lb.js`, `backends.js` and `health.js`. Any `*.rs` path written under `cloudflare-worker/`
  is a documentation error, not a source file.

---

## References

External dependencies, all reachable and returning HTTP 200 at the time of verification:

- axum — https://docs.rs/axum
- redis (Rust crate, 0.27) — https://docs.rs/redis/0.27/redis/
- reqwest (Rust crate, 0.13) — https://docs.rs/reqwest/0.13/reqwest/
- jmap-client (0.4.2) — https://docs.rs/jmap-client/0.4.2
- JMAP specification — https://jmap.io/spec/
- JMAP RFC 8620 — https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8620/
- Redis Streams — https://redis.io/docs/latest/develop/data-types/streams/
- Redis persistence — https://redis.io/docs/latest/operate/oss_and_stack/management/persistence/
- Cloudflare Workers — https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/
- Cloudflare Workers runtime APIs — https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/runtime-apis/
- RFC 8030 (Web Push) — https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8030
- RFC 7231 §7.2.3 — https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7231#section-7.2.3
- Dockerfile reference — https://docs.docker.com/reference/dockerfile/
- rust Docker image — https://hub.docker.com/_/rust
- Uptime Kuma — https://uptime.kuma.pet/
- OWASP Logging Cheat Sheet — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Logging_Cheat_Sheet.html

Not linked because they do not resolve to documentation: `crates.io/crates/jmap-client`
(404) and `platform.openai.com` documentation paths (403). The project describes the LLM
dependency as OpenAI-compatible and documents it through `reqwest` instead.